Hill v. Eaton & Smith

10 Citing cases

  1. Holliday v. Miles, Inc.

    266 Cal.App.2d 396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 6 times

    That duty has been said to be greater than that owed by a business invitor to his invitee. ( Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11, 13 [ 149 P.2d 762].) "Since plaintiff was the employee of the subcontractor, his relationship to the contractor was that of a business visitor or invitee.

  2. Biondini v. Amship Corp.

    81 Cal.App.2d 751 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947)   Cited 49 times
    Referring to scaffolding as "appliances"

    There is no doubt that with respect to the ship at large, plaintiff, as an employee of a subcontractor, was a business visitor and invitee of the general contractor, Amship. ( Dingman v. A.F. Mattock Co., 15 Cal.2d 622 [ 104 P.2d 26]; Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11 [ 149 P.2d 762]; Leenders v. California Hawaiian etc. Corp., 59 Cal.App.2d 752 [ 139 P.2d 987].) Of course, the fact that plaintiff was an invitee of this defendant as to the use of the deck is not determinative of the question as to whether he was impliedly invited to use the scaffold. [3] A person may be an invitee as to one portion of the premises and a mere licensee or even a trespasser as to others, but the question as to the extent of the invitation is usually one for the jury and not for the court. [4] The true rule is stated in Gastine v. Ewing, 65 Cal.App.2d 131, at page 140 [ 150 P.2d 266], as follows: "It is true . . . that one may be an invitee to a certain portion of the premises and a licensee or trespasser as to other portions. . . . The question as to whether the invitation, express or implied, included that part of the premises where the injury occurred is generally not one of law.

  3. Pauly v. King

    44 Cal.2d 649 (Cal. 1955)   Cited 46 times
    Holding that a landowner "'is not liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or should have been observed in the exercise of reasonable care.'"

    [1] An employee of a subcontractor occupies the relationship of an invitee to the main contractor. ( Dingman v. A.F. MattockCo., 15 Cal.2d 622, 624 [ 104 P.2d 26]; Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11, 13 [ 149 P.2d 762].) [2] "The applicable general principle is that the owner of the property, insofar as an invitee is concerned, is not an insurer of safety but must use reasonable care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition and give warning of latent or concealed perils.

  4. Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course

    273 Cal.App.2d 20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 53 times
    In Beauchamp, the plaintiff slipped and fell while walking in golf shoes with half-worn spikes across the defendant's veranda, a rough, troweled concrete surface, even though she knew that her footing would not be as stable as it would have been on grass. 273 Cal. App. 2d at 23-24.

    And "the question whether the facts disclose a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant is in the first instance a question of law for the court." ( O'Keefe v. South End Rowing Club, 64 Cal.2d 729, 749 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 534, 414 P.2d 830, 16 A.L.R.3d 1]; Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11, 14 [ 149 P.2d 762]; Carroll v. Central Counties Gas Co., 74 Cal.App. 303, 308 [ 240 P. 53], quoting from Pacheco v. Judson Mfg. Co., 113 Cal. 541, 545 [45 P. 833]; Palmer v. Crafts, supra, 16 Cal.App.2d 370, 374, 375.) (2) But the principle likewise can be characterized as assumption of risk.

  5. Decker v. S.H. Kress Co.

    168 Cal.App.2d 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 7 times
    In Decker v. S.H. Kress Co. (1959) 168 Cal.App.2d 365 [ 335 P.2d 952, 337 P.2d 163], Labor Code section 6400, relating to the employer's duty to furnish a safe place of employment, was held not applicable to create liability where the employee, in the employer's absence, not only knew of the dangerous condition but actually created it himself and therefore could have protected himself from the danger.

    [3] Many of the cases add the obvious corollary that where the condition which results in injury to the invitee is actually as well known to the invitee as to the property owner no liability arises. ( Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Assn., 211 Cal. 556, 561 [ 296 P. 76]; Mawhiney v. Signal Trucking Co., 132 Cal.App.2d 809, 813 [ 283 P.2d 27]; Markwell v. Swift Co., 126 Cal.App.2d 245, 251 [ 272 P.2d 47]; Delk v. Mobilhomes, Inc., 118 Cal.App.2d 529, 532-533 [ 258 P.2d 75]; Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11, 13-14 [ 149 P.2d 762]; Walker v. Greenberger, 63 Cal.App.2d 457, 462 [ 147 P.2d 105]; Funari v. Gravem-Inglis Baking Co., 40 Cal.App.2d 25, 29 [ 104 P.2d 44]; Vitrano v. Westgate Sea Products Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 462, 465 [ 93 P.2d 832].) [4] In Mautino v. Sutter Hospital Assn., supra, 211 Cal. at page 561 the court said: "The true ground of liability is the proprietor's superior knowledge of the perilous instrumentality . . . It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not to the person injured that a recovery is permitted . . . There is no liability for injuries from the dangers that are obvious, or as well known to the person injured as to the owner or occupant."

  6. Slovick v. James I. Barnes Constr. Co.

    142 Cal.App.2d 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956)   Cited 31 times
    In Slovick v. James I. Barns Constr. Co. (1956) 142 Cal.App.2d 618 [ 298 P.2d 923], a contractor was found to have negligently constructed a catwalk which collapsed when the plaintiff walked upon it.

    [17] Complaint is made of the giving of instructions concerning certain industrial safety orders which cover the matter of construction of catwalks, scaffolds, and the like. The claim is that this is error per se, reliance being placed on Hard v. Hollywood Turf Club, 112 Cal.App.2d 263 [ 246 P.2d 716], and Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11 [ 149 P.2d 762]. Each of those cases turned upon the legal conclusion that the statute (in the Hard case) or the safety order (in Hill) was not provided for the protection of a class to which plaintiff belonged.

  7. Billeter v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd.

    104 Cal.App.2d 137 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951)   Cited 17 times

    If he was contributively negligent he may not recover. ( Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11 [ 149 P.2d 762]; Miller v. Pacific Constructors, Inc., 68 Cal.App.2d 529 [ 157 P.2d 57].) [7] The test is whether the invitee acted as a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances. In the present case contributory negligence was pleaded by respondents.

  8. Barrett v. Faltico

    117 F. Supp. 95 (E.D. Wash. 1953)   Cited 1 times

    The owner or occupant is not required to reconstruct or alter the premises so as to eliminate known and obvious dangers, nor is he liable for injury to an invitee resulting from a danger which was obvious or reasonably apparent, or such as should have been observed in the exercise of ordinary care. Caron v. Grays Harbor County, 18 Wn.2d 397, 139 P.2d 626, 148 A.L.R. 626; 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 50, page 541; 38 Am.Jur. 757, Negligence, 97; See also: Walsh v. West Coast Coal Mines, Inc., 31 Wn.2d 396, 197 P.2d 233; Blodgett v. B.H. Dyas Co., 4 Cal.2d 511, 50 P.2d 801; Fraters v. Keeling, 20 Cal.App.2d 490, 67 P.2d 118; Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11, 149 P.2d 762; King v. Griffith Co., 65 Cal.App.2d 114, 150 P.2d 8; City of Tulsa v. Harman, 148 Okla. 117, 299 P. 462. The foregoing principles have been applied by the Courts to invitee patrons in baseball parks.

  9. Srader v. Pecos Construction Company

    71 N.M. 320 (N.M. 1963)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that "ordinances enacted under the police power of a municipality for the protection of the public health and safety ... should be liberally construed"

    Since a violation of a statute or ordinance has been held to be negligence per se, McLain v. Haley, supra, in order for the ordinance to be relevant to the question of actionable negligence, the act or omission complained of must have involved an actual violation of the ordinance. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 19, p. 422; Hill v. Eaton Smith, 65 Cal.App.2d 11, 149 P.2d 762. On its face, this section of the ordinance would seem to refer only to openings in floors and be inapplicable to the instant case.

  10. Hotels El Rancho, Inc. v. Pray

    187 P.2d 568 (Nev. 1947)   Cited 9 times

    Defendants, in their opening brief, page 10, have cited numerous cases in support of their contention, and we have carefully considered them, and will now refer to some of those authorities. Hill v. Eaton et al., 65 Cal.App.2d 11, 149 P.2d 762, 764, was an action brought by plaintiff therein, a roofer employee of a subcontractor, against a general contractor, for injuries sustained by the plaintiff from falling through an open skylight in the roof of the structure upon which he was working, as such roofer. A judgment of nonsuit was affirmed, upon the ground that "the open skylights were obvious; they were not hidden in any way, and plaintiff was an experienced roofer, fully aware of their existence."