Defendants contend that the 1917 Amendment "prohibits direct explicit and mandatory action by the General Assembly; that it does not prohibit the General Assembly's setting up machinery by which local groups may undertake certain action." They also rely on Harris and particularly cite the following cases: Kornegay v. Goldsboro, 180 N.C. 441, 105 S.E. 187; Huneycutt v. Commissioners, 182 N.C. 319, 109 S.E. 4; Hill v. Commissioners, 190 N.C. 123, 129 S.E. 154; Reed v. Engineering Company, 188 N.C. 39, 123 S.E. 479; Fletcher v. Comrs. of Buncombe, 218 N.C. 1, 9 S.E. 606. The parties find comfort in their respective contentions from language found in the cases relied on by them.
Cf. Matthews v. Blowing Rock, 207 N.C. 450, 177 S.E. 429. It would seem that the acts challenged are only declaratory of, or supplementary to, the powers given the City of Durham under the general law. Hill v. Commissioners, 190 N.C. 123, 129 S.E. 154. In the case of Holton v. Mocksville, supra, the constitutionality of Chapter 86, of the Private Laws of 1923, entitled, "An act relating to the financing of street and sidewalk improvements in the Town of Mocksville," was attacked.
Roebuck v. Trustees, supra. Hailey v. Winston-Salem, 196 N.C. 17, 144 S.E. 377; Hill v. Comrs., 190 N.C. 123, 129 S.E. 154; Advisory Opinion, 227 N.C. 716, relied upon by the Hospital are distinguishable. A local act is one operating only in a specified locality.
We think the contentions of defendants are sustained by a long line of decisions in this jurisdiction, since the passage of the constitutional amendment, section 29, Article II, which was ratified 28 February, 1917, and became effective 10 January, 1917. Brown v. Comrs., 173 N.C. 598; Hill v. Comrs., 190 N.C. 123; S. v. Horne, 191 N.C. 375. See concurring opinion and cases cited in Webb v. Port Commission, 205 N.C. 663, p. 678, et seq.
We think, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the bonds are for a county purpose. It may be noted that the county roads were taken over by the State for maintenance and improvement, and are now maintained and improved by the State. Public Laws 1931, ch. 145. In Hill v. Comrs., 190 N.C. 123, it is held: "A public-local law authorizing the commissioners of a county to take over a specified highway within the county, constituting one of the principal highways within the county, connecting two important State highways, transferring to the said commissioners the bridges of the various townships for their care and supervision, is not violative of Article II, sec. 29, of our Constitution against direct legislation by local, private, or special act, nor the taking of property without the due process of law, Article I, sec. 17; nor the pledging of the county's faith or credit without the approval of the voters, etc., Article VII, sec. 7; nor against the uniformity rule, Art. VII, sec. 9." The third question: It has been held by this Court that roads are necessary expenses.
It was held that there is nothing in the amendment which prohibits the Legislature from authorizing county commissioners to raise money by the issuance of bonds or by current taxation to enable them to carry out the measures necessary for the orderly government of their counties, and in consequence injunctive relief was denied. See, also, Comrs. of Surry v. Trust Co., 178 N.C. 170; Davis v. Lenoir, ibid., 668; Comrs. v. Bank, 181 N.C. 347; Emery v. Comrs, ibid., 420; Hill v. Comrs., 190 N.C. 123. The act construed in Parvin v. Comrs., 177 N.C. 508, was applicable to any county in the State and the proposed tax was intended for all the roads in a county (Public Laws 1917, ch. 284); and in Honeycutt v. Comrs., 182 N.C. 319, it was made to appear that the road commissioners had the control and management of all their public roads and bridges.
Counties have generally been held to be agencies of the state for the performance of functions of the state, and, while necessarily clothed with some corporate powers, to have only such powers as are conferred by statute. Board of Commissioners v. Gates, 83 Ohio St. 19, 93 N.E. 255. In other jurisdictions counties have no power to alien property unless express legislative authority exists therefor.