Opinion
February 4, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court (Lomanto, J.).
In 1974, defendant purchased a one-family house in the Town of Glenville, Schenectady County, where she resided until 1985, when she moved to Arizona. Instead of selling the house, she decided to maintain it as rental property. Thereafter, she made regular visits to this area at least twice a year during which she went to the house to visit her tenants. In 1992, during one of her visits, she observed that the exterior stairway in the rear of the house was in need of repair and hired a contractor to replace the stairs. Notably, there has been a window, unguarded and unprotected, located adjacent to the lower portion of the stairway on the left side prior to and throughout the time defendant has owned the property. In 1994, defendant rented the property to plaintiff's girlfriend. In August of that same year, during a rainstorm and while attempting to ascend the stairway in question to enter the house, plaintiff slipped on the second step and fell to the left into the unguarded window, causing the window to break and resulting in severe injuries to his arm. Plaintiff commenced this action alleging negligence, asserting that his injuries were caused by the dangerous and defective condition about which defendant knew or should have known. During the course of the trial, plaintiff offered evidence that the unprotected window was in violation of the State Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code (hereinafter State building code) which states, in pertinent part, that "[w]indow openings on stairs or landings, and well openings, shall be guarded by railings or other equivalent protection" (9 NYCRR 713.1 [f] [2]). The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and a judgment was entered from which defendant now appeals.
We affirm. "`[A] building owner cannot be liable for injuries caused to a person as a result of a defective condition on the premises unless it can be shown that the owner created the condition or that [the owner] had actual or constructive notice of the condition for such a reasonable period of time that in the exercise of reasonable care, the owner should have corrected it'" ( Parsons v. City of New York, 195 A.D.2d 282, 284, quoting Trujillo v. Riverbay Corp., 153 A.D.2d 793, 794; see, Polipo v. Sanders, 227 A.D.2d 256, 257, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 812). Here, the key question when determining whether defendant could have been held liable for the condition of the stairs was whether defendant had notice of the allegedly dangerous and defective condition. The issue of whether or not defendant had notice that this condition, namely the absence of some form of protection for the window, was a violation of the State building code is irrelevant because "`[i]gnorance of the law does not excuse persons so as to exempt them from the consequences of their acts'" ( National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., 23 N.Y.2d 621, 628, quoting Municipal Metallic Bed Mfg. Corp. v. Dobbs, 253 N.Y. 313, 317). Defendant was well aware that the window which was located directly to the left of the back stairs was unguarded; she had lived in the house for over 10 years and, after moving out, had returned to visit at least twice a year. The existence of the State building code mandate together with notice to defendant of the existence of the proximity of the window to the stairs was all the proof needed for plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. Therefore, under the facts in this case, defendant could properly be held liable for injuries resulting from the unprotected window ( see, Polipo v. Sanders, supra, at 257; Parsons v. City of New York, supra, at 284).
Next, we reject defendant's contention that Supreme Court improperly instructed the jury with regard to the State building code. During defense counsel's opening statement, the court, in response to an objection raised by plaintiff's counsel, stated: "Ignorance of the law is no excuse. * * * We are all aware of the statute in the state. That is the law." During its jury charge, the court instructed: "If you find that the defendant violated the code by not protecting the window, you may consider the violation as some evidence of negligence, along with the other evidence in the case provided that such violation was a substantial factor in bringing about the occurrence." Because ignorance of the law does not excuse one from liability ( see, National Conversion Corp. v. Cedar Bldg. Corp., supra, at 628) and a violation of the building code can be considered as some evidence of negligence ( see, Clo v. McDermott, 239 A.D.2d 4, 6), the court's instructions to the jury were proper.
We also conclude that there was sufficient evidence presented at the trial to support the jury's verdict. A jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff will not be set aside unless "`the evidence so preponderated in favor of the [defendant] that the verdict could not have been reached on any fair interpretation of the evidence'" ( Moxley v. Givens, 255 A.D.2d 632, 633 quoting Petrivelli v. Walz, 227 A.D.2d 735). Here, it is undisputed that defendant owned the house and, thus, exercised the mandated control over the premises ( see, Warren v. Wilmorite, Inc., 211 A.D.2d 904, 905). It is also undisputed that defendant hired a contractor to repair the, stairs and, after the stairs were repaired, the adjacent window continued to be unprotected. Plaintiff's expert testified that the unguarded window was in violation of the building code and that, although not a violation of any building code, the handrail on the stairs, which was located on the opposite side of the window, did not meet recognized national standards. The evidence of the building code violation, alone, served as some evidence of negligence on the part of defendant ( see, Clo v. McDermott, supra, at 6). Also, the jury could fairly conclude that the absence of any such protection or guard was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries in that such injuries were sustained as a result of plaintiff's arm going through the window and that defendant had notice of the conditions of the stairs and the area surrounding the stairs. In our view, there was ample credible evidence presented at trial to support a determination that a dangerous condition existed and defendant had the required notice of that condition ( see, Pulley v. McNeal, 240 A.D.2d 913; Walsh v. City School Dist., 237 A.D.2d 811; Warren v. Wilmorite, Inc., supra).
We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
Mikoll, J. P., Crew III, Peters and Graffeo, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.