Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp.

13 Citing cases

  1. Horn v. A.O. Smith Corp.

    50 F.3d 1365 (7th Cir. 1995)   Cited 37 times
    Recognizing that Wehling applied the discovery rule to all Indiana tort claims

    Similar allegations have been made against AOSHPI in a number of federal and state cases. See, e.g., Miles v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 992 F.2d 813 (8th Cir. 1993); Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1992); Estate of Korf v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 917 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1990); Hines v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 880 F.2d 995 (8th Cir. 1989); Agristor Leasing v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 869 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1989); Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1986); Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986); Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1342 (D.Minn. 1995); Veldhuizen v. A.O. Smith Corp., 839 F. Supp. 669 (D.Minn. 1993); This v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 1-91-CV-239, 1993 WL 771013, 1993 U.S.DIST. LEXIS 11846 (W.D.Mich. June 29, 1993); Mohr v. A.O. Smith Corp., No. 88-CV-10043-BC, 1994 WL 178111, 1993 U.S.DIST. LEXIS 19226 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 25, 1993); Nelson v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., No. 86-4230-R, 1990 WL 252135, 1990 U.S.DIST LEXIS 17850 (D.Kan. Dec. 4, 1990); Johnston v. Agristor Credit Corp., No. 84-4421-S, 1987 WL 348509, 1987 U.S.DIST. LEXIS 12871 (D.Kan. Nov. 23, 1987); Agristor Leasing v. Meuli, 634 F. Supp. 1208 (D.Kan. 1986), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1988); Boyd v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 776 P.2d 1125 (Colo.Ct.App. 1989); Buller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 518 N.W.2d 537 (Minn. 1994); First Nat'l Bank of Louisville v. Brooks Farms, 821 S.W.2d 925 (Tenn. 1991).

  2. Carpenter v. J.P. Morgan Sec., LLC

    CASE NO. 4:15CV2584 (N.D. Ohio Jul. 5, 2017)

    A court does not have to accept a plaintiff's bald assertions and conclusory statements as proof of defendant's discrimination. Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 1986); see alsoHartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 1996); Klepper, 916 F.2d at 342. Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that the target customer bases of these branches were different, and more important, that his reassignment (or later denial of transfer) was the result of discriminatory behavior.

  3. Beattie v. Centurytel, Incorporated

    673 F. Supp. 2d 553 (E.D. Mich. 2009)   Cited 7 times

    The Sixth Circuit has held that generally, that "is not a question the trial judge or this court can answer; it is a question for the jury." Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217, 225 (6th Cir. 1986). Other courts have found inquiry notice to exist for claims under the FTA when commercial customers had constructive notice of a violation.

  4. Taggart Taggart v. First Tenn. Bank

    684 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Ark. 1988)   Cited 17 times
    Applying Arkansas law

    And the intent of the parties as expressed in the terms of the agreement determines the scope and extent of a release. Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Tennessee law) (citing Sutton v. First National Bank, 620 S.W.2d 526, 530 (Tenn.App. 1981)). In Hill, the buyers of agricultural feed storage structures had experienced foundation problems with the structures which the dealer was unable to correct.

  5. Charash v. Oberlin College

    14 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 1994)   Cited 73 times
    Holding that a conversion takes place where the converter handled the property and under lex loci delecti, that place's law controls

    Generally, notice, including constructive notice, is an issue of fact, and is normally determined by a jury. See, e.g., Imes v. Touma, 784 F.2d 756, 759 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Whether the plaintiff in this case . . . should have known that the injury was the result of negligence is a fact question which should not have been decided by summary judgment."); Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217, 225 (6th Cir. 1986) ("Whether the Hills should have discovered the problem earlier is not a question the trial judge or this court can answer; it is a question for the jury."). However, this issue can be decided on a summary judgment motion if the movant can show that no issues of material fact exist regarding this issue.

  6. Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle

    967 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1992)   Cited 523 times
    Holding that discovery accrual rule applies to causes of action under Michigan law for fraud

    Of course, if the case proceeds to trial after remand, Harvestore and Smith will be free to present evidence to the jury to prove that West Marion knew or should have known of the alleged misrepresentation prior to October, 1981. See Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986) (indicating that when a plaintiff knew or should have known of a problem is a typically a jury matter). If there is again a conflict in the evidence at trial regarding West Marion's knowledge, then the jury is entitled to resolve that dispute. See Agristor Leasing v. Saylor, 803 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1986).

  7. Rusu v. Corr. Corp. of Am.

    CASE NO. 4:15CV1954 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2016)

    Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1133 (6th Cir. 1986). The Court, however, does not have to accept Plaintiff's bald assertions and conclusory statements as proof of Defendant's discrimination. Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217, 222 (6th Cir. 1986); see alsoHartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 1996); Klepper, 916 F.2d at 342. Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence other than Plaintiff Susan Rusu's own conclusions about other officers' behavior.

  8. In re New England Compounding Pharmacy, Inc.

    MDL NO. 13-02419-RWZ (D. Mass. Aug. 29, 2014)   1 Legal Analyses

    1975). See also Hill v. A.O. Smith Corp., 801 F.2d 217, 224 (6th Cir. 1986) (following McCroskey in civil conspiracy case); Blakeney v. Kassel, 1991 WL 87978 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (same). Plaintiffs' position appears to have better support.

  9. In re Johnson

    187 B.R. 598 (E.D. Tenn. 1994)   Cited 5 times
    Stating that a quitclaim deed is a conveyance and the effect is only to convey whatever interest the grantor has in the property

    McQuiddy Printing Co., supra, 23 Tenn.App. at 445, 134 S.W.2d at 204 (citations omitted). Ms. Joyner relies upon such decisions as Hill v. A.O. Smith Corporation, 801 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying Tennessee law), and Little Darlin' Corporation v. Shelby Singleton Productions, Inc., 60 Tenn. App. 530, 448 S.W.2d 447, cert. denied, id. (Tenn. 1969), to argue that the scope of a release depends upon the intent of the releasor, and that a court may receive parol evidence concerning intent or purpose.

  10. Moon v. White

    909 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Tenn. 1993)   Cited 5 times
    Finding that even though ERISA policy failed to specify the consequence of noncompliance with limitation period, "a reasonable person in [plaintiff's] position would understand the proof-of-loss provisions in the two policies in issue to state outside time limits for submitting proofs of loss, and would understand these time limits, like statutes of limitations, to bar claims submitted too late"

    Id. at 138. Furthermore, in Hill v. A.O. Smith Corporation, 801 F.2d 217 (6th Cir. 1986), a decision which this court is bound to follow, the federal court of appeals, following, inter alia, Prescott v. Adams, supra, applied the discovery rule to determine when a claim for damages on a civil conspiracy theory under Tennessee law accrued. On the basis of these authorities, the court must conclude that when Moon's cause of action against White accrued is an issue of fact which is not subject to decision on a motion for summary judgment.