Opinion
Civil No. 01-1132-AS
October 18, 2001
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendants Bob Mink, the State Office for Services to Children and Families and Ramona Foley (collectively the "Defendants") move to dismiss the action filed against them by plaintiff Linda Hilger (aka Linda Fender) ("Plaintiff") for violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ( 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.) ("ADA") and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("Section 504"). Defendants contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a 40-year old women who suffers from multiple mental conditions, including post traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder and major depressive disorder. In addition, she has a low-range IQ, which may limit her ability to comprehend complex or abstract information, and she suffers from ongoing physical pain due to trauma from a severe car accident. Plaintiff receives high doses of pain medication to ease her physical pain which may also affect her psychological functioning. Defendant Bob Minks is the Director of the Oregon Department of Human Resources and Defendant Ramona Foley is the duly appointed administrator of the State Offices of Services to Children and Families (the "State").
The following facts are taken directly from the complaint and are viewed as true for the purposes of this motion:
On January 8, 2000, Plaintiff's daughter, Selena, was admitted to Providence Hospital's psychiatric unit for out-of-control behaviors. She spent four days in the hospital during which her behaviors improved. At a staff discharge meeting, which was attended by a worker from the State, all parties agreed that although Plaintiff had been "consistently nurturing" during her daughter's four-day stay, she appeared to have "inconsistent capacities to thing clearly and articulate clearly during her visits." Because of this concern, the State agreed to provide a voluntary arrangement to supervise Selena's progress and assist Plaintiff to address her own mental health needs.
Plaintiff's daughter was removed from Plaintiff's care on March 1, 2000, when Selena's physician, Dr. Sandra Barton, contacted the State after observing what she considered to be disorganized thinking on Plaintiff's part during Selena's office visit. Plaintiff's purse containing her anti-anxiety medicine had been stolen days earlier. At a preliminary hearing on March 2, 2000, the court noted that if Plaintiff was able to stabilize herself medically, a return of her daughter might be possible, with State oversight. Selena was placed in the first of at least three foster homes. Initially, Plaintiff was allowed supervised visitation with her daughter once a week, which she attended faithfully and with great anticipation. However, due to perceived difficult behavior displayed by Selena immediately prior to and following these visits, the visits were gradually decreased and are currently only twice per month for one hour.
Selena is currently placed in a treatment foster home.
Plaintiff has always cooperated completely with all of the court's and the State's requests. She has been very willing to participate in services and has requested them numerous times. Despite this, Plaintiff has not been offered any reunification services from the State, not even the hands-on parenting training highly recommended by her then treating therapist. Because of lack of effort on the part of the State, Plaintiff's progress has been limited. Based on this limited progress, the State has filed a petition to terminate Plaintiff's parental rights to her daughter.
The petition to terminate Plaintiff's parental rights was filed in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Washington on January 10, 2001. On January 16, 2001, a Washington County judge adopted the service plan proposed by the State, allowing Plaintiff to continue to visit with Selena but relieving the State of it's duty to assist in reunifying efforts. The termination proceeding is currently scheduled for November 7, 2001.
In this action, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that Defendants have violated the ADA and Section 504, an injunction requiring Defendants to provide her with reunification services, and damages, attorney fees and costs. Defendants argue that this court lack subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy; that the court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction based on Younger and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; that Plaintiff's request for an injunction is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act and by judicial immunity and that her request for damages is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; and that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under Section 1983.
DISCUSSION
Defendants maintain that I should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) because of the ongoing state custody proceedings. "Younger and its progeny espouse a strong federal policy against federal-court interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances." Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Younger abstention is required where: (1) state proceedings are ongoing; (2) that implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal questions. Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432; Polykoff v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1332 (9th Cir. 1987); Fresh Int'l v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1986). Although Younger concerned criminal proceedings, the doctrine applies equally to civil matters and is not limited to a request to enjoin the state proceeding itself. See Kitchens v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1337, 1341 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988). "When a case falls within the proscription of Younger, a district court must dismiss the federal action." Fresh Int'l, 805 F.2d at 1356.
Ongoing State Proceeding
This requirement is satisfied if the state proceedings were initiated before any federal "`proceedings of substance on the merits.'" Fresh Int'l, 805 F.2d at 1358 (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975)). There is no dispute that the state proceedings addressing Plaintiff's parental rights were initiated before this action and are ongoing.
Important State Interests
To decide whether the state has a "substantial, legitimate interest in a dispute," courts should focus on "the importance of the generic proceedings to the state," rather than the narrow outcome of the case at issue. New Orleans Public Serv. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989). A state has a strong and valid interest in protecting the children of the state through child custody procedures and hearings. Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979).
Opportunity to Raise Federal Claims
The relevant inquiry in deciding this question is whether the state proceedings afford Plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise her constitutional claims. Id. at 432. "When a litigant has not attempted to present her federal claims in related state court proceedings, a federal court should assume that state proceedings will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary." Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987) (citing Moore, 442 U.S. at 432). Plaintiff has not raised her ADA or Section 504 claims in the custody proceedings. Plaintiff thus has the burden of demonstrating that the state custody proceedings are inadequate to decide this claim. Id., at 14.
Plaintiff argues that the ADA and Section 504 are federal laws delegated exclusively to the federal courts and that numerous state courts have "made it clear that the issue of a state's child protection agency's non-compliance with the ADA cannot be raised at a termination of parental rights' trial." While it is true that a few state courts have held that the ADA does not apply to state child welfare agencies providing services to parents facing the possibility of losing their children, there is no evidence that the Oregon courts would follow this logic. To the contrary, Oregon courts have considered claims under the ADA based on a denial of state services and have afforded individuals the right to challenge child custody proceedings on federal statutory or constitutional grounds. Ulrich v. Senior and Disabled Services Division, 164 Or. App. 50 (1999) (ADA challenge to a denial of services to senior citizen); McCulley v. Bone, 160 Or. App. 24 (1999) (consideration of federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act on state child custody proceedings); State v. Geist, 310 Or. 176 (1990) (consideration of a parent's federal right under Fourteenth Amendment to appointed counsel in parental termination action).
The court has found that this action meets the requirements set forth in Younger. Accordingly, the court is obligated to dismiss this action. In light of this recommendation, the court need not address the other arguments raised by Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion (#16) to dismiss should be GRANTED.