Opinion
Case No. 02-WY-1125-AJ (OES).
October 25, 2005
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND PLEADINGS
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court on plaintiff David L. Hildebrand's Motion to Amend Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. After careful consideration of Mr. Hildebrand's motion, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
While Mr. Hildebrand has fashioned his motion to amend as one brought pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2), the Court notes that Rule 15(c)(2) governs only the "relation back" effect of an amended or supplemental pleading; this provision does not govern the basis upon which a motion to amend is granted or denied. Accordingly, noting that Mr. Hildebrand is proceeding pro se, the Court determines that this motion is properly construed as one brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), not 15(c)(2). Cf. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (construing pro se plaintiff's pleadings under a lower standard than if such pleadings were drafted by an attorney); Herrera v. Harkins, 949 F.2d 1096, 1097 (10th Cir. 1991) (same).
After the permissive period, and without written consent of the adverse party, the decision to grant leave to amend a complaint is within the sole discretion of the district court. Las Vegas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185-86 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)). In exercising this discretion, the district court is guided by a number of factors, including whether: (1) the amendment will result in undue prejudice; (2) the request to amend was inexplicably delayed; (3) the amendment was offered in good faith; and (4) the party had sufficient opportunity to state a claim and failed to do so. Id. at 1185.
In the present matter, Mr. Hildebrand moved to amend his complaint to add a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. This motion was filed and presented to the Court during the ninth day of a two-week jury trial. The Tenth Circuit has stated that "[u]ntimeliness alone may be a sufficient basis for denial of leave to amend." Id. The Court finds the present situation appropriate for such a determination.
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons articulated from the bench by this Court, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff David L. Hildebrand's Motion to Amend shall be, and now is, DENIED.