Upon sustaining said motion, judgment was entered instanter for plaintiff. The defendants appealed. In reversing the trial court, we held ( 263 P.2d 174) that the trial court did not err in granting a new trial but did err in rendering a judgment against defendants prior to retrial of the case. On the second trial, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and defendants appealed.

"Where a motion for new trial is granted, a showing for reversal should be much stronger than where a new trial is denied." Hildebrand v. Harrison, Okla., 263 P.2d 174. We hold that the action of the trial court in sustaining the motion for a new trial was not arbitrary or capricious, nor did the court err in some pure, simple and unmixed question of law.

And, also, that such rule is further extended by a multitude of cases which require that, when a new trial has been granted, the showing required for reversal of the trial court's ruling must be stronger than in instances where the motion has been denied. Hildebrand v. Harrison, Okla., 263 P.2d 174. However, plaintiff urges that the broad discretion reposed in the trial court is not an absolute, arbitrary discretion but must be a sound legal discretion which is to be exercised in discovering the course prescribed by recognized principles of law.

" In the more recent opinion in the case of Hildebrand v. Harrison, Okla., 263 P.2d 174, handed down in 1953, this Court quoted from the Keystone case, supra, and the same rules have been announced and approved in numerous decisions of this Court. The only question before us is whether the court erred in some question of law, but for which its decision would have been otherwise, or abused its discretion by acting capriciously or arbitrarily.