Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo, No. JV-47976, Ginger E. Garrett, Judge
Hilary S., in pro. per. for Petitioner
No appearance for Respondent.
Warren R. Jensen, County Counsel, Leslie H. Kraut, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
COFFEE, J.
Hilary S., petitioner and mother of J. S., seeks extraordinary writ review of a November 24, 2009, juvenile court order setting a permanent placement hearing for J.S. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) We deny the petition.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Facts and Procedural History
J.S. was born in November 2008. On February 18, 2009, the Department of Social Services (DSS) filed a dependency petition for failure to protect and support J.S. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (g).) The petition alleged that mother seemed unable to care for J.S. and the whereabouts of his two alleged fathers were unknown. The petition further alleged that on February 14, 2009, mother was slurring her words, the home had the stench of unclean cat litter, and there were bottles of prescription medication within the reach of J.S. On February 19, 2009, the court ordered that J.S. be removed from mother's custody and placed with the DSS.
In its March 24, 2009 Jurisdiction/Disposition Report, DSS indicated that J.S. would not be safe with mother. Mother had a long history of substance abuse and she was under the influence when she arrived for some of her visits with J.S. The DSS case plan specified entry into a residential treatment program among mother's responsibilities. J.S. was living with his paternal grandfather and his wife. DSS recommended that he remain in out-of-home care and that mother receive six months of reunification services. At the March 24, 2009 jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the court found J.S. to be a person described by section 300, found petitioner to be the alleged mother and approved the DSS case plan. It ordered reunification services for mother and advised her that the time for such services would not exceed six months if she did not participate regularly and make substantive progress in any court-ordered treatment program.
In its report for the June 23, 2009 interim review hearing, DSS reported that J.S. was receiving therapy and seemed happier as his skills progressed. Mother had not visited him consistently. Two visits were canceled because she appeared to be under the influence. Although J.S. would play with mother and sit on her lap, he avoided eye contact with her. She had not entered a residential treatment program.
In its report for the September 1, 2009 status review hearing, DSS recommended termination of mother's reunification services. DSS had referred mother to many services to address her substance dependence, including two free residential treatment programs, which she refused to enter because they would not accept J.S. Another program rejected her because she was under the influence upon her arrival. In its October 27, 2009 addendum, DSS reported that on August 31, 2009, mother entered a no contest plea to child endangerment and other offenses. (Pen. Code, § 273a.) Mother entered a sober-living program on September 1, 2009. It was not a licensed treatment facility and its residents used outside agencies.
On November 16, 2009, the court conducted the status review hearing which had originally been set for September 1. Mother admitted that she did not enter the sober-living program until the DSS recommended the termination of reunification services in the September 1 status review report. Two social workers testified regarding J.S.'s significant developmental delays and challenges and the progress he made while in placement. Although J.S. had learned to make eye contact with other people, he continued to avoid eye contact with mother. Mother did not accept her responsibility for some of J.S.'s special needs.
On November 24, 2009, after taking the matter under submission, the court found that the return of J.S. to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment because she failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in her court-ordered treatment. It terminated her reunification services and set the matter for a March 9, 2010 section 366.26 hearing.
On January 7, 2010, petitioner filed a pro per writ petition requesting that this court vacate the section 366.26 hearing orders, and order reunification services.
DISCUSSION
H.S. argues that she was deprived of reasonable reunification services. We disagree.
As in any substantial evidence case, we review the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court's order. "[I]n reviewing the reasonableness of the reunification services provided by the Department, we must also recognize that in most cases more services might have been provided, and the services which are provided are often imperfect. The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances." (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.) The evidence shows that mother was provided extensive services but failed to avail herself of them. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763; Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 599.)
On March 24, 2009, upon ordering that mother receive reunification services, the court advised her that the time for reunification services would not exceed six months if she did not participate regularly and make substantive progress in any court-ordered treatment program. Her reunification plan required her participation In residential substance abuse treatment. DSS referred mother to several residential treatment programs, but she failed to enter them. Until the DSS issued its report recommending the termination of reunification services, mother did not enter any program. On September 1, nearly six months after the court ordered reunification services, she entered a sober-living program without licensed residential treatment.
Before ordering the termination of reunification services, the court found that the return of J.S. to his mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to him because mother failed to participate regularly and make substantive progress in her court-ordered treatment. Substantial evidence supports its findings. The services offered were reasonable. The termination of services cannot be blamed on DSS or the trial court. (See e.g., In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1363; Angela S. v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 763.) "The trial court is only required to order that reasonable reunifications services be provided; it cannot make the parents accept those services. [Citation.]" (In re Joanna Y. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 433, 442.)
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied.
We concur: YEGAN, P.J., PERREN, J.