Because the trial court had jurisdiction to decide issues pertaining to the government's possession of property, it necessarily follows that the trial court also had jurisdiction to accept, interpret, and enforce a stipulation resolving such issues. See State Highway Dep't v. Swift, 129 Colo. 413, 419-20, 270 P.2d 751, 755 (1954) (interpreting stipulation regarding landowner's access to public freeway in eminent domain proceeding); Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Steiner Am. Corp., 31 Colo. App. 125, 132-33, 500 P.2d 983, 986-87 (1972) (enforcing stipulation regarding compensable nature of property not taken in eminent domain proceeding); cf. Crystal Lakes Water Sewer Ass'n v. Backlund, 908 P.2d 534, 543 (Colo. 1996) ("As a general rule, `[o]nce a court takes jurisdiction of an action, it thereafter has exclusive jurisdiction of the subjects and matters ancillary thereto.'" (quoting People ex rel. Maddox v. Dist. Court, 198 Colo. 208, 211, 597 P.2d 573, 575 (1979))).