The libellant relies heavily upon the case of State Highway Public Works Comm. of N.C. v. Diamond S.S. Transportation, 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 78 (1945), to sustain the service of process on Standard Dredging Corporation. The contention is made that the present action is identical to the situation in the Highway Comm. case.
Each case must be decided on its own facts. State Highway Public Works Commission v. Diamond S.S. Transportation Corp., 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 78. "in the last analysis the question is one of due process of law under the Constitution of the United States * * *."
Under the construction of the statute contended for by the appellant, the Severence might ply its trade in every port from Seattle to Bangor and back again, leaving a trail of obligations in its wake, and never 'do business' in any state, or become subject to any statute designed to bring it into court upon that basis." State Highway and Public Works Commission v. Diamond S.S. Transp. Corp., 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1945.)
The federal District Court of South Carolina has held that the owner of a vessel was doing business in South Carolina and was therefore subject to substituted service although only a single trip to the port of Charleston was involved. Kenematso-Gosho (USA) Inc. v. SS "ATLANTIC SUN", supra. Among the decisions there cited is State Highway Public Works Commission v. Diamond S.S. Transportation Corporation, 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 78 in which the Supreme Court of North Carolina said that any other construction of the statute would make it possible for the vessel to "ply its trade in every port from Seattle to Bangor and back again, leaving a trail of obligations in its wake, and never `do business' in any state, or become subject to any statute designed to bring it into court upon that basis". See also Gkiafis v. SS Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 555-556 where the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "a finding of regular contacts with a forum state is not an indispensable predicate to the assertion of jurisdiction.
We recognize that North Carolina has held the owner of a tramp steamer to be doing business in that state where the vessel made only one visit to North Carolina, on which occasion the visit resulted in the property damage giving rise to the suit. State Highway Public Works Commission v. Diamond S.S. Transp. Corp., 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 78, 81. We do not believe that one visit of a vessel to Virginia would come within the minimal contact requirement where the cause of action arose in another state.
The facts found would suffice in a suit against a nonresident corporation to establish that it was doing business in this State and hence amenable to service of process here. Harrington v. Steel Products, 24 N.C. 675, 94 S.E.2d 803; Harrison v. Corley, 226 N.C. 184, 37 S.E.2d 489; Highway Com. v. Transportation Corp., 225 N.C. 198, 34 S.E.2d 78; Ruark v. Trust Co., 206 N.C. 564, 174 S.E. 441; Lunceford v. Association, supra; Bankers' Holding Corp. v. Maybury, 275 P. 740, 75 A.L.R 1237; Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681, 18 A.L.R.2d 179, and annotations 198; American Cities Power Light Corp. v. Williams, 74 N.Y.S.2d 374; Industrial Research Corp. v. General Motors Corporation, 29 F.2d 623; Mas v. Orange-Crush Co., 99 F.2d 675. International unions with charter provisions similar to the ones here considered have, through their control and dominance of local unions, been held, in well-considered cases in other States, to be doing business in places other than the place of their residence.
ectit to Process Left with the Secretary of State: 181 S.C. 171, 186 S.E., 272; 172 S.C. 415, 174 S.E., 384; 320 U.S. 81; 267 U.S. 333, 69 L.Ed., 634; 289 U.S. 85, 77 L.Ed., 1047; 153 N.W., 814; 213 N.W., 867; 181 S.C. 171, 186 S.E., 272; 251 N.W., 557; 246 U.S. 79, 62 L.Ed., 587; 268 U.S. 203, 69 L.Ed., 916. TheAppellant Not Subject to Penalty Statute: 220 N.Y., 259, 115 N.E., 915; 129 F.2d 177; 90 F.2d 196; 55 P.2d 449; 237 U.S. 189, 59 L.Ed., 910. Attorney General John M. Daniel, Assistant AttorneysGeneral T.C. Callison and M.J. Hough and Messrs. Nelson,Mullins Grier, all of Columbia, and Mr. Thomas M. Boulware, of Allendale, for respondent, cite: As to the AppellantDoing Business in South Carolina Within the Meaning ofthe Domestication Statute: 200 S.C. 393; 93 F.2d 870; 129 F.2d 177; 318 U.S. 313, 87 L.Ed., 777; 50 F.2d 993; 134 F.2d 511; 131 N.Y. Supp., 514; 233 U.S. 16; 193 Sou., 625, 126 A.L.R., 1102; 200 N.Y.S., 397; 134 F.2d 511, 146 A.L.R., 926; 176 S.C. 59, 179 S.E., 693; 34 S.E.2d 78; 190 U.S. 147, 47 L.Ed., 987; 200 U.S. 612, 50 L.Ed., 620; 234 U.S. 579, 58 L.Ed., 1478; 322 U.S. 202, 88 L.Ed. 887. May 16, 1946.
This was an action to recover damages for injury to the State Highway bridge spanning the Cape Fear River, near Wilmington, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the movement of its steamship Severance. The former appeal in this case, reported in 225 N.C. 198, involved only a question of service of process. On the trial following it was not controverted that in attempting to pass through the draw the ship collided with the fender piling erected in connection with the drawbridge.
It cannot, by the simple expedient of closing shop and departing this jurisdiction, withdraw that assent so as to defeat a suit instituted on a cause of action which arose while it was engaged in business here. Fisher v. Insurance Co., 136 N.C. 217; Sisk v. Motor Freight, Inc., 222 N.C. 631, 24 S.E.2d 488; Highway Comm. v. Transportation Corp., 225 N.C. 198; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, and cases cited; 45 A.L.R., 1442; Anno., P. 1447. The judgment below is