Therefore, I will not consider the affidavits of Frank Hancock, Michael Koenig, General Manager of defendant Modern Aero, Inc., Earl Joseph Waugh, or Susan Marsh, an officer of defendant Buffalo Aviation. As I recently stated in Highway Auto Sales v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc. 943 F. Supp. 825, 828 (N.D.Ohio 1996), to establish a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the plaintiff must show: "(1) the defendant is amenable to suit under the forum state's long-arm statute; and (2) due process requirements of the Constitution are met." ( Citing CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262; Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir. 1994); In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220, 224 (6th Cir. 1972)).

Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 238 (1994); see also Glasstech, Inc. v. TGL Tempering Systems, Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 722, 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999). Plaintiff, therefore, must show: 1) the defendant is amenable to suit under Ohio's long arm statute, and 2) allowing the defendant to be sued in Ohio does not contravene due process. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262; Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 825, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1996). A. Ohio's Long-Arm Statute

"Plaintiff, therefore, must show: 1) the defendant is amenable to suit under Ohio's long arm statute, and 2) allowing the defendant to be sued in Ohio does not contravene due process. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262; Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F.Supp. 825, 828 (N.D.Ohio 1996)." Special Aviation Sys., Inc., 323 F. Supp.2d at 842.

The "transacting business" clause of the Ohio long-arm statute "means 'to carry on business' and 'to have dealings,' and is 'broader than the word "contract."'" Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 825, 828-29 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (internal citations omitted) (noting that although Sixth Circuit has construed "transacting business" as extending to outer limits of due process, Ohio Supreme Court has stated that it is erroneous to extend long-arm statute to limits of due process); Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 559 N.E.2d 477, 480 (1990) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary in defining "transacts" as "'to prosecute negotiations; to carry on business; to have dealings. . . . The word embraces in its meaning the carrying on or prosecution of business negotiations but it is a broader term than the word "contract" and may involve business negotiations which have been either wholly or partly brought to a conclusion.'").

Faurecia Exhaust Sys., Inc. v. Walker, 464 F.Supp.2d 700, 705-06 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (quoting Ky. Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 75 (1990)); see also Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F.Supp. 825, 829 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (“[I]f the phrase ‘transacting business' is ‘broader than the word contract,' ‘transacting business' must logically subsume the narrower act of contracting.”).

Courts also consider whether the parties contractually obligated themselves to one another. See Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdate, Inc., 943 F.Supp. 825, 829 (N.D.Ohio 1996) (explaining that the phrase transacting business must "logically subsume the narrower act of contracting"); Kentucky Oaks Mall, supra, 53 Ohio St.3d at 76 (finding personal jurisdiction when the defendant, among other things, negotiated a lease by telephone with an Ohio-based limited partnership that created ongoing duties and obligations). As party to the September 21 and October 5, 2007 contracts, Demrex and Portnoy created ongoing contractual responsibilities.

Ohio's long — arm statute does not extend personal jurisdiction to the limits of due process. Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 238 n. 1 (1994); see also Glasstech, Inc. v. TGL Tempering Systems, Inc., 50 F. Supp.2d 722, 725 (N.D. Ohio 1999). Plaintiff, therefore, must show that: 1) the defendant is amenable to suit under Ohio's long — arm statute and 2) due process requirements of the Constitution are met. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1262; Douglas v. Modern Aero, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 (N.D. Ohio 1997); Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto — Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 825, 828 (N.D. Ohio 1996). Because plaintiff does not assert any particular subsection of the statute as its basis for asserting specific jurisdiction over defendants, the court will discuss the most relevant potential bases for jurisdiction in this case: namely, subsections (1), (2), and (4). 1. Subsection (1) of the Ohio Long — Arm Statute

"Transacting business" subsumes the narrower act of contracting. Id. ( citing Highway Auto Sales v. Auto-Konig ofScottsdale, 943 F. Supp. 825, 829 (N.D. Ohio 1996)); Kentucky Oaks Mallv. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc., 53 Ohio St.3d 73 (1990). A defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction within the forum.

On the strength of Goldstein, the court in Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc. 943 F. Supp. 825 (N.D.Ohio 1996) recognized that Ohio's long-arm statute is not to be equated with the limits of federal due process. Id. at 828.

Professionals, Inc. v. Network Int'l, Ltd., 146 F.R.D. 179, 181 n. 1 (D.Minn. 1993) ("The due process analysis focuses on a defendant's contacts with the forum, not its contacts with the plaintiff; thus, an isolated sale will not support jurisdiction, even if the cause of action arises from the sale."); see also Wines v. Lake Havasu Boat Mfg., Inc., 846 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1988); Chung v. NANA Dev. Corp. 783 F.2d 1124, 1126 (4th Cir. 1986) (a sale comprising no more than an "`isolated' or `attenuated' single transaction . . . has always been deemed inadequate to satisfy due process"); Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1978) ("four sporadic and isolated sales" did not support personal jurisdiction); Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp.2d 1261 (N.D.Ala. 2000); accord Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1985); Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1973); Douglas v. Modern Aero, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1206 (N.D.Ohio 1997); Highway Auto Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 825 (N.D.Ohio 1996). Of particular relevance is whether the plaintiff initiated the sale or contact.