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Higher Educ. v. Laudenslager

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department
May 25, 1994
161 Misc. 2d 329 (N.Y. App. Term 1994)

Opinion

May 25, 1994

Appeal from the Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County, Margaret Taylor, J.

Hayt, Hayt Landau, Great Neck (Kenneth P. Backhus of counsel), for appellant.

Friedman Yaeger, New York City (Philip L. Friedman of counsel), for respondent.


Order dated December 17, 1993 reversed, with $10 costs, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted in the principal amount of $5,056.27, with interest from October 20, 1978.

Defendant's student loan obligation was not discharged in the 1978 bankruptcy adjudication ( 11 U.S.C. § 523 [a] [8]). Plaintiff's claim, time barred in 1984, was revived on April 9, 1991, when Congress amended 20 U.S.C. § 1091a to preempt State limitations statutes for certain suits on guaranteed student loans ( 20 U.S.C. § 1091a [a] [1]). The legislation effectively revived some actions that were previously extinct (State of New York Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. v Starr, 179 A.D.2d 992; see, United States v Davis, 817 F. Supp. 926). This action was timely commenced in March 1992, within the "window" opened by the amendment to section 1091a. An action at law on a promissory note, commenced by a State agency in the public interest, is not vulnerable to a laches defense, nor to allegations of "equitable estoppel." (State of New York v Rockland County, 74 A.D.2d 921; Kahn v New York Times Co., 122 A.D.2d 655, 663; Columbus Trust Co. v Campolo, 110 A.D.2d 616.) Moreover, the recognition of such defenses would defeat the Federal purpose of extending the period for suit on defaulted student loans.

Plaintiff set forth a prima facie case entitling it to judgment on the promissory note, which defendant failed to oppose with sufficient evidence (Unisource, Inc. v Wolfe, 169 A.D.2d 567). Plaintiff is entitled to interest from the date the cause of action accrued (CPLR 5001), in this case October 20, 1978. The intent of the statute authorizing prejudgment interest is to indemnify successful plaintiffs "'for the nonpayment of what is due to them'" (Love v State of New York, 78 N.Y.2d 540, 544).

OSTRAU, P.J., MILLER and McCOOE, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Higher Educ. v. Laudenslager

Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department
May 25, 1994
161 Misc. 2d 329 (N.Y. App. Term 1994)
Case details for

Higher Educ. v. Laudenslager

Case Details

Full title:NEW YORK STATE HIGHER EDUCATION SERVICES CORPORATION, Appellant, v. JANET…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department

Date published: May 25, 1994

Citations

161 Misc. 2d 329 (N.Y. App. Term 1994)
616 N.Y.S.2d 135

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