Opinion
35825.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 27, 1955. REHEARING DENIED OCTOBER 13, 1955.
Voluntary manslaughter. Before Judge Houston. Gwinnett Superior Court. May 12, 1955.
Walter B. Fincher, for plaintiff in error.
Hope D. Stark, Solicitor-General, contra.
Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, the court did not err in denying the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty.
DECIDED SEPTEMBER 27, 1955 — REHEARING DENIED OCTOBER 13, 1955.
The defendant was indicted for murder. On the call of the case, he filed his special plea of insanity as provided for in Code § 27-1501. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant sane. What transpired thereafter is set forth fully and with clarity by the trial court in the order overruling and denying the defendant's plea to withdraw the plea of guilty. We will therefore quote the order of the court: "Elbert Higgins v. The State of Georgia. The above stated case was called for trial before the undersigned at the March term of Gwinnett Superior Court 1955. Defendant's counsel made a motion to continue the case upon the ground that they needed additional time to secure evidence and prepare the case. The accused was indicted for the murder of Hoke Crowe, Jr., on the 5th day of November, 1954, and had been in the Gwinnett County jail on said charge since November 1954; that he had been represented by the same counsel for more than three months; that he was indicted on the 8th day of March 1955, and an insanity plea was filed in the office of the Clerk of the Superior Court of Gwinnett County on the 14th day of March, 1955; that the court overruled the motion to continue the case for the term, but passed the case over for two days, until March 19th, when defendant's counsel renewed their motion to continue the case due to the fact that `No doctor in the county could be procured who would examine the defendant as to his sanity.' No doctor's name was given, and none had been subpoenaed, neither did the defense make any showing as to what they expected to prove by any physician, and the court overruled the motion to continue.
"A jury was stricken and a trial had on the sanity plea and the jury returned the following verdict: `We the jury find the defendant Elbert Higgins sane. This the 17th day of March. C. T. Jacobs, Foreman.' The case was then called for trial on Friday morning, March 19th, 1955. The defendant, Elbert Higgins, and both his attorneys were present in the courtroom. The solicitor-general went over to defendant's counsel and the latter stated to the court that the solicitor-general had agreed to accept a plea of guilty with a recommendation to the mercy of the court and we would like to have an opportunity to consult with our client and interested parties. The court took a recess and the defendant's counsel, the defendant and relatives of the defendant went into an adjoining room for consultation. The solicitor-general later informed the court that defendant's attorney had agreed to enter a plea to voluntary manslaughter and take a sentence of twenty years minimum and twenty years maximum, which the court approved. The plea was entered on the back of the murder indictment. There is no basis for the allegation by defendant's counsel that the indictment was changed to an indictment for manslaughter. No change was made whatever in the indictment. On the back of the indictment where there is a printed form for a plea the words `Vol. manslaughter' were added making the plea read: `The defendant Elbert Higgins waives formal arraignment, copy of bill of indictment, list of witnesses sworn before grand jury and pleads guilty vol. manslaughter. This 18th day of March, 1955. Glyndon C. Pruitt, Defendant's Attorney.'
"The defendant was then brought before the court who stated to him that his attorney had entered a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter, and sentenced him to a minimum and maximum of twenty (20) years in the penitentiary.
"I call attention to the affidavits of Sheriff C. K. Pittard and Deputy Sheriff Lamar Crowe, in which both state that both of the defendant's attorneys not only discussed the question of entering this plea with the defendant but also with his brothers and other relatives; that they were pleased to enter such a plea, and that all were happy after the plea was entered, and the defendant sentenced. The defendant was in the courtroom all the time except when he was carried in an adjoining room, at the request of his attorneys, to discuss the question of entering a plea with his attorneys and relatives; that after this consultation a plea was entered to voluntary manslaughter instead of guilty with a recommendation to the mercy of the court. The defendant was sent to Reidsville State Prison, and so far as the court knew, everybody was satisfied with the disposition on the case until this motion was filed.
"As to the mental condition of the defendant, his attorneys filed an insanity plea, this was tried, and the trial jury returned a verdict finding him sane. No motion was made for a new trial on this issue. In view of the above-stated facts the motion to set aside the sentence of the court is overruled. This the 12th day of May, 1955. John C. Houston, Judge Sup. Court, Piedmont Circuit, Presiding."
There is but one question to be decided in this case. That question is, did the court abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty? Before sentence is passed one accused of a crime may withdraw his plea of guilty as a matter of right. After sentence has been passed it is within the discretion of the court as to whether or not the accused will be permitted to withdraw a plea of guilty. See Clark v. State, 72 Ga. App. 603 ( 34 S.E.2d 608), Rowland v. State, 72 Ga. App. 793, 800 ( 35 S.E.2d 372), and Boyett v. State, 81 Ga. App. 49 ( 57 S.E.2d 831).
Under all the facts of this case the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion of the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty.
Judgment affirmed. Townsend and Carlisle, JJ., concur.