Higgins v. Realty Investment Co.

41 Citing cases

  1. Harper v. St. Joseph Lead Co.

    361 Mo. 129 (Mo. 1950)   Cited 28 times

    It is sufficient to show that plaintiff was the proximate and efficient cause of maliciously putting the law in motion. 38 C.J. 395: Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer etc., 74 S.W.2d 805. (6) The trial court erred in finding that by showing an indictment, plaintiff created a barrier which could not be overcome. As stated in paragraph (4), all cases in point show that defendants and their witnesses did appear and did testify before the grand jury in each case, including Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward Co., 166 S.W.2d 503. (7) Trial court, on passing on demurrer, must consider plaintiff's evidence to be true and in so doing must draw every inference in its favor that the law and the evidence will warrant.

  2. Bonzo v. Kroger Gro. Baking Co.

    344 Mo. 127 (Mo. 1939)   Cited 22 times

    (f) Damage to the plaintiff. LaChance v. Natl. Pigments Chemical Co., 104 S.W.2d 693; Dawes v. Starrett, 82 S.W.2d 55; Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty Inv. Co., 74 S.W.2d 812. (4) Whether a witness testified falsely in procuring the information is a question of fact for the jury. Dawes v. Starrett, 82 S.W.2d 43. (5) The inference or presumption of probable cause which the information created was overcome and wiped out by plaintiff's acquittal and an inference of want of probable cause arose and supplied that essential element of his cause of action.

  3. Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward Co.

    350 Mo. 360 (Mo. 1942)   Cited 32 times
    Finding that while plaintiff had presented evidence that handwriting experts were mistaken in their opinion that it was her who had forged the check, there was no evidence that the testimony was both "false and known to be false" and therefore did not support a claim of lack of probable cause

    (1) The court erred in overruling this defendant's demurrer to the evidence and refusing to direct a verdict for this defendant as requested in Instruction A at the close of the plaintiff's case, and Instruction C at the close of all of the evidence. Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty Inv. Co., 74 S.W.2d 805, 335 Mo. 1010; Laughlin v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 50 S.W.2d 92, 330 Mo. 523; Stoker v. Elniff, 33 S.W.2d 977; Madden v. Covington, 86 S.W.2d 190; Polk v. M.-K.-T.R. Co., 111 S.W.2d 138, 341 Mo. 213; Bonzo v. Kroger Grocery Baking Co., 125 S.W.2d 75, 344 Mo. 127; Dye v. Loewer, 94 S.W.2d 948; Wilkinson v. McGee, 265 Mo. 574; Dawes v. Starrett, 82 S.W.2d 43, 336 Mo. 897. (2) The court erred in giving plaintiff's Instruction 6 because it entirely ignored the indictment. Wilkinson v. McGee, 265 Mo. 574; Dawes v. Starrett, 82 S.W.2d 43, 336 Mo. 897; Bonzo v. Kroger Grocery Baking Co., 125 S.W.2d 75, 344 Mo. 127. (3) The court erred in refusing to give this defendant's Instruction M because there is no duty, in investigating a crime, to have any discussion with the party being investigated in connection therewith, or to investigate to determine whether such party claims an alibi.

  4. Daniels v. Terranova

    611 S.W.3d 799 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 4 times

    In contrast, "[p]robable cause [to prosecute] is reasonable cause and may be defined as the existence of such a state of facts as would warrant an ordinarily cautious and prudent [person] in the belief that the accused was guilty of the offense charged." Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co. , 335 Mo. 1010, 74 S.W.2d 805, 813 (Mo. 1934). "And ‘the test as to whether or not probable cause for instituting a criminal prosecution existed is to be applied to the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time the prosecution was commenced.’ "

  5. Williams v. Ryder/P.I.E. Nationwide, Inc.

    786 F.2d 854 (8th Cir. 1986)   Cited 9 times

    As a result, the elements necessary to sustain a malicious prosecution claim "must be strictly and clearly proven." Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty Investment Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 74 S.W.2d 805, 814 (1934); Sanders, 682 S.W.2d at 806; Harper, 233 S.W.2d at 838. This disfavor of malicious prosecution actions represents a value choice based on public policy considerations.

  6. Bellington v. Clevenger

    228 S.W.2d 817 (Mo. Ct. App. 1950)   Cited 11 times

    In a malicious prosecution suit the evidence must clearly establish all of the following elements: (1) The commencement or prosecution of the proceeding against plaintiff; (2) its legal causation by the defendant; (3) its termination in favor of the plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice therein; and (6) damage to plaintiff by reason thereof. Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 74 S.W.2d 805; Ripley v. Bank of Skidmore, 355 Mo. 897, 198 S.W.2d 861. In the Higgins case the court said, 74 S.W.2d at page 814:

  7. Renda v. International Union, UAW

    366 Mich. 58 (Mich. 1962)   Cited 47 times
    Rejecting the notion that "any party who is a proximate cause of a prosecution is himself the prosecutor and may be held liable if the prosecution thereafter ensuing proves to have been commenced without probable cause"

    This unusual claim, set forth at the commencement of this action, was made more unusual by plaintiff's claim, as submitted to the jury in final instructions, that the UAW and its 4 agents should be found guilty of "conspiracy, maliciously to prosecute" because these 5 defendants failed to advise their co-conspirators, O'Brien and Rashid, of the method (the $25,000 escrow agreement) used in bringing the conspiracy to maliciously prosecute to a successful conclusion. Plaintiff's claim is such that it calls for the test set forth in Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty Investment Co., 335 Mo 1010, 1029 ( 74 S.W.2d 805), where the court stated that actions for malicious prosecution have "been hedged about by limitations more stringent than those in the case of almost any other act causing damage to another and the courts have allowed recovery only when the requirements limiting it have been fully complied with." Malicious prosecution cases require instructions that definitely and clearly define to the jury the legal principles involved in determining whether there was an absence of probable cause, whether malice was proven, and whether malice could be inferred from the want of probable cause.

  8. Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co.

    261 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. 1953)   Cited 44 times

    " Wilcox v. Gilmore, 320 Mo. 980, 986, 8 S.W.2d 961, 962. At the same local citation it is said: "Probable cause `consists of a belief in the charge or facts alleged, based on sufficient circumstances to reasonably induce such belief in a person of ordinary prudence in the same situation.'" And in Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty Investment Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 1026, 74 S.W.2d 805, 813, it was said that "Probable cause is reasonable cause and may be defined as the existence of such a state of facts as would warrant an ordinarily cautious and prudent man in the belief that the accused is guilty of the offense charged." But, as pointed out in Lindsay v. Evans, Mo.App., 174 S.W.2d 390, 396, "probable cause does not depend upon what may have ultimately proved to be the actual state of facts embraced in the previous action or proceeding, but instead upon the honest and reasonable belief of the one who instigated its prosecution. If it appears that a reasonably prudent person would have believed and acted under the circumstances as such person did, then the existence of probable cause is sufficiently established; but on the other hand, if it appears that the facts and circumstances would not have warranted an ordinarily prudent person in entertaining an honest belief that both his action and the means taken in the prosecution of it were legally just and proper, then there

  9. Coleman v. Ziegler

    248 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. 1952)   Cited 12 times

    The constitutive elements of an action for malicious prosecution are: (1) The commencement or prosecution of the proceedings against the present plaintiff; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant; (3) its termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice therein; and (6) damage to plaintiff by reason thereof. Bonzo v. Kroger Grocery Baking Co., 344 Mo. 127, 131, 125 S.W.2d 75; Higgins v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 1025; 74 S.W.2d 805, 812; Kvasnicka v. Montgomery Ward Co., 350 Mo. 360, 166 S.W.2d 503, 505. Evidence of guilt or innocence was of course admissible on the issue of probable cause.

  10. Moffett v. Commerce Trust Co.

    354 Mo. 1098 (Mo. 1946)   Cited 5 times

    Such alleged cause of action attacking our courts and the use of legal process belong to a class not favored by the courts but hedged about by many stringent limitations. Johnson v. Stebbins-Thompson Realty Co., 167 Mo. 325, 66 S.W. 933; State ex rel. Conran v. Duncan, 333 Mo. 673, 63 S.W.2d 135; Edwards v. Harrison, 236 S.W. 328; Case v. Sipes, 280 Mo. 110, 217 S.W. 306; Higgins v. Knickermeyer-Fleer Realty Inv. Co., 335 Mo. 1010, 74 S.W.2d 805; Northcutt v. McKibben, 236 Mo. App. 605, 159 S.W.2d 699. (3) Terte and Wright judgments not before this court for review.