Opinion
Index No. 618466/2016
05-13-2020
MICHAEL JOSEPH HIGGINS, Plaintiff, v. ARTUR HALUDA and CHRISTOPHER T. QUIGLEY a/k/a C.T. QUIGLEY, COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT Defendants.
SCHWARTZAPFEL LAWYERS, PC Attorneys for Plaintiff Michael Joseph Higgins. PICCIANO & SCAHILL, P.C. Attorney for Defendants Quigley and Haluda. DENNIS M. BROWN, ESQ. Attorney for Defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Police Department.
Unpublished Opinion
SCHWARTZAPFEL LAWYERS, PC Attorneys for Plaintiff Michael Joseph Higgins.
PICCIANO & SCAHILL, P.C. Attorney for Defendants Quigley and Haluda.
DENNIS M. BROWN, ESQ. Attorney for Defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Police Department.
PRESENT: Hon. ROBERT F. OUINLAN Justice.
Hon. Robert F. Quinlan, J.S.C.
Upon the following papers read on defendant County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Police Departments'-motions for summary judgment iseeking dismissal: Notice of Motion and supporting papers of defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Police Department: NYSCEF Docs. # 34-57 : Affirmation in opposition of defendants Haluda and Quigley: NYSCEF Doc. #58: Affirmation in opposition of plaintiff: NYSCEF Doc. # 62: and Reply Affirmation: NYSCEF Doc. # 64: it is, ORDERED that the motions for summary judgment by defendants County of Suffolk and Suffolk County Police Department seeking dismissal of the action and all claims against them is granted for the reasons set forth below.
Plaintiff Michael Joseph Higgins ("plaintiff) commenced this action against defendants Arthur Haluda ("Haluda") and Christopher T. Quigley a/k/a C. T. Quigley ("Quigley") by filing a summons and complaint with the Suffolk County Clerk on November 15, 2016. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an amended summons and complaint on November 30, 2017 adding to the action defendants County of Suffolk ("County") and Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD").
Prior to the filing of the amended complaint, on January 26, 2017, Thomas Higgins filed a separate action under Index # 601570/2017 against defendants Haluda, Quigley, Michael Joseph Higgins, Michael Higgins,the County and the SCPD. The two actions were joined for trial by the order of this court dated January 23, 2018 (Luft, A.S.J.), and the court notes that the County and SCPD have filed a similar motion in that action, along with other defendants therein, which is addressed in a separate, but similar, decision
Plaintiff seek to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision which occurred on October 21, 2016. At the time of the accident plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle when it was contacted by a motor vehicle operated by Haluda and owned by Quigley at the intersection of East John Street and North Erie Avenue, Town of Babylon, Suffolk County, New York. The testimony and proof submitted in support of the motion includes the depositions of both plaintiff and his brother, the plaintiff in the action under Index # 601570/2017, taken pursuant to GML § 50-h, as well as their examinations before trial, and the examinations before trial of Haluda and a witness produced on behalf of the County and the SCPD, Police Officer Victoria Singh ("Singh")
The testimony of both plaintiffs showed that as a result of injuries they sustained in the accident, neither had any recollection of the events immediately before the happening of the accident as the Higgins vehicle approached the intersection.
In his examination before trial, Haluda testified that "[a]t the time of the accident, I was looking in the mirror because the police are behind me, so that's what I was focused on, you know, because, like, the sirens were on, the lights were on, and I was looking in the rearview mirror, and that's when I went through the intersection." He further stated that he never stopped at the intersection where the accident occurred and that he never saw the vehicle operated by plaintiff before the accident. Additionally, in his testimony he admitted that he was charged with a number of offenses arising out of the accident and entered into a plea agreement where he plead guilty to Driving While Intoxicated, Vehicular Assault and Leaving the Scene of An Accident (EBT, p. 34,1.17 through p. 35,1. 16).
Singh testified that on the morning of October 21, 2016, she received a radio broadcast that a 911 caller had reported a male in a white van acting suspiciously by approaching a woman and child, and requesting to borrow a cell phone. Upon receiving that information Singh drove to the incident location and canvassed the area for a few minutes before spotting a white van, the Quigley vehicle operated by Haluda. After seeing the van she followed it at a distance of about one block, eventually losing sight of it but regaining contact a short time later. She continued following the vehicle which was still "a good block and some ahead" of the her as it traveled southbound on North Erie Avenue. As the van approached the intersection of Byrd Street and North Erie Avenue, which was controlled by a stop sign for vehicles traveling in the van's direction, Singh saw the van enter the intersection without stopping for the stop sign and flip over. At that point the officer activated her police vehicle's emergency lights and sirens. At no point prior to the van flipping over did she activate her vehicle's lights or sirens, nor was there evidence that she was involved in a "high speed chase" of the vehicle operated by Haluda. The court notes that neither plaintiff brought a claim against Singh personally for her actions on the morning of October 21, 2016.
CLAIMS AGAINST SCPD DISMISSED
The County and SCPD move to dismiss the claims against the SCPD as it is not an separate entity which can be sued on its own behalf, as it is merely an administrative arm of the County. That motion is granted and the claims as to the SCPD are dismissed. As an administrative arm of the County, the SCPD lacks the capacity to be sued as a separate entity (see Young v. Suffolk County, 920 2 F.Supp. 2nd 368 (EDNY2013); Guintav. County of Suffolk, atal, Index number 64564/13 (Supreme Court, Suffolk County 2014 [Pitts, J]); Carthew v. County of Suffolk, 709 F. Sup. 2nd 188 (EDNY 2010); Ceparano v. Suffolk County, 2010 WL5437212 (EDNY 2010); see also David v. Lynbrook Police Dept, 224 F.Supp. 2nd 463, 277 (EDNY 2002); Valle v Police Department, 2010 WL 3958432 [E.D.N.Y. 2010]; Murray v County of Suffolk, 66 Misc.3d 1216 (A), 2020 NY Slip Op 501114 (U) (Sup.Ct., Suffolk Co., 2020, Berland, J.). Accordingly, the plaintiffs claims against defendant SCPD are dismissed.
COUNTY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment must make a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a mater of law, tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case (see Sillman v Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395 [1957]; Gilbert Frank Corp. v Federal Insurance, 70 N.Y.2d 966[1988]; Torres v Industrial Container, 305 A.D.2d 136 [1st Dept 2003]). The movant has the initial burden of proving entitlement to summary judgment, failure to make such a showing requires denial of the motion regardless of the sufficiency of the opposition (see Winegrad v New York University Medical Center, 64 N.Y.2d 851 [1985]; William J. Jenack Estate Appraiser and Auctioneers v Rabizadeh, 22 N.Y.3d 470 [2013]; Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hospital Corp, 22 N.Y.3d 824 [2014]). Once such proof has been offered, the burden then shifts to the opposing party, who in order to defeat the motion, must proffer evidence in admissible form to establish a factual issue sufficient to require a trial (CPLR 3212 [b]; see Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557 [1980]; Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Center). It has long been recognized as a general principle of summary judgment that a moving party, as well as an opponent, is required to assemble and lay bare all its proof in support, or opposition, of the motion (see Maurice O'Meara Co. v National Park Bank of New York, 239 NY 386 [1925]; Dodwell & Co. Inc. v Silverman, 234 A.D. 362 [1st Dept 1932]; M&S Mercury Air Conditioning Corp. v Rodolitz, 24 A.D.2d 873 [2d Dept 1965]). Failure to do so is done at the party's risk (see Deleon v New York City Sanitation Dept., 25 N.Y.3d 1102 [2015]). In deciding the motion the court is to determine whether there are bonafide issues of fact and generally is not to delve into or resolve issues of credibility (see Vega v Restani Corp., 18 N.Y.3d 499 [2012]), unless it clearly appears that the issues are not genuine, but feigned (see Curry v MacKenzie, 239 NY 267 [1925]; Glick & Dolleck, Inc. v Tri Pack Export Co., 22 N.Y.2d 439 [1968]; Loughlin v City of New York, 186 A.D.2d 176 [2d Dept 1992]; Sullivan v Pilevsky, 281 A.D.2d 410 [2d Dept 2001]; Rodriguez v City of New York, 295 A.D.2d 590 [2d Dept 2002]; 6243 Jericho Realty Corp. v AutoZone, Inc., 27 A.D.3d 447 [2d Dept 2006]; Dorazio v Delbene, 37 A.D.3d 645 [2d Dept 2007]; Pryor & Mandelup, LLP v Sabbeth, 82 A.D.3d 731 [2d Dept 2011]; Carthen v Sherman, 169 A.D.3d 416 [1st Dept 2019]).
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate first and foremost that a duty was owed by defendant to plaintiff (see Solomon v City of New York, 66 N.Y.2d 1026 [1985]). Here, in an attempt to defeat County's summary judgment motion, plaintiff attempts to portray Singh's conduct as a potential high speed pursuit, but other than speculation, there is no evidence presented to support that assertion. If there had been evidence in admissible form presented of such conduct, then Singh's conduct would have been governed by the standard of reckless disregard for the safety of others (VTL § 1104), yet there is no indication of such conduct in the proof submitted. Neither Haluda nor Singh describe a high speed car chase, at best Haluda alleges that he was distracted by what he claims were police lights and sirens to his rear. Assuming for the purposes of this motion that Haluda's recollection and testimony is accurate and truthful, and discounting Singh's account (see Boston v Dunham, 21A A.D.2d 708, [3rd Dept 2000]), the duty owed by Singh to the plaintiffs was nevertheless circumscribed to the extent that Haluda's reaction was not foreseeable (see generally, Holdampf v A.C. & S., [In re New York City Asbestos Litig.], 5 N.Y.3d 486 [2005]).
A driver is entitled to anticipate that other motorists will obey traffic laws which require him/her to yield or stop (see Williams v Hayes, 103 A.D.3d 713 [2d Dept. 2013]). Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff and Haluda, even if Singh had her vehicle's emergency lights and sirens activated under the circumstances as Haluda describes, the Second Department has said that a motor vehicle operator such as Haluda was obliged by the Vehicle and Traffic law to pull over and not take some other type of dangerous action, such as entering an intersection without observing the traffic control device controlling his travel (VTL § 1144; see Tobacco v North Babylon Fire Department, 251 A.D.2d 398 [2d Dept 1998]). There is no reasonable view of the evidence presented that can form the basis for a trier of fact to conclude that any actions by Singh could be considered a competent producing cause of the accident. "If a rule of law were established so that liability would be imposed in an instance such as this, it is difficult to conceive of the bounds to which liability logically would flow" (Pulka v Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781 [1976]).
Accordingly, the County's motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims against it by plaintiff and co-defendants is granted, and the action is dismissed as to the County.
The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this court.