Id. at 381. In Higginbotham v. Rice, 271 Ga. 262 ( 517 S.E.2d 784) (1999), the Supreme Court concluded the caveat was untimely and reversed the judgment of this Court. On remittitur from the Supreme Court, we conclude that Rice's remaining enumerations of error were either decided adversely to Rice by the decision of the Supreme Court, or are without merit.

Proceedings for the probate of a will are special proceedings within the meaning of OCGA § 9–11–81. Rice v. Higginbotham , 235 Ga. App. 378, 379 (1), 508 S.E.2d 736 (1998), reversed on other grounds, Higginbotham v. Rice , 271 Ga. 262, 517 S.E.2d 784 (1999). Because the Civil Practice Act's procedure in OCGA § 9–11–60 for attacking a judgment through a set-aside motion is more restrictive than the Probate Code's procedure in OCGA §§ 53–3–50 and 53–3–51 for attacking an order admitting a will to probate on the ground that another will should be admitted to probate, the constraints of OCGA § 9–11–60 do not apply in this case.