Opinion
Case No. 1:04-CV-63-TS.
September 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
This cause is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [DE 10], filed on April 16, 2004. The Court also considers the Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel [DE 6], filed on March 31, 2004.
BACKGROUND
On March 18, 2004, the Plaintiff, Dewayne Higdon, filed his pro se Complaint against Michael W. Lautzenheiser, a Wells County Prosecutor, alleging malicious prosecution in violation of his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiff sought both monetary damages and injunctive relief.
On March 31, 2004, the Plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel. The Court took the motion under advisement and ordered the Plaintiff to complete a questionnaire provided by the Court. The Plaintiff returned the questionnaire on April 19, 2004.
On April 16, 2004, the Defendant moved to dismiss the Plaintiff's Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). After seeking an extension of time to file a response, the Plaintiff responded on May 3, 2004. On May 12, 2004, the Plaintiff replied and on May 26, 2004, the Plaintiff filed a sur-response.
STANDARD
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint and not the merits of the suit. Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). The court presumes all well-pleaded allegations to be true and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepts as true all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations. Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1995). A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is not proper "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
To survive a motion to dismiss a § 1983 action, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant, acting under color of state law, intentionally and unlawfully deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. See Patrick v. Jasper County, 901 F.2d 561, 565 (7th Cir. 1990). Federal notice pleading requires only that the plaintiff "set out in [his] complaint a short and plain statement of the claim that will provide the defendant with fair notice of the claim." Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472, 474-75 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Scott v. City of Chicago, 195 F.3d 950, 951 (7th Cir. 1999)). In addition, pro se pleadings are held to less exacting standards than those prepared by counsel and are to be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 325 (7th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
In his Motion to Dismiss, the Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's claims for money damages against him in his official capacity are barred by federal sovereign immunity. The Defendant also submits that he is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity from the Plaintiff's claims against him in his individual capacity.In his response, the Plaintiff clarifies that he did not intend to sue the Wells County Prosecutor's Office or the State of Indiana. Rather, the "Complaint was filed and intended as an Individual Capacity Suit." (Pf.'s Resp. at 2.) The Plaintiff, arguing that he need only allege that he was deprived of a right secured under the constitution and that it was caused by a person acting under color of state law provides:
The plaintiff has been denied his civil liberties and his rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The defendant has acted under color of state law to personally wage a vendetta against the plaintiff. The plaintiff [has] suffer[ed] mentally and financially at the hands of Michael Lautzenheiser, in a malicious manner.
The Plaintiff is correct that, to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff need not plead particular legal theories or particular facts. See Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1998). Instead, under § 1983, the Plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978).
However, because the Plaintiff sues the Defendant in his individual capacity, the Court must also determine whether the Complaint seeks relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. (Based on the Plaintiff's response about the nature of his suit, the issue of sovereign immunity is not before the Court.)
A. The Defendant is Immune from Suit in His Individual Capacity
To free the judicial process from the harassment and intimidation associated with frivolous litigation, the Supreme Court has held that prosecutors are immune from acts or omissions associated with the judicial process, in particular, those taken "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). The degree of immunity prosecutors are afforded depends on their activity in a particular case. If a prosecutor's function is judicial or quasi-judicial, he is entitled to absolute immunity from suit; but if the function was administrative or investigatory, he is only entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1997). Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Allegations of malice or bad faith are not sufficient to overcome the immunity. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
Even under the liberal notice pleading standard and the liberal construction afforded pro se pleadings, the Complaint does not provide any facts that would suggest that the Defendant's actions were not judicial or quasi-judicial. The Plaintiff's allegations center around the Defendant's acts of filing charges against him and failing to investigate an accusation before filing charges. In his quasi-judicial capacity, a prosecutor sued for malicious prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity even where an indictment is not supported by probable cause. Spiegel v. Rabinovitz, 121 F.3d 251, 257 (7th Cir. 1997); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir. 1986).
Although the Supreme Court has held that judicial immunity does not extend to injunctive relief, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984), in 1996, Congress amended § 1983 to provide that "injunctive relief shall not be granted" in an action brought against "a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or a declaratory relief was unavailable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Pub.L. 104-317, 1996 S 1887, § 309(c). Under this amendment, the type of relief available to a plaintiff who sues a judicial officer is limited to declaratory relief. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
The Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims against the Defendant that would entitle him to relief. The Defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from the Plaintiff's § 1983 suit for damages and injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
B. The Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is Denied
On March 31, 2004, the Plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel. On April 19, 2004, the Plaintiff submitted a Questionnaire for Appointment of Counsel indicating that he could not afford an attorney and that he had tried to obtain counsel.
Because the Plaintiff's Complaint asserts claims against a defendant who is immune from suit, appointment of counsel would not make a difference in the outcome of this case. See Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 322 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing the necessary inquiry for appointment of counsel as: "given the difficulty of the case, did the plaintiff appear to be competent to try it himself and, if not, would the presence of counsel have made a difference in the outcome?") Accordingly, the Court declines to ask an attorney to represent the Plaintiff in this matter. See Luttrell v. Nickel, 129 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Although civil litigants do not have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel, the district court has the discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to request attorneys to represent indigents in appropriate cases.") (citing Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 1995)). Given the facts of this case, the Defendant's motion to dismiss would be granted despite the efforts of any court-appointed counsel.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel [DE 6] is DENIED and the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [DE 10] is GRANTED. Judgment is entered for the Defendant, Michael Lautzenheiser, and against the Plaintiff, Dewayne Higdon.
SO ORDERED