Hicks v. State

20 Citing cases

  1. Carter v. State

    2016 Ark. 152 (Ark. 2016)   Cited 5 times

    The written order or the docket must detail the reason for the continuance on this basis. Id. (citing Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991) ). Rule 28.3(b)(1)'s requirement of a contemporaneous written order or docket entry explaining with particularity the reasons the trial docket does not permit trial was not met in the present case. Thus, appellant is correct that the trial court erred in excluding the period from May 13 to July 22, 2013.

  2. Osborn v. State

    340 Ark. 444 (Ark. 2000)   Cited 11 times
    Recognizing that “[w]hile our Rules of Appellate Procedure—Criminal do not specifically mention cross appeal, as such, our Rule of Appellate Procedure—Civil clearly do ( seeArk. R.App. P.—Civ. 3(d))

    See Ark.R.Crim.P. 28.3(i). In support of his argument, Osborn directs our attention to Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991). In Hicks, we held that congestion alone did not constitute exceptional circumstances to justify breaching the speedy-trial rule.

  3. Bradford v. State

    953 S.W.2d 549 (Ark. 1997)   Cited 7 times
    In Bradford, the State attempted to exclude a period based primarily on a chronology of events to show the defendant was responsible for the delay.

    [2] The trial court should enter written orders or make docket entries at the time a continuance is granted to detail the reason for the continuance, and to specify to a date certain the amount of excluded time. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(c); Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991). Adherence to this principle is necessary "[i]n order to provide any impetus behind Rule 28.3 . . . otherwise, there is no need for the rule."

  4. Tanner v. State

    324 Ark. 37 (Ark. 1996)   Cited 20 times
    In Tanner, there was nothing in the record to indicate that either Tanner or his counsel was present at the pretrial hearing during which the court reset his trial.

    (h) Other periods of delay for good cause. In Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991), the court, on its own motion, continued the appellant's trial to a date which was outside the speedy trial period. A docket entry read that, "due to the crowded court trial docket" it was necessary to move the appellant's trial.

  5. Jones v. State

    323 Ark. 655 (Ark. 1996)   Cited 16 times
    In Jones v. State, 323 Ark. 655, 916 S.W.2d 736 (1996), the appellant had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.

    This case is distinguishable from other decisions in which we have found that, in addition to the trial court's noncompliance with Rule 28.3(i), the state failed to prove that the disputed delay was legally justified. E.g., Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991) (finding the trial court's order excluding period of delay violated Rules 28.3(b) and 28.3(i)); Turbyfill v. State, 312 Ark. 1, 846 S.W.2d 646 (1993) (finding no proper continuance indicating the reasons for delay was granted by the trial court when continuance was ordered). In the present case, in contrast, the state has clearly demonstrated that the disputed delay was the result of appellant's conduct.

  6. Turbyfill v. State

    312 Ark. 1 (Ark. 1993)   Cited 7 times
    Finding no proper continuance indicating the reasons for delay was granted by the trial court when continuance was ordered

    Id. See Glover v. State, 307 Ark. 1, 817 S.W.2d 409 (1991) (writ of prohibition granted where defendant's right to speedy trial was violated). We agree with Turbyfill that no proper continuance indicating the reasons for the delay was granted by the trial court at the original trial date and, under the facts of this case, his reliance on Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991), is well placed. In Hicks, the trial court waited eight days after deciding to continue the case to note the continuance on its docket.

  7. Lewis v. State

    307 Ark. 260 (Ark. 1991)   Cited 13 times

    Opinion delivered November 18, 1991 [Rehearing denied December 23, 1991.] 1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — SPEEDY TRIAL — BURDEN ON STATE TO SHOW DELAY WAS JUSTIFIED. — The burden was on the state to show the delay was justified where appellant's second trial after severance was held fifty-one days beyond the time for speedy trial. 2. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE — SPEEDY TRIAL — CONTINUANCE ORDERED TO BEGIN TWO MONTHS EARLIER — TRIAL SPEEDY. — Although the July 12 order purported to grant a continuance beginning two months earlier contrary to Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991), where the order was not otherwise flawed and when the sixty-nine days from June 12 to August 20 was excluded, appellant's trial was within the time allowed under the speedy trial rules. 3.

  8. Moody v. Arkansas County

    350 Ark. 176 (Ark. 2002)   Cited 20 times

    This court has stated that the law is well settled that congestion of the trial docket without more is not just cause for breaching the speedy-trial rule. Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991). See also, Novak v. State, 294 Ark. 120, 741 S.W.2d 243 (1987); Harkness v. Harrison, 266 Ark. 59, 585 S.W.2d 10 (1979); Rule 28.3(b).

  9. Miles v. State

    348 Ark. 544 (Ark. 2002)   Cited 22 times
    In Miles, just as in the present case, the trial court's entry of the order nunc pro tunc, corrected the record to reflect the date action was taken in the circuit court.

    In any event, compliance with such a request would not change the outcome of the case.[4] The only case cited by Mr. Miles under his speedy-trial argument is Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991). Mr. Miles argues that, in both Hicks and the instant case, "the motion was made prior to trial and no order was entered showing the circumstances of any continuance."

  10. IN RE R. 28.3, RULES, CRIM. PROC

    337 Ark. App'x 624 (Ark. 1999)

    These changes have been made to address recurrent problems arising in cases. E.g., Hicks v. State, 305 Ark. 393, 808 S.W.2d 348 (1991).