See Roach v. Barclays American/Credit, 164 Ga. App. 616 ( 298 SE2d 304) (1982). See generally Johnson v. Kimberly Clark, 233 Ga. App. 508, 510 ( 504 SE2d 536) (1998); Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 702 ( 458 SE2d 883) (1995); Hayes v. Century 21 Shows, 116 Ga. App. 490, 491 (1) ( 157 SE2d 779) (1967). There is nothing in OCGA § 11-9-609 that allows a secured party to avoid liability for a wrongful repossession by simply delegating this duty to an independent contractor.

OCGA § 51-3-1 imposes a nondelegable duty upon a landowner to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition, and a landowner must use ordinary care to do so. Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 702 ( 458 SE2d 883) (1995). The general rule regarding premises liability is that a landlord does not insure tenants' safety against third-party criminal attacks, and that any liability from such attacks must be predicated on a breach of duty to "exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe."

OCGA § 51-3-1 imposes a non-delegable duty upon a landowner to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition, and a landowner must use ordinary care to do so. Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701 ( 458 S.E.2d 883) (1995). A landowner can be liable for third-party criminal attacks if the landowner has reasonable grounds to apprehend that such a criminal act would be committed but fails to take steps to guard against injury. Walker v. St. Paul Apartments, 227 Ga. App. 298 ( 489 S.E.2d 317) (1997); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga. App. 241, 242 ( 414 S.E.2d 265) (1991); Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 492 ( 405 S.E.2d 474) (1991).

(a) Under O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 (4), the employer of an independent contractor is liable for the acts and omissions of such independent contractor when the duty is imposed by statute; in this case, O.C.G.A. § 51-3-1 imposes a personal and nondelegable duty upon the landlord to keep the premises and approaches safe when he retains possession and control. Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223 Ga. App. 47 ( 476 S.E.2d 822) (1996); Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 702-703 ( 458 S.E.2d 883) (1995); Moon v. Homeowners Assn. of Sibley Forest, 202 Ga. App. 821, 824 (4) ( 415 S.E.2d 654) (1992); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga. App. 194, 196-197 (1) ( 351 S.E.2d 718) (1986). Further, a personal and nondelegable duty imposed by statute cannot be avoided by a management company employing the security company to protect only the owner's property; the owner is liable for the torts of an independent contractor in protecting its premises.

A landowner is liable to invitees for injuries caused by his failure to use ordinary care in keeping the premises safe; this is a statutory duty. OCGA §§ 51-3-1; 44-7-13; Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701 ( 458 S.E.2d 883). A landlord impliedly warrants that the rented premises are in good repair, and if by reason of a latent defect they are not, he is liable if he actually knew they were not in good repair or if by the exercise of ordinary care he could have discovered that they were not, if the defective condition is the proximate cause of the injury. Country Club Apts. v. Scott, 154 Ga. App. 217, 219 ( 267 S.E.2d 811). The requirement of ordinary care in maintaining an adequate fire detection and alarm system, whether established by ordinance or by the jury's finding, is intended to warn of fire whatever its cause. Even assuming that Denise's "petulant" child started this fire, if an adequate fire detection and alarm system may have spared the plaintiffs the particular harm caused to them, the defendant landlords may be liable to the extent determined by the jury.

Generally, where the case has moved to a jury trial and the evidence is extensive, it is better to let the jury hear the facts and then grant a judgment n.o.v., than to court the prospect of having to re-try the entire case. See Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701 ( 458 S.E.2d 883). Judgment reversed. Johnson and Smith, JJ., concur.

Considerations of judicial economy would therefore generally dictate that, once a jury is seated in a case involving the McDonnell Douglas framework, a trial court refrain from ruling on CR 50 motions until after a jury verdict is returned. See generally Hickman v. Allen, 217 Ga. App. 701, 703-04, 458 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1995) ("Whenever a party is entitled to a directed verdict, it should be granted . . ., but when the erroneous grant of directed verdict to a defendant will require a new trial, and particularly where there is extensive evidence and debate as in this case, it is a wise exercise in judicial economy to let the jury decide the matter and then to grant a judgment n.o.v., rather than court the prospect of trying the entire matter again as to that defendant, with resulting prejudice to all parties."); Rhein v. ADT Auto., Inc., 122 N.M. 646, 930 P.2d 783, 790 n. 4 (1996); N.H. Ins. Co. v. Sid Smith Assocs., Inc., 610 So.2d 340, 344 (Miss. 1992); Therrell v. Georgia Marble Holdings Corp., 960 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1992); Colonial Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. Musgrave, 749 F.2d 1092, 1098 n. 3 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. Vahlco Corp, 720 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1983); 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDREAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2533, at 319 (1995) ("[A]ppellate courts have repeatedly

Therefore, Tavares's status as an independent contractor has no bearing on its potential liability. See England v. Beers Constr. Co. , 224 Ga. App. 44, 47 (2), 479 S.E.2d 420 (1996) ("OCGA §§ 51-2-4 and 51-2-5 limit an employer's vicarious liability only, and do not apply to a claim arising from the employer's own conduct."); see also Hickman v. Allen , 217 Ga. App. 701, 702, 458 S.E.2d 883 (1995) (landlord was subject to liability for independent contractor's torts because OCGA § 51-3-1 imposes a nondelegable duty to exercise ordinary care to keep premises safe for invitees).Nor are we persuaded by Zen Massage's reliance on Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J. B. , 300 Ga. 840, 797 S.E.2d 87 (2017), and Tomsic v. Marriott Intl., Inc. , 321 Ga. App. 374, 739 S.E.2d 521 (2013).