Prior to and since the above statute was enacted in 1945, (Chapter 21, Public Acts 1945), the appellate courts of this state have held repeatedly that a court speaks only through its minutes. Fraker v. Brazelton, 80 Tenn. 278; State v. True, 116 Tenn. 294, 95 S.W. 1028; Dennis v. State, 137 Tenn. 543, 195 S.W. 162; Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor Implement Vehicle Co., 138 Tenn. 28, 195 S.W. 762; Broadway Motor Co. v. Public Fire Ins. Co., 12 Tenn. App. 278; Mullen v. State, 164 Tenn. 523, 51 S.W.2d 497; Jackson v. Jarratt, 165 Tenn. 76, 52 S.W.2d 137; Prince v. Lawson, 167 Tenn. 319, 69 S.W.2d 889; McClain v. State of Tenn., 186 Tenn. 401, 210 S.W.2d 680; Bernard v. Walker, 186 Tenn. 617, 212 S.W.2d 600; Hickle v. Irick, 42, Tenn. App. 183, 300 S.W.2d 54. In Dennis v. State, supra, it was held that denial of a motion for a new trial by a special judge appointed pending impeachment proceedings against the judge who presided at the trial was not an approval of the verdict.
valid and effective judgment on the verdict of the jury; and (2) there is no valid and efficacious ruling of the Court on defendant's motion for new trial. We have critically examined Johnson v. Johnson (1870), 49 Tenn. 521; Moore v. State (1871), 50 Tenn. 493 ; Bass v. State (1872), 65 Tenn. 579; State v. Farrow (1876), 67 Tenn. 571; Jackson v. Jackson (1878), 3 Tenn. Cas. 18; State v. True (1905), 116 Tenn. 294, 95 S.W. 1028; Crum v. Fillers (1926), 6 Tenn. App. 547; Wilkenson v. Johnson City Shale Brick Corp. (1928), 156 Tenn. 373, 299 S.W. 1056, 2 S.W.2d 89; State ex rel. Pierce v. Hardin (1931), 163 Tenn. 471, 43 S.W.2d 924; Mullen v. State (1932), 164 Tenn. 523, 51 S.W.2d 497; Hines v. Thompson (1940), 25 Tenn. App. 86, 148 S.W.2d 376; Hamilton v. State (1941), 177 Tenn. 282, 148 S.W.2d 375; Chrisman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1942), 178 Tenn. 321, 157 S.W.2d 831; McClain v. State (1948), 186 Tenn. 401, 210 S.W.2d 680; Gilpin v. Burrage (1948), 188 Tenn. 80, 216 S.W.2d 732; Hickle v. Irick (1956), 42 Tenn. App. 183, 300 S.W.2d 54; Cobb v. Brown (1956), 42 Tenn. App. 595, 305 S.W.2d 241; Duboise v. State (1956), 200 Tenn. 93, 290 S.W.2d 646; Jackson v. Handell (1959), 46 Tenn. App. 234, 327 S.W.2d 55, and others. This collation leads to two prime conclusions, (1) that the law of Tennessee with respect to the question above stated has vaccilated to a distressing degree, and (2) that this highly significant judicial procedure should not be left in the penumbra.
See Blackburn v. Blackburn, No. E2006-00753-SC-R11-CV, 2008 WL 4877136, at *5, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2008); see also State v. all, No. M 2003-01328-CO A-R9-JV, 2003 W L 22964300, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. A pp. Dec. 16, 2003) (citing Hickle v. Irick, 300 S.W .2d 54, 57 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1956); Hines v. Thompson, 148 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1940); Sparkle Laundry and Cleaners, Inc. v. Kelton, 595 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1979); Envtl. Abatement v. Astrum R.E., 27 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000)). As our Supreme Court recently stated in Blackburn, the purpose of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 58 "is to insure that a party is aware of the existence of a final, appealable judgment in a lawsuit in which he is involved."
This Court has held that "a judgment orally pronounced cannot be appealed from, and is not binding on the parties for any purpose." Hickle v. Irick, 300 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1956); see also Hines v. Thompson, 148 S.W.2d 376 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1940); Sparkle Laundry and Cleaners, Inc. v. Kelton, 595 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1979); Envtl. Abatement v. Astrum R.E., 27 S.W.3d 530 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000). While Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-113, in the absence of a court order, leaves to the discretion of law enforcement officers, DCS representatives, and duly authorized officers of the court the decision to make an emergency preliminary judgment that a child should be taken into immediate custody, section 37-1-114(b) also limits to 24 hours the time for detention prior to a detention hearing.
It is apparent that on April 20, 1970, the Trial Court verbally overruled the plaintiff-appellant's motion for a new trial. A verbal judgment cannot be appealed from. Hickle v. Irick (1956) 42 Tenn. App. 183, 300 S.W.2d 54. It is further apparent the written judgment overruling plaintiff-appellant's motion for a new trial was signed by the Trial Judge on April 27, 1970. Under the local court rules the judgment submitted to the Trial Judge should not have been dated.