Opinion
CIV-20-1291-R
03-29-2022
DEDRICK LEMONT HICKEY, Plaintiff, v. OKLAHOMA COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, et. al. Defendants.
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
GARY M. PURCELL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Plaintiff, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 43, 45, 46), to which Defendant has responded. Doc. No. 51. The matter has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment be denied and that Plaintiff's First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims be dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. Nos. 45, 46) are essentially identical to his Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 43) filed on November 29, 2021. For the sake of clarity, the undersigned will solely reference Plaintiff's November 29, 2021 Motion for Summary Judgment herein.
I. Background Information
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff was confined in the Oklahoma County Detention Center (“OCDC”) located in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Doc. No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff's claims arise primarily from the actions of an OCDC official who threw away Plaintiff's personal property. Construing Plaintiff's Complaint liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), he has asserted a First Amendment claim alleging Defendants interfered with his right of access to the courts, as well as Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims based on the taking of his property. As Defendants, Plaintiff has named the OCDC, OCDC Jail Administrators and individual Defendants Damaris Guerra, Sandra April, Michael Alleman, and Samuel Aguilar. Doc. No. 1 at 1, 10.
II. Uncontroverted Facts
On November 8, 2020, Plaintiff was moved from the general population to the segregated housing unit (“SHU”). Doc. No. 22 at 2. During this transfer, certain contraband items were discovered in Plaintiff's possession and confiscated by OCDC officials. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff's remaining property may have included personal items such as letters he had received, photographs, and contact lenses, commissary items such as hygiene items and certain foods, legal documents related to his criminal proceedings, one pair of shoes, a radio with batteries, books, magazines, playing cards, and music that he was writing and intended to sell. Doc. No. 1 at 2, 8, 9; Doc. No. 22-4 at 2, 3, Doc. No. 43 at 2, 7-8, 9, 10.
Following his transfer, Plaintiff discovered that all of his personal property was missing. He utilized the grievance process to inquire about this and OCDC officials launched an investigation. Doc. No. 1 at 3; Doc. No. 22 at 3-4; Doc. No. 22-4 at 2-3; Doc. No. 43 at 1-3. The OCDC investigator, Phillips Hall, determined that following Plaintiff's transfer to SHU, Detention Officer Christopher Rosales, acting in haste and with inexperience, had thrown away two plastic bags containing Plaintiff's personal property. Doc. No. 22 at 4; Doc. No. 22-4 at 2-3. Investigator Hall recommended replacing the portion of Plaintiff's personal property that OCDC could replace, such as hygiene items, one pair of shoes, playing cards, radio with batteries, and certain food items that could be verified from Plaintiff's last commissary order. Doc. No. 22-4 at 3. He also suggested contacting the Oklahoma County Public Defender's Office to notify them that Plaintiff's legal paperwork had been destroyed and request assistance in replacing copies of all legal documents Plaintiff would need for his criminal proceedings. Id.
OCDC officials contend that they replaced the suggested items on December 9, 2021. Doc. No. 22 at 4. Plaintiff disputes this assertion and contends his items were not replaced. Doc. No. 1 at 8; Doc. No. 43 at 6, 7. Plaintiff also notes that certain items, such as letters, photographs, books, and magazines cannot be replaced. Id. at 7-8. Finally, although OCDC officials assert that they contacted the Oklahoma County Public Defender's Office requesting assistance in replacing copies of Plaintiff's legal documents, see Doc. No. 22 at 4, Plaintiff contends such replacement did not occur. Doc. No. 1 at 8; Doc. No. 43 at 9. Additionally, Plaintiff notes that during the time period in which he was representing himself in his legal proceedings, he had secured an affidavit from a witness who he is now experiencing difficulties in locating. Id. at 10.
III. Standard of Review
A. Summary Judgment Review
Summary judgment may only be granted when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the evidence and inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burke v. Utah Transit Auth. & Local, 462 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006).
A dispute is “genuine” if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Material facts are “facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .” Id. “At the summary judgment stage, a complainant cannot rest on mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence specific facts, which for purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true.” Burke, 462 F.3d at 1258 (quotations and alterations omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quotations omitted).
B. Screening of Prisoner Complaints
A federal district court must review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Additionally, in cases in which the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the court shall dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof at any time that it determines a claim is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
In conducting this review, the reviewing court must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from the allegations, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Although a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, “[t]he burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest' that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). The allegations in a complaint must present “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Further, a claim is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact” or is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory[.]” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 327 (1989).
IV. First Amendment
Though not explicitly asserted, construing Plaintiff's Complaint broadly, the undersigned interprets a portion of Plaintiff's allegations as relevant to a First Amendment claim based on interference with his right of access to the courts. Doc. No. 1 at 2, 9. Specifically, Plaintiff states that the loss of his personal property included his legal materials and documents related to his criminal proceedings and placed him at a disadvantage for his upcoming criminal trial. Id.
Generally, courts recognize a federal First Amendment constitutional claim, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based upon a right of access to courts whenever a litigant contends that a defendant has interfered with his ability to seek redress from the court system. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). “Any deliberate impediment to access [to the courts], even a delay of access, may constitute a constitutional deprivation.” Green v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1383, 1389 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted).
However, to establish a violation of his right of access to the courts, a plaintiff must prove that he was actually impeded in his ability to conduct a particular case. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-55 (1996). In order to satisfy this actual injury requirement, the plaintiff must show that prison officials frustrated or impeded the plaintiff's ability to conduct litigation, such as to file non-frivolous direct appeals from his conviction, a habeas corpus petition, or a civil rights claim pursuant to § 1983 “to vindicate basic constitutional rights.” Id. at 354 (quotations omitted). See also Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998) (“To present a viable claim for denial of access to courts, however, an inmate must allege and prove prejudice arising from the defendants' actions.”).
The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to establish a claim for violation of his constitutional right of access to the court. Although he states that the loss of his legal documentation “forc[es] him to start from scratch and put[s him] at a major disadvantage, ” see Doc. No. 1 at 9, these kinds of general allegations do not establish an actual injury. Additionally, it appears from the record that Plaintiff was represented by counsel, certainly by the time of trial in his criminal proceedings, further undermining a finding of actual injury from the loss of his legal documentation. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied, and his First Amendment claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
V. Eighth Amendment
It appears Plaintiff intended to assert an Eighth Amendment claim based on the deprivation of his property because it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Doc. No. 1 at 6. The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from deprivation “of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” as measured under a contemporary standard of decency. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety qualify as basic human needs. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).
Deprivation of Plaintiff's personal items, described as letters, photographs, contact lenses, hygiene items, certain foods, legal documents, one pair of shoes, a radio with batteries, books, magazines, playing cards, and music that he was writing and intended to sell, does not rise to that standard. See Thomas v. N.M. Corr. Dep't, 272 Fed.Appx. 727, 730 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that prisoner plaintiff's deprivation of personal property did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment); Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935, 941 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Plaintiff [] did not allege a deprivation of essential human needs. Rather, he alleged that he was deprived of ‘what little luxury' he had. While such a deprivation may be ‘restrictive and even harsh,' it did not amount to the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.” (citation omitted)), overruled on other grounds by Clark v. Wilson, 625 F.3d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 2010). Therefore, Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim should be dismissed.
VI. Fourteenth Amendment
Construing Plaintiff's Complaint liberally, as required by Haines, 404 U.S. at 520, he has also asserted a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim based on deprivation of property. The Due Process Clause provides that “no State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Supreme Court has explained, “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government [officials] from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126 (1992) (quotations omitted).
Prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the prison gate, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974), but “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (alteration omitted)). In Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986), the Supreme Court held that an injury arising from a prison officer's negligent actions does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. The Court explained:
We think that the actions of prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate's property, are quite remote from the concerns [about governmental power being used for purposes of oppression] just discussed. Far from an abuse of power, lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person. To hold that injury caused by such conduct is a deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment would trivialize the centuries-old principle of due process of law.Id. at 332. The Supreme Court found that “mere lack of due care by a state official [will not] ‘deprive' an individual of life, liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 330-31. See also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) (“[L]iability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process.”); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (clarifying that Daniels applies to substantive, as well as procedural, due process).
Our Constitution deals with the large concerns of the governors and the governed, but it does not purport to supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in society. We have previously rejected reasoning that “‘would make of the Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States[.]'” Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 [] (1976), quoted in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. [527], 544 [(1981)].Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332.
In Defendants' Special Report, Defendants explain that Mr. Rosales' actions in disposing of Plaintiff's property was the result of haste and inexperience. Doc. No. 22 at 4. Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion. See generally Doc. Nos. 1, 43.
In McKinney v. Revell, 364 Fed.Appx. 430 (10th Cir. 2010), a case strikingly similar to the present, the plaintiff brought a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim based on a deprivation of his personal property. Id. at 431. The plaintiff had been previously transferred from general population to a special housing unit and during that process, his personal property was not returned to him. Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim because he did “not allege, and there is no indication in the complaint, that the loss of his personal property was the result of anything other than mere negligence, [and therefore, ] there is no constitutional violation.” Id. (quotations omitted). On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, explaining, “According to the Supreme Court's decision in Daniels, the due process clause ‘is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property.' 474 U.S. at 328 []. Mr. McKinney does not assert an intentional loss or destruction of his property, thus his allegations fall short of supporting a due process claim.” Id. at 432.
Similarly, in the present case, Plaintiff does not assert an intentional loss or destruction of his property. Instead, Defendants have explained that Mr. Rosales' actions were negligent, and Plaintiff does not dispute this assertion. Accordingly, the Court should deny Plaintiff's request for summary judgment and, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), also dismiss this claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
VII. OCDC Is Not A Proper Party
Alternatively, Defendant OCDC should be dismissed from this lawsuit as an improper party. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) provides that a noncorporate entity's capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court is located. A county jail in Oklahoma, as a subdivision of the county in which it is located, has no separate legal identity under Oklahoma law. Thus, OCDC is not amenable to suit in this Court, and any claims against it should be dismissed with prejudice. See White v. Utah, No. 00-4109, 2001 WL 201980, at *1 (10th Cir. March 1, 2001) (affirming dismissal of county jail because no state law supported directing a cause of action directly against a county's subdivisions, including its jails); see also, cf., Lindsey v. Thomson, No. 06-7114, 2007 WL 2693970 at *3 (10th Cir. Sept. 10, 2007) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against police department and county sheriff's department because they are entities with no apparent legal existence). Accordingly, OCDC should be dismissed from this lawsuit.
VIII. Personal Participation
“[P]ersonal participation is an essential allegation in a § 1983 claim.” Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). Plaintiff has not named a defendant that participated in the violation of his due process rights. As established herein, it is undisputed that the OCDC employee who disposed of Plaintiff's property was Mr. Rosales. However, Plaintiff has not named Mr. Rosales as a Defendant in this matter.
It is unlikely that prior to Defendants filing the Special Report on May 14, 2021, Plaintiff knew the identity of the ODOC employee who threw away his personal property. Doc. No. 1 at 8 (wherein Plaintiff explains that OCDC officials refused to provide him the name of the employee who disposed of his property). However, since that time, Plaintiff has not amended his pleading to name Mr. Rosales as a Defendant.
As individual Defendants, Plaintiff has named the Jail Administrators, Damaris Guerra, Sandra April, Michael Alleman, and Samuel Aguilar. Doc. No. 1 at 1, 10. Plaintiff admits in his Complaint that he named the individual Defendants because he knew they “made contact with” his property on November 8, 2020, the day he was transferred to SHU and his property was thrown away. Id. at 8. However, it has since been established that none of these Defendants disposed of Plaintiff's property and therefore, did not personally participate in a violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, as an alternative basis, the Court should dismiss these Defendants based on their lack of personal participation in the events underlying Plaintiff's claims.
Additionally, while Jail Administrators clearly hold a supervisory position with regard to the OCDC, a supervisor may only be held liable if he is affirmatively linked to the constitutional violation. “Section 1983 does not authorize liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2011). As a result, government officials have no vicarious liability in a § 1983 suit for the misconduct of their subordinates because “there is no concept of strict supervisor liability under section 1983.” Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted).
Instead, a supervisor is liable only if he is “personally involved in the constitutional violation, and a sufficient causal connection [] exist[s] between the supervisor and the constitutional violation.” Serna v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 455 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted); see also Schneider v. Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 2013) (requiring a plaintiff to show an “affirmative link” between the supervisor and the constitutional violation). “Thus, [] Plaintiff must base supervisory liability ‘upon active unconstitutional behavior' and ‘more than a mere right to control employees.'” Davis v. Oklahoma County, No. CIV-08-0550-HE, 2009 WL 2901180, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 3, 2009) (quoting Serna, 455 F.3d at 1153). Plaintiff fails to allege any affirmative link between the Jail Administrators and the events underlying his claims.
Based on Plaintiff's failure to allege any link between the individual Defendants and his claims, it is recommended the Court dismiss Defendants Jail Administrators and Defendants Damaris Guerra, Sandra April, Michael Alleman, and Samuel Aguilar based on their lack of personal participation. Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding dismissal of § 1983 claims because the complaint did not indicate personal participation by the named defendants).
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing findings, it is recommended Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 43, 45, 46) be denied. Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(e)(2)(B)(ii), the undersigned recommends Plaintiff's First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defendant ODOC should be dismissed as an improper party. Finally, Defendants Jail Administrators, Damaris Guerra, Sandra April, Michael Alleman, and Samuel Aguilar should be dismissed for lack of personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations.
Plaintiff is advised of the right to file an objection to this Supplemental Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by March 15 th, 2022, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. The failure to timely object to this Supplemental Report and Recommendation would waive appellate review of the recommended ruling. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991); cf. Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.”).
This Supplemental Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter, and any pending motion not specifically addressed herein is denied.