Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991), disapproved on other grounds, Windham v. Griffin, 295 Neb. 279, 887 N.W.2d 710 (2016).
We have previously decided that a district court in a dissolution action, acting pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-364 (Reissue 1998), has jurisdiction to grant rights of visitation to an ex-stepparent when that ex-stepparent establishes that during the marriage, he or she acted as a parent to the stepchild. Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991). It is undisputed that Mark acted as a parent to Nicole during his marriage to Debra and is, therefore, entitled to seek visitation.
In the absence of a biological relationship between a husband and his wife's child, the husband may acquire certain rights and responsibilities when he elects to stand in loco parentis to the child. See, Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991); Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N.W.2d 560 (1946). We have stated:
As we have stated repeatedly: "[P]arties in a proceeding to dissolve a marriage cannot control the disposition of minor children by agreement." Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 582, 477 N.W.2d 8, 11 (1991). Accord, Hicks v. Hicks, 223 Neb. 189, 388 N.W.2d 510 (1986); Eliker v. Eliker, 206 Neb. 764, 295 N.W.2d 268 (1980); Koser v. Koser, 148 Neb. 277, 27 N.W.2d 162 (1947).
In the absence of a biological or adoptive relationship between a husband and his wife's child, the Nebraska Supreme Court and this court have recognized that certain rights and responsibilities may arise where a husband elects to stand in loco parentis to his wife's child. See, Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991); Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N.W.2d 560 (1946); Cavanaugh v. deBaudiniere, supra. The Nebraska Supreme Court has held:
Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 510 N.W.2d 73 (1994); Dice v. Dice, 1 Neb. App. 241, 493 N.W.2d 207 (1992). See, also, Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991). DISCUSSION
We do not agree.Our reference to “same rights” goes back at least to Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom , 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991), which relied in part on Gribble v. Gribble , 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). In Gribble , the Supreme Court of Utah based a stepparent's standing to seek visitation upon an interpretation of a Utah divorce statute, then codified as Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1953).
Latham, supra note 16. See Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991).“[W]hile it is presumed that a child's best interest is served by maintaining the family's privacy and autonomy, that presumption must give way where the child has established strong psychological bonds with a person who, although not a biological parent, has lived with the child and provided care, nurture, and affection, assuming in the child's eye a stature like that of a parent.
Weinand v. Weinand, 260 Neb. 146, 152–53, 616 N.W.2d 1, 6 (2000) (emphasis omitted). In Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991), we determined that the doctrine of in loco parentis, although not enumerated in the statutes, is a proper consideration when determining stepparent visitation with due consideration to the best interests of the child.
Pursuant to § 42-366, upon marital separation, parties may enter into a written agreement for the disposition of their property, and the terms of such an agreement are binding on the court unless found to be unconscionable. Parties are bound by stipulations that are voluntarily made, and relief from such stipulations is warranted only under exceptional circumstances. Hickenbottom v. Hickenbottom, 239 Neb. 579, 477 N.W.2d 8 (1991). In this case, the parties entered into the stipulation and agreement, in which they agreed upon the disposition of all of their property except Dallas' tier II benefits.