Opinion
No. KNO FA 07 4106128 S
June 27, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTIONS TO OPEN AND MODIFY JUDGMENT and MOTIONS FOR CONTEMPT
Before this court are defendant's May 23 and May 26 motions (#194 and 195) claiming that plaintiff is in contempt of certain prior orders of this court, and his May 31 motion to open and modify the judgment as to custody (#196). Also present are two motions (#197 and 198) filed by plaintiff on June 1, praying that the court open and modify the judgment so as to limit visitation to supervised conditions only; these are exact copies of each other, and hence #198 is redundant. At the inception of the hearing on June 9, only motion #194 was scheduled to be heard, with all remaining motions scheduled to be heard on the June 13 short calendar. However, both parties agreed that they were prepared to proceed on June 9 as to all outstanding motions in one hearing. Accordingly, the scope of the hearing was thus expanded. In the course of the proceeding, defendant informed the court that he was withdrawing motion #194, but desired to continue the pursuit of his two remaining motions. This decision, then, resolves all outstanding motions.
I. History of the Case
The court (Goldberg, J.) dissolved the marriage of the parties on September 12, 2007. The court accepted the parties' agreement with respect to custody of and access to their daughter, who was born on August 4, 2005, and so is now five years old. They were awarded joint custody, primary residence with plaintiff, and a visitation schedule affording defendant two visits per week.
Since September 12, 2007, the parties have filed a total of thirty post-judgment motions, about half filed by each, and about equally divided between motions for contempt and motions to open and modify the judgment. While a few of these filings dealt with financial disputes, the vast majority concern custody and visitation. Over the course of the last three and a half years, defendant's access has at times been restricted to supervised visits, later expanded to allow overnights on weekends, then again contracted to eliminate the overnights. Coincidentally, it was this jurist who entered the last two orders in the file. On October 25, 2010, following a contested hearing on the short calendar at which only the parties testified, defendant lost the privilege of overnight visits. On January 24, 2011, again after a contested hearing, the court ordered defendant to no longer allow any exposure of the child to an adult friend of his named Bob Nickerson. (On that same date, the court also admonished plaintiff against unilateral noncompliance with court orders.) At the time the present hearing began, the current orders were joint custody, primary residence with plaintiff, with defendant's visitation on Wednesday afternoons and on alternating Saturdays and Sundays from noon to seven p.m. A separate order setting forth a schedule for holiday visits entered on July 21, 2010 (Shluger, J.), and remains in effect.
II. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff's two motions to open and modify, both dated May 23 but filed on June 1, claim that defendant has allowed inappropriate contact with the child by an unrelated adult friend. She moves that visitation henceforth be only on a supervised basis.
III. Defendant's Claims
Defendant's May 26 motion (#195) charges plaintiff with contempt of court for deliberately thwarting visits with him on May 18, 19, 21, and 22. Additionally, he seeks attorneys fees from her. Characterizing her behavior as evidence of a long-standing pattern on her part of disparaging him to the child and alienating them from each other, his June 1 motion (#196) prays for a sole custody order in his favor, with plaintiff to be allowed visitation on a supervised basis only.
IV. Legal Standards
This court heard both parties and their witnesses at length over a period of two (non-consecutive) hearing dates. The court reviewed all pleadings and orders in the file. The court considered applicable case law and statutes, particularly Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46b-56(c) and 46b-87. The court observed the demeanor and attitude and assessed the credibility of each of the witnesses, and enters the orders set forth below in accordance with the following findings.
This subsection reads in full:
In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the child's cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers.
This section reads in full:
When any person is found in contempt of an order of the Superior Court entered under section 46b-60 to 46b-62, inclusive, 46b-81 to 46b-83, inclusive, or 46b-86, the court may award to the petitioner a reasonable attorneys fee and the fees of the officer serving the contempt citation, such sums to be paid by the person found in contempt, provided if any such person is found not to be in contempt of such order, the court may award a reasonable attorneys fee to such person. The costs of commitment of any person imprisoned for contempt of court by reason of failure to comply with such an order shall be paid by the state as in criminal cases.
V. Findings A. Contempt
Orders in effect on May 18, 2011 (a Wednesday) provided that the child ought to be visiting with defendant, but the visit did not occur. May 19 is defendant's birthday, and pursuant to the July 21, 2010 holiday orders is therefore a day set aside for him to spend with the child; she was not with him. On Saturday, May 21, and Sunday, May 22, also days when it was his privilege to be with his daughter, the visits again did not occur. He was ready, willing, and able to visit with her on each of these times, and has satisfied this court that the sole reason for the lapse is plaintiff's refusal to allow the child to spend those times with him. She does not deny these elements of his prima facie case, instead contending that her daughter was placed in a zone of abuse by defendant and that to now allow them to spend time together would be to risk inflicting further abuse upon her.
Plaintiff's failure to literally comply with this court's visitation orders may, but does not automatically, mean that she ought to be found in contempt. In Meehan v. Meehan, 40 Conn.App. 107 (1996), the Appellate Court upheld a trial court's refusal to hold in contempt a mother who thwarted visits between her children and their father because of her fear that he might harm the children. The decision cited a line of cases holding that a contempt finding depends on the facts and circumstances underlying it, including Dukes v. Durante, 192 Conn. 207 (1984) which stated that "it is within the sound discretion of the court to deny a claim for contempt when there is an adequate factual basis to explain the failure to honor the court's order," 192 Conn. 207, 228. A parent bent on contempt, however, cannot expect that subjective protestations of fear will insulate her from a finding that she has willfully defied a court order; she may face sanctions for such behavior including fines and attorneys fees. Thus in Gina M.G. v. William C., 77 Conn.App. 582 (2003), the Appellate Court affirmed a trial court order imposing such penalties upon a mother who alleged that the child's father had sexually abused the child and who had continuously frustrated visits between him and her daughter despite findings that such abuse had not occurred. The court considered the entire record of the dealings between the parents in reaching its decision.
The first question facing this court is which of these two poles this case most accurately approaches. Plaintiff asserts that in early May, some associate of defendant's named Eric (who did not appear before this court) had touched the child along her leg and in her privates. She testified that the child reported this to her on or about May 6. Thereafter, plaintiff reported the child's statements to her own therapist, who, in turn, called the Department of Children and Families (DCF). DCF sent an investigative social worker to research this referral. She has found nothing to sustain the allegations. Eighteen days after the child's revelation, Plaintiff also made a report to the Norwich Police Department, although no information as to its investigation was brought to the court's attention.
The considerable disclosure of information concerning DCF reports and investigations, and the testimony of a DCF worker in this hearing, warrant mention that the court conducted a discussion on the record as to the confidentiality provisions of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-124(b) ("All records of cases of juvenile matters . . . shall be confidential . . . and open to inspection or disclosure . . . only upon order of the Superior Court, except that: . . . (2) such records shall be available to . . . (B) the parents or guardian of the child or youth until such time as the child or youth reaches the age of majority"). Both parents, who are represented by counsel, and the guardian ad litem as well, waived the statutory privilege.
That incident is remarkably similar to two prior encounters between the parties, which led to the orders entered by this court in October and January. The October order followed a series of events in September and October of 2010 which included, inter alia, a call from the child's physician's office to DCF reporting that defendant had slapped the child in the face during a September visit. That investigation remained pending when the parties appeared before this court on plaintiff's October 7, 2010 motion to open and modify (#182). The motion alleges that there was bruising on the child's face, and that she was lethargic and responding negatively to spending overnights. At the hearing, plaintiff added that the child had been burned on the arm while at her father's home, had a bruise on her leg as well as the one on her face, and had flea bites; moreover, she said the child had told her therapist that father had told her not to talk about any of this. The picture painted was of a man out of control and unsafe to be left around a child. It sufficed to cause a curtailment of his overnight visits, and to induce this court to order the appointment of a guardian ad litem.
The matter returned to this court on January 24 on defendant's motion (#189) seeking that plaintiff be held in contempt for denying him court-ordered visits with the child on diverse dates in November and December. On this occasion, plaintiff admitted that she had inhibited some court-ordered visits because of reports that the child was frightened at father's house by the presence of Bob Nickerson. What he was alleged to have done was to take pictures of her, which plaintiff claimed made the child extremely upset. Plaintiff asserted that the child's therapist was even more concerned, and that the effect of her halting the visits was to allow the child to relax. On the strength of this testimony, and in light of the testimony presented at the October hearing, this court declined to hold her in contempt, and ordered defendant to not permit access between the child and Mr. Nickerson.
The present dispute is thus the third within nine months forcing the court to resolve a bitter parental standoff between this mother and father. This time, due to the benefit of a full hearing with a family relations office evaluation finalized, and the input of a guardian ad litem, numerous significant details have been brought to the court's attention which result in the truth being considerably less obscured.
1) On October 28, 2010, DCF concluded its investigation that had still been in progress on October 25. There was no substantiation of abuse on the part of the defendant.
2) Plaintiff's repeated allegations that the child was afraid of defendant and refused to visit with him are contradicted by the following:
a) The family relations officer, Matt Walker, observed father and child on June 7, 2011. His report indicates that she "appeared happy," that he was "calm, attentive, and protective," and that they have a "secure, affectionate relationship which appears natural and loving."
b) The FRO's report transmits the concerns of the child's therapist, Wendy St. George, who also had worked with father and child together. Her observation was that he is "calm," "cool," and "careful" around his child. Significantly, the first impression she had of him originated from mother's report that he was abusive and was causing the child significant distress. At an early meeting, plaintiff had demanded she author a letter to the court recommending a suspension of father's visitation rights. The therapist's interaction with defendant did not begin immediately. When she finally proposed that including him in the child's therapy was important, she reports that plaintiff "went ballistic," loudly yelling and swearing in the child's presence. Mother eventually terminated therapy without consulting father.
c) The FRO's report further relates the observations of the child's long-time day care worker, Amanda Kapilitis, who told him that defendant was "always polite" and noted that the child "lights up" when she sees him.
d) The investigative social worker from DCF to whom the 2010 referral was assigned issued a report (plaintiff's Exhibit 5), recounting a meeting between father and child which she had observed on September 29, 2010. The worker, identified as Rebecca Jeffrey, met first with the child, who told her that she was happy at that home. Later, when father was present, Ms. Jeffrey describes her behavior as "affectionate" with him and that no fear was evident; she stated that she had no concerns to report concerning the child's interaction with father or with stepmother.
e) Finally, defendant testified credibly that his relationship with his daughter is a good one. He contends that the only difficult time is the point of transition between the parents, when the child clings to her mother on the delivery, and then gets anxious again just before the pickup. Both of them, he reports, enjoy the time in between. He expressly refuted the proposition that Eric had ever assaulted his daughter, maintaining that he was present at all times when Eric was in the child's presence and that no inappropriate touching occurred or would have been tolerated.
Plaintiff called four witnesses. None had anything to say as to the alleged parenting deficiencies on defendant's part. The net effect of the many positive reports, and the court's observation of the various witnesses who rendered them, is the conclusion that defendant is a capable and caring parent, although frustrated in his ability to raise his daughter by a number of inhibitions created by plaintiff. Her premise that the child is afraid of him and does not desire contact with him is baseless.
3) The finding that plaintiff has misstated the nature of the relationship between defendant and her daughter could, in the abstract, be the result of an innocent misperception on her part, arising from benign hypervigilance. That premise is undermined, however, by the reality that on many occasions she has not been candid and truthful in her reporting on defendant and other details relative to her daughter.
a) In the course of the 2010 DCF investigation, she told the social worker that defendant had not seen the child in three years. She also reported that he had been arrested for child abuse in the state of New Hampshire. Both assertions were patently false.
b) She terminated the child's four-year long relationship with her daycare provider, Ms. Kapilitis, stating in court that another child had bullied her daughter. At the time of the termination, however, she had left a voice mail message expressing her dismay that a daycare worker had communicated information about the child to the stepmother. She is not credible on this point.
c) Her October 2010 claim that defendant had burned the child during a visit was reviewed by DCF as an additional aspect of the referral then underway. DCF determined, consistent with defendant's report and the child's statement, that while baking cookies she accidentally touched a hot burner. Plaintiff's insinuation that the child suffered a serious injury on account of gross negligence if not deliberate malice on the part of defendant was an exaggeration at best, or an exploitation of an unfortunate accident such as inevitably will occur as a child grows up.
d) The 2010 referral to DCF terminated without substantiation. The 2011 referral to DCF terminated without substantiation. Each of these involved different adult male friends of defendant. At trial, after repeating last years' concerns about "Bob," then detailing the danger represented by Eric, she raised new concerns about someone else named "Bobby," whom she portrays as yet another sinister part of defendant's entourage. Previously, on July 21, 2010, she had obtained a court order barring any contact between the child and defendant's stepson, Anthony, for reasons not disclosed on the record. This court can acknowledge the possibility that one individual with harmful intentions towards a child may slip into a parent's inner circle, but in light of the fact that two thorough investigations have proven plaintiff's charges to be unfounded the court rejects the theory that a parent as caring and careful as defendant will nevertheless continuously permit such a boogeyman to be present.
e) The investigative social worker from DCF to whom the 2011 referral was assigned, Tina Sposato, appeared here under a subpoena from plaintiff. As of the day on which she testified, June 9, she had met with the child alone on two occasions, both at plaintiff's home. The child gave her two reports as to the alleged abuse by Eric, but they differ in the details. This worker met with the child in plaintiff's presence also on these same two days, on one of which the child denied she had been touched and stated that her mother had told her to say that. An accusation that an adult has sexually assaulted a five-year-old child is an explosive development in a case in which the child's two parents have been at odds over custody for most of her life, and is not to be taken lightly. If true, such an event could well expose the culpable parent to loss of the child's companionship (and that is the consequence plaintiff asks this court to impose upon the father), if not criminal charges. The circumstances here, however, which specifically include the father's first-hand observations of the child's meeting with Eric, make it more likely than not that no assault occurred.
If plaintiff did coach the child to fabricate this report, that would reveal a depth of depravity which the court will not today ascribe to her. On the other hand, giving her the benefit of the doubt that the child made this report to her as she described, what impeded her from calling defendant and reporting this to him, first, as the child's other joint custodian? He was not the alleged perpetrator. Generally, it would be logical and appropriate that she inform him of such a report involving his child. But especially where the alleged incident occurred in his home, and the perpetrator named was one of his guests, such a report would be even more appropriate and logical as it would allow him to take immediate measures to protect his daughter. Plaintiff instead contacted the police and her therapist, and set in motion a chain of events that led to a DCF referral — the second in less than a year — and a substantial hiatus in father's visitation.
Under all the circumstances, this court finds that defendant has proven the allegations of his motion for contempt, and that plaintiff has failed to establish any justification for her unilateral suspension of visits ordered on May 18, 19, 21, and 22. She is in contempt of the prior court orders of July 21, 2010, and January 24, 2011.
B. Custody and Visitation
Both parties move to modify the custody orders so as to allow the other only supervised visitation with their child. Defendant's motion expressly seeks an order of sole custody. Plaintiff's most recent motion does not, but the record reveals that she has made a similar request on a prior occasion (see, plaintiff's motion to open and modify judgment of April 15, 2009, #126). In addition, the enduring and passionate battle between the parents renders the original joint custody arrangement no longer workable and hence not in the child's best interest; as such, the court has the jurisdiction to modify it. Lambert v. Donahue, 78 Conn.App. 493 (2003) (". . . the parties' complete inability to communicate concerning their child . . ." constitutes a substantial change of circumstances, 78 Conn.App. 493, 506). Moreover, as established by the same court in Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz, 60 Conn.App. 429 (2000), the best interests of a child may warrant modifying a prior order even in the absence of a finding of a substantial change.
This court has no doubt that plaintiff is a loving parent capable of meeting her daughter's material and intellectual needs. She is a teacher, and places a premium on education; the child, although still very young, is doing well in school and would be expected to continue that pattern as she matures.
The court also has little cause to fear that defendant could not meet the child's tangible needs. Although less educated than the mother, he did finish his GED and learn a trade which he still pursues. Socially, he is rougher around the edges than plaintiff, but is an intelligent individual who impresses the court with his understanding of the severity of the present situation and the difficulties which his daughter will face as long as her parents continue the current pattern of behavior.
Because the child has lived with plaintiff since birth, the court does not take lightly the prospect of changing her primary residence at this point. Clearly, in light of the above discussion regarding contempt, plaintiff demonstrates a real deficiency in her "willingness and ability . . . to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders," to quote § 46b-56(c). In addition, or as a consequence, there are multiple indications that the child may not be doing as well on her watch as the kindergarten report card would imply:
1) Two DCF social workers, on two dates months apart, reported the child to be in considerable need of discipline while in her mother's care, and that the needed discipline was not imposed.
2) A pattern has emerged of the child complaining of pain, which leads to doctor's office or emergency room visits beyond the number that would be expected of a healthy five-year-old. Also, plaintiff reports that the child experiences bed-wetting.
3) Various observers describe the child as demonstrating both distress and guilt when reflecting upon the relationship between her parents. Conflict is all that she has known. Wisely, she understands that the conflict abates when the contact between them diminishes; accordingly, she indicated that she will sometimes say that she does not wish to visit her father, as that makes her mother happy.
4) Furthermore, the court notes and shares the concern voiced by the child's therapist as to plaintiff's propensity to remove the child from a setting in which a neutral observer might conclude that the defendant is not really as bad a parent as she would have the world believe. Thus she abruptly ended the therapeutic sessions, telling this court that the therapy just isn't working anymore. She ended a four-year day care arrangement claiming bullying, when the real problem was the provider's innocent report to defendant's new wife about the child.
This is a case in which the court cannot emphasize enough the value of seeing the parties explain their perceptions and experiences of their daughter in their own words. Defendant has not been perfect in his relationship with plaintiff, and has taken to the use of sarcasm and threats of legal repercussions instead of more rational dialogue. This posture is somewhat excusable when viewed in the context of the lengthy effort on her part to exclude him from their daughter's life. He impressed the court with his awareness of the burden which the chronic dispute between her parents places upon this child, and he accepted some of the blame for that. He clearly comprehends the need to move past that.
Plaintiff, in contrast, held fast to her version of the events of the last year in spite of the lack of any corroboration. She is unapologetic for the lengthy interruptions in the father's visits with the child, or for the cost and humiliation which her several claims have caused him. She gives this court little confidence that a continuation of the status quo would not simply produce more of the same: continued conflict over visitation, and over every detail of father's relationship with his child; continued litigation; and continued pain for the child, until something changes or defendant gives up.
VI. Conclusions and Orders
In light of the foregoing findings, the court concludes that the price of leaving this child with plaintiff — the eventual loss to the child of her father — is exorbitant, and unnecessary.
The defendant and the Family Relations Officer recommend that if defendant is awarded custody, then visitation by plaintiff should be supervised only so as to preclude her from making additional attempts to turn the child's mind. Their suggestion is not frivolous, and imposing upon plaintiff the unnatural strictures of seeing her child only under the watchful eyes of a trained professional might, given how she has relegated defendant to that fate, be a form of poetic justice. How that would appear to the child is unknown. She deserves to achieve something resembling normalcy. In the hope that normalcy may more quickly be available to her if her mother is not so limited in interaction with her as a supervised visitation order would produce, the court deems it an acceptable risk to allow plaintiff a reasonable period of time with her child on a regular basis, and under regular circumstances. If the changes wrought by the orders set forth below are insufficient to persuade plaintiff that her strategy of pursuing the elimination of defendant from their daughter's life was a losing one, it will not take long for additional evidence to arise which could warrant this or another court's making further modifications to its orders so as to create additional safeguards for this child's emotional life. Thus the court strongly recommends to plaintiff that she seek counseling to understand what has led to this turn of events, and what is required of her to not cause the situation to worsen.
Accordingly, taking into account the foregoing findings, and to further the best interests of this child, it is hereby ORDERED:
1) Defendant's motion to open and modify judgment (#196) is granted. Sole custody of the parties' child is awarded to him.
2) Because the child is with plaintiff on an out-of-state vacation through July 10, she may remain with her mother until that date. By 5 p.m. on July 10, plaintiff shall return the child to the custody of defendant, and he shall have her for vacation without interruption through 6 p.m. on July 29.
3) Commencing on July 29, plaintiff shall have visitation with the child on alternate weekends from Friday at 6 p.m. through Sunday at 6 p.m. She may also have visitation on each Wednesday from 4 to 7 p.m. Additionally, and superseding the foregoing schedule if there is a conflict:
a) Defendant shall have the child from after school or 2:30 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. on Father's Day and on his birthday;
b) Plaintiff shall have the child from after school or 2:30 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. on Mother's Day and on mother's birthday;
c) Defendant shall have the child on her birthday from 2:30 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. in odd-numbered years, and plaintiff in even-numbered years;
d) Defendant shall have the child on Easter Sunday from 10:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. in even-numbered years, and plaintiff in odd-numbered years;
e) Defendant shall have the child for Thanksgiving from after school on Wednesday through Friday at 7:00 p.m. in odd-numbered years, and plaintiff in even-numbered years
f) Defendant shall have the child on Christmas Day in odd-numbered years, and plaintiff in even-numbered years
g) Defendant shall have the child from Memorial Day and Labor Day in odd-numbered years, and plaintiff in even-numbered years
h) Defendant shall have the child Fourth of July and New Year's Eve in even-numbered years, and plaintiff in odd-numbered years;
i) Each party may have two weeks uninterrupted vacation time with the child each summer. Plaintiff may inform defendant of her desired time period not later than June 1, and defendant shall notify her of his plans, not later than June 20.
j) During school vacation weeks in December, February, and April, plaintiff shall have access with the child for an extended, five-day period in two of the three weeks, with defendant to select the times;
k) In the event of an announced snow or other weather alert, watch, or warning which makes transportation of the child unsafe, the visitation, if it has not commenced, shall be postponed until such emergency passes. If such condition arises when the child is with plaintiff, she may postpone her return until the emergency passes. Visitation shall not occur if the child is ill;
l) Defendant is responsible for picking up the child at plaintiff's home at the end of all visits, and plaintiff for picking her up at his home or at school to commence each visit;
m) As to all times set forth above, time is of the essence. The parties may vary the schedules set forth herein by agreement, but neither may rely upon an agreement as a defense to any charge of contempt of these orders unless that agreement has been reduced to a writing signed by both parties.
4) When plaintiff delivers the child to defendant on July 10, she shall also deliver to him a reasonable supply of clothing, toys, and other personal belongings of the child, an insurance card, and copies of recent medical, dental, and school records (unless such documents are already in his possession). Thereafter, he shall ensure that copies of the child's records of the same character are made available to her in a timely fashion.
5) Father is ordered not to consume alcohol or drugs not medically prescribed while with the child.
6) Defendant shall return the child to the therapeutic program with Wendy St. George, and shall adhere to her recommendations as to the child's needs, if any, in coping with these new orders.
7) Both parties are ordered not to disparage each other or to discuss court proceedings in the presence of the child.
8) Defendant shall not permit the child to be in the presence of his stepson, Anthony.
9) The parties are ordered to appear before the Family Support Magistrate in this courthouse on July 26, 2010, at 10:00 a.m., for the entry of an appropriate child support order. The effective date of that order is July 10, 2011. The magistrate is also requested to calculate any arrearage which defendant might owe to plaintiff as a result of prior orders.
10) Plaintiff, having been found to be in contempt of this court's orders on defendant's motion of May 26, shall pay to defendant as attorneys fees the sum of $1,500. If the support arrearage exceeds $1,500, then, after offsetting the fee award, defendant shall purge the remaining arrearage by weekly payments to plaintiff of $25. If the arrearage is less than $1,500, then so much of such amount as exceeds the arrearage shall be paid by plaintiff to defendant at the rate of $25 weekly.
11) Provided child support payments are current, plaintiff may claim the child as a dependent for tax purposes, in even-numbered years.
12) Plaintiff's motions to open and modify filed June 1 (#197 and 198) are denied.