Opinion
9:18-CV-336 (TJM/TWD)
11-01-2021
DEREK A. HEYLIGER, Plaintiff, v. KARIN WEST, TOM FORBES, Defendants.
DEREK A. HEYLIGER Plaintiff, pro se HON. LETITIA JAMES KASEY K. HILDONEN Attorney General for the State of New York Assistant Attorney General Counsel for Defendants
DEREK A. HEYLIGER Plaintiff, pro se
HON. LETITIA JAMES KASEY K. HILDONEN Attorney General for the State of New York Assistant Attorney General Counsel for Defendants
ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
Derek A. Heyliger (“Plaintiff”), an inmate in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), commenced this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting his constitutional rights were violated at Great Meadow Correctional Facility (“Great Meadow C.F.”). (Dkt. No. 7.) The Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy, Senior United States District Judge, reviewed the original and amended complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and found the following claims against Karin West and Tom Forbes (collectively “Defendants”) required a response: “(1) [P]laintiff's denial of access to the courts claim; (2) [P]laintiff's claim for interference with the free flow of legal mail; and (3) [P]laintiff's gross negligence claim based on the alleged interference with his legal mail.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 4.)
Thereafter, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. In their motion, Defendants argued Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his claims were meritless in any event. (Dkt. No. 15.) Judge McAvoy granted Defendants' motion with respect to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim but denied it in all other respects. (Dkt. No. 23.)
Now, at the close of discovery, Defendants move for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 56.) In so doing, they largely reiterate their arguments with respect to exhaustion. Specifically, Defendants argue the operative grievance in this case did not put DOCCS on notice of the relevant claims. (Dkt. No. 56-5 at 12-13.) Defendants also argue Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he filed this action before receiving a response from the Central Office Review Committee (“CORC”). Id. at 13-18. Inexplicably, Defendants did not file an accompanying Statement of Material Facts and instead rely upon a declaration attaching certain exhibits. (Dkt. No. 56.) Plaintiff responded, pointing out the recent Second Circuit case Hayes v. Dahlke, 976 F.3d 259, 270 (2d Cir. 2020), forecloses most of Defendants arguments. (Dkt. No. 60.) For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends denying Defendants' motion.
II. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE LOCAL RULES
Local Rule 56.1(a) requires a party moving for summary judgment to file and serve a Statement of Material Facts. See L.R. 56.1(a) (“[a]ny motion for summary judgment shall contain a separate Statement of Material Facts.” (emphasis added)). “The Statement of Material Facts shall set forth, in numbered paragraphs, a short and concise statement of each material fact about which the moving party contends there exists no genuine issue.” Id. “Failure of the moving party to submit an accurate and complete Statement of Material Facts shall result in a denial of the motion.” Id. (emphasis in the original).
The Local Rules are not “empty formalities, ” and courts within this District have routinely denied a party's motion for summary judgment based on their failure to file a Statement of Material Facts. See Jackson v. Broome Cty. Corr. Facility, 194 F.R.D. 436, 437 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment for failure to comply with the Local Rules); Monroe v. Critelli, No. 9:05-CV-1590 (FJS/GHL), 2008 WL 508748, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2008) (same); Kele v. Middaugh, No. 9:04-CV-0377 (TJM/GHL), 2006 WL 1313348, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. May 12, 2006) (same); see also Lore v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:00-CV-1833, 2007 WL 655628, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (noting that the Statement of Material Facts “inform[s] the court of the evidence and arguments in an organized way-thus facilitating its judgment of the necessity for a trial.”); Riley v. Town of Bethlehem, 5 F.Supp.2d 92, 93 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[t]he failure of a moving party to file a properly supported Local Rule 7.1 Statement of Material Facts is fatal to a summary judgment motion).
Here, Defendants failed to support their motion for summary judgment with an accompanying Statement of Material Facts. (Dkt. No. 56.) Though, in some circumstances, Courts have overlooked such a glaring mistake, those cases have all involved a pro se litigant's motion. See, e.g., Fox v. Lee, No. 915CV0390TJMCFH, 2018 WL 1211111, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. 915CV390TJMCFH, 2018 WL 1185237 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2018); Bulter v. Hyde, No. 9:08-CV-0299 (LEK/GHL), 2009 WL 3164753, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2009) (declining to recommend dismissal of the pro se plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment due to the plaintiff's failure to file an “accurate and complete” Statement of Material Facts). The New York State Attorney General's Office represents Defendants in this matter and there is no reason-given that office's significant experience in federal litigation-to disregard such an error without consequences. Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Defendants' motion.
With respect to Defendants' second argument, much of the case law relied upon has been squarely overruled. To that end, as Plaintiff pointed out, the Second Circuit recently held that “an inmate exhausts administrative remedies when he follows the procedure in its entirety but the CORC fails to respond within the 30 days it is allocated under the regulations.” Hayes, 976 F.3d at 270. Defendants did not attempt to distinguish this case or even mention it in their memorandum of law. Given the state of the law, Defendants' argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he sued before receiving a decision from CORC is without merit. In sum, had the Court considered the merits of Defendants' motion for summary judgment, it would still recommend that it be denied. The Court further finds that Defendants' motion is meritless. First, Defendants' argument regarding the content of the grievance is specious as that grievance specifically mentions Plaintiff's difficulties with the facilitiy's mail. (Dkt. No. 56-3 at 24.) Indeed, the investigatory documents related to that grievance show DOCCS' personnel treated the grievance as Plaintiff complaining about “staff destroy[ing] his mail . . . .” Id. at 30; id. at 31 (D. Beebe's memo addressing Grievance GM# 61637-17 and stating he did not “tamper with [Plaintiff's] mail”). CORC's final review, on June 20, 2018, labeled the grievance “Mail Tampering” and specifically considered that “Sgt. B” denied “tampering with or confiscating the grievant's mail.” Id. at 32. Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff's grievance put DOCCS on notice of the relevant issues.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court recommends denying Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 56), be DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide to Plaintiff a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec 'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).