Opinion
May 15, 1951. Rehearing Denied June 6, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Stanley Milledge, J.
Courshon Courshon, Miami Beach, and Anderson Nadeau, Miami, for appellants.
Hoffman, Kemper Johnson, Miami, for appellees.
Appellants as complainants filed a bill of complaint against Airline Pilots Association International, a voluntary unincorporated association, hereinafter called the association, wherein it was prayed that plaintiffs be granted an injunction restraining the association from acting as the bargaining representative of the personnel employed as airline pilots of National Airline, Inc., and for other relief. The bill was amended but both the amended and the original bill went out on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction over the defendants motion to dismiss. This appeal was prosecuted from that decree.
The parties are at variance as to the question presented here for determination, but that is nothing new or even unusual. We conceive the question to be whether or not the courts of this State may acquire jurisdiction of a labor union when service of process is made in any manner other than as provided at common law.
It is apparent that appellants are commercial airline pilots and that the association is a voluntary unincorporated association or labor union with many members scattered throughout the country, that certain of its members are its managing representatives, that they were sued as a class, that the labor union and its bargaining agent under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq., are charged with committing offenses against the complainants which they say were prohibited by Federal law to the continued damage of the plaintiffs.
The chancellor granted the motion to dismiss the bill on the theory "that the legislature has expressly determined that a union of a class to which the defendant association belongs, may be sued only in the manner allowed at common law, and that the defendant association may not be sued by bringing into court members or officers of the association as representatives of a class."
Process was issued and directed to Airline Pilots Association International with directions to serve "W.T. Babbett, Regional Vice President, 1109 Andalusia Avenue, Coral Gables, Florida, Charles Ruby, National Airline, Inc., Representative, Airline Pilots Association International, Douglas Entrance Apartments, 801 East Ponce de Leon Boulevard, Coral Gables, Florida." The sheriff's return states that copies of the summons and bill of complaint were served on "W.T. Babbett, Regional Vice President of Airline Pilots Association International and Charles Ruby, National Airlines Inc., representative, Airline Pilots Association International."
Such was the summons and service to which the motion to dismiss was directed. The Association contends that the summons was ineffective to confer jurisdiction on the Circuit Court because the service was not made as required at common law, that is to say, by joining every member of the defendant labor union as a party defendant and making service on each of them. In other words a labor union can not be sued in its common name. The contention is predicated on the applicable provisions of the Railway Labor Act when read in connection with Chapter 447, F.S.A., particularly Sections 447.11, 447.13 and 447.15, which they say exempts all railway labor organizations from its effect.
As against the contention of the association it appears that the Railway Labor Act did not limit jurisdiction of controversies in which labor unions were involved exclusively to the Federal Courts, neither did it define the extent of State Courts' jurisdiction over them. Section 11 of said Act provides that labor organizations shall be subject to suits in equity and actions at law in its commonly used name in the same manner and to the same extent as any corporation authorized to do business in the State.
In view of these provisions, we do not think it necessary to discuss the purpose of Section 447.15, F.S.A., exempting "All railway labor organizations and members thereof" as long as they are regulated by acts of congress. This act goes to regulation by congress as such and does not affect the association as a legal entity in so far as it may sue or be sued in the courts of the State. Even though a creature of the Federal Statute, those whom it wrongs may have their remedy in the State Courts. The statute seems to govern railroad brotherhoods rather than labor organizations and even if it could do so, there is no showing whatever that the legislature intended to deprive litigants of the right to bring suits in the courts of the State.
The purpose of the Railway Labor Act was to regulate relations between interstate rail carriers and the railway brotherhoods. It was later extended to interstate air carriers. It authorizes employees to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. By the very terms of the statute representatives of the labor unions have all the powers that their name implies. They are clothed with various duties which could only be exercised by the labor union. Read as a whole there seems no doubt that unincorporated labor unions could sue and be sued in their own names, regardless of the state laws on the subject. United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570, 66 L.Ed. 975; Steele v. Louisville, N. Railway Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173; 2 Barron and Holtzoff, Section 487. These cases establish the principle that the representative of a labor organization under the statute, acts for all the members of the organization.
We recognize of course that there are fields in which Federal rights are exclusive and when this is the case, Federal law controls. When this is not the case, the State Courts may enforce both Federal Acts and the Federal Constitution. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 340-341, 4 L.Ed. 97; Mondou v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 32 S.Ct. 169, 56 L.Ed. 327. These cases approve the doctrine that rights created under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq., may be enforced in the Courts of the States when their jurisdiction, as prescribed by the law of the state, is adequate to the occasion.
There can be no doubt that the law of Florida is adequate on this point. Section 63.14, F.S.A., provides in substance that when the question is one of general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the Court, one or more may sue or defend for all. Florida Common Law Rule 6(c), 30 F.S.A. Florida Equity Rule 14, 31 F.S.A., and Section 4, Declaration of Rights, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., are to like effect. This is in harmony with the philosophy of the law in this country. One of the first lessons learned when we commenced the law study was that there is a remedy for every legal wrong and the place or forum to pursue the remedy is that most convenient to the person wronged.
The plain facts are that we are confronted with a controversy in which appellants contend that appellees have done them a wrong, the truth or the extent of which we express no opinion. Appellees say they are governed by Federal law and that jurisdiction of them has not been acquired. The point is, has the State Court secured jurisdiction of the parties and the cause? The controversy is not one of exclusive Federal jurisdiction and, as pointed out in the preceding paragraph, the means provided to secure jurisdiction by the State Courts is ample. When this is the case the primary concern of the Court is whether the means provided by the State have been exercised so as to secure jurisdiction and administer justice to the litigants. Whether or not the "i's" and "t's" of procedure are dotted and crossed is of little moment, one with a bona fide grievance is entitled to have it considered and any means provided under the law to do this should be made available to him, otherwise, a lawsuit is an instrument of injustice rather than a means to seek out the truth and administer justice. The idea of an entity in this country that cannot be reached by process runs counter to every precept of justice.
It is therefore our opinion that the association is the agent of the plaintiffs, that it is bargaining and acting for them and that the process and service were sufficient to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction over them.
It follows that the judgment appealed from must be and is hereby reversed.
Reversed.
SEBRING, C.J., and CHAPMAN and ADAMS, JJ., concur.