Contrary to defendant's contention, the brevity of the marriage, the parties' previous marital status, and the absence of children as a result of the union, are factors which arguably support the award of alimony in gross over other forms of alimony, once it has been determined that alimony itself is proper. (See Loeb v. Loeb (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 892, 894; Hesley v. Hesley (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 766.) Except for defendant's argument above, he has not demonstrated the otherwise inequitable nature of the court's award of alimony in gross. Accordingly, we find that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding alimony in gross.
• 3, 4 The plaintiff, however, does not argue that the award of the proceeds in the trial court's decree was an equitable distribution pursuant to section 17 of the Divorce Act but argues that the court's award was made in lieu of alimony under section 18. In support of this contention plaintiff has directed our attention to the cases of Mills v. Mills (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 288, and Hesley v. Hesley (1973), 13 Ill. App.3d 766. Neither case, however, is helpful to the plaintiff here. Mills is authority for the conceded rule that special equities and circumstances need not be alleged or shown where the court is ordering a transfer of property in lieu of alimony under section 18 of the Divorce Act.