We have held that "[w]hen fingerprints of the defendant are found where the crime was committed, and circumstances rule out the possibility that they might have been imprinted at a different time than when the crime occurred, a conviction is warranted." Carr v. State, 96 Nev. 936, 939, 620 P.2d 869, 871 (1980) (citing Hervey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1972)). Corroborating evidence is not required.

If the Commonwealth's expert can establish that the prints were impressed at or about the time the crime was committed or other circumstances indicate impression at that time, and the defendant's innocent presence is excluded, such evidence has been held sufficient to convict. Miller v. State, 122 Ga. App. 553, 177 S.E.2d 838 (1970); Hervey v. People [ 178 Colo. 38] 495 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1972); Hack v.Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.App. 1968); Hannahv. State, 3 Md. App. 325, 239 A.2d 124 (1968).

A growing number of state courts have likewise held that retrials following reversals for insufficiency of the evidence are barred by the double jeopardy clause. Hervey v. Colorado, 178 Colo. 38, 495 P.2d 204, 208 (1972); People v. Woodall, 61 Ill.2d 60, 329 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (1975); People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App.2d 281, 241 N.E.2d 653, 659-64 (1st Dist. 1968); State v. Moreno, 69 N.M. 113, 364 P.2d 594, 595 (1969); see State v. Torres, 109 Ariz. 421, 510 P.2d 737, 738-39 (1973); Danks v. State, 229 A.2d 789, 791-92 (Del. 1967); Smith v. State, 239 So.2d 284, 288-89 (Fla.App. 1970), rev'd, Fla., 249 So.2d 16 (1971); Sosa v. Maxwell, 234 So.2d 690, 692 (Fla.App. 1970). Most federal courts have not yet gone so far as to repudiate Bryan. They have, however, strictly limited application of the Bryan rule to cases wherein the accused requested a new trial in the district court or on appeal. E. g., Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Diggs, 527 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v. Howard, 432 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Fusco, 427 F.2d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1970); Wright, supra note 14, at 272.

This evidence may be considered, along with other circumstances attending the killing, in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to prove intent after deliberation. Id.; cf. Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 43-45, 495 P.2d 204, 207 (1972) (the use of a deadly weapon, of itself, is not a sufficient basis for the legal presumption that the killing was deliberate, premeditated, and done with express malice aforethought). Circumstances attending the killing may take the form of enmity, hostility, jealousy, or other manifestations of ill will between the accused and the victim.

There is no federal constitutional requirement applicable to the states mandating a grand jury proceeding or probable cause hearing in order to place a person on trial in a state criminal proceeding. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 668 n. 1, 93 S.Ct. 2926, 37 L.Ed.2d 873 (1973); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884); Collins v. Swenson, 443 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1971); State v. Gyuro, 156 Conn. 391, 394, 242 A.2d 734, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937, 89 S.Ct. 301, 21 L.Ed.2d 274 (1968); State v. Orsini, 155 Conn. 367, 375-76, 232 A.2d 907 (1967); Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 44, 495 P.2d 204 (1972); State v. Jefferson, 79 Wash.2d 345, 348, 485 P.2d 77 (1971); 1 F. Wharton, Criminal Procedure (13th Ed. Torcia) 179. Connecticut was free therefore to create its own method and procedures to establish probable cause as a prerequisite to a trial for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. The constitutional amendment established the method, a probable cause hearing, and the legislature, pursuant to the constitutional mandate imposed upon it by the amendment, established the procedures for the conduct of the hearing through the enactment of 54-46a.

Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 43, 495 P.2d 204, 207 (1972). The evidence regarding defendant's state of mind need not be direct.

Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1982); People v. Rutt, 179 Colo. 180, 500 P.2d 362 (1972); Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 495 P.2d 204 (1972). In resolving the defendant's claim we must consider all the evidence, including that presented by the defendant, and evaluate this evidence in a light most favorable to the People and then determine whether, when so considered, the evidence is of sufficient quality and quantity to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant's guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Prior to the enactment of the Colorado Criminal Code, this court held in a long line of cases that the use of a deadly weapon, by itself, is not sufficient to establish the express malice formerly required for murder in the first degree. E.g., People v. Morant, 179 Colo. 287, 499 P.2d 1173 (1972); Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 495 P.2d 204 (1972); Power v. People, 17 Colo. 178, 28 P. 1121 (1892); Kent v. People, 8 Colo. 563, 9 P. 852 (1885); Hill v. People, 1 Colo. 436 (1872). These cases stand for the proposition that the essential culpability for first degree murder cannot be determined on the basis of a presumption of law. Rather, the requisite culpability must be proven as a matter of fact.

" Hervey v. People, 178 Colo. 38, 42, 495 P.2d 204, 206 (1972);see also, People v. Gomez, 189 Colo. 91, 537 P.2d 197 (1975); People v. Hannaman, 181 Colo. 82, 507 P.2d 466 (1973). Hervey v. People, supra, preceded our decision in People v. Bennett, supra, in which we adopted the substantial evidence test set forth in the quotation from People v. Downer, supra.

When fingerprints of the defendant are found where the crime was committed, and circumstances rule out the possibility that they might have been imprinted at a different time than when the crime occurred, a conviction is warranted. Harvey v. People, 495 P.2d 204 (Colo. 1972). Fingerprints are "the strongest evidence of identity, and . . . ordinarily sufficient alone to identify the defendant."