Opinion
06-29-2017
Richard J. HERRMANN, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Christin COLETTI and Jack Valente, Defendants, Guardian Preservation LLC, Intervenors–Defendant.
Richard J. Herrmann, Jr., Esq., Clifton Park, for Plaintiff (pro se). Donald M. Matusik, Esq., Loudonville, for Defendants. Kenneth W. Gibbons, Esq. Scotia, for Intervenor–Defendant.
Richard J. Herrmann, Jr., Esq., Clifton Park, for Plaintiff (pro se).
Donald M. Matusik, Esq., Loudonville, for Defendants.
Kenneth W. Gibbons, Esq. Scotia, for Intervenor–Defendant.
THOMAS MARCELLE, J.
This is a small claims action for payment of rent, but it is really much more; it's a case involving winding facts, complex law and some clever lawyering.
Defendants Christin Coletti and Jack Valente ("tenants") rented 8 Avalon Court in Loudonville, N.Y. from Lisa Waters ("Waters") of York, Maine. Tenants just wanted to pay their rent, enjoy their home and live peacefully. Things were fine for about six months until Plaintiff Richard Herrmann ("Herrmann") notified the tenants that they should pay him the rent and not Waters. Herrmann told the tenants that Waters had signed a debt instrument (a collateral balloon mortgage), had defaulted on the mortgage, and because Waters had defaulted, Herrmann was now entitled to the rent. This message was conveyed with all the legal trimmings—a letter from an attorney and official documents bearing the imprimatur of the county clerk.
The tenants were now stuck in the middle—should they pay Waters or Herrmann? The tenants engaged counsel who had them place the money in an escrow account. Having not been paid the rent that he believed was due him, Herrmann sued. He commenced a small claims action against the tenants from not paying rent. The court ultimately transferred the case to its regular civil part ( Uniform City Court Act § 202 ).
When the case came before the court, not only did Herrmann and the tenants appear, but another entity asked to be heard—Guardian Preservation LLC ("Guardian"). Guardian explained that Waters had assigned Guardian the rent from 8 Avalon Court (the tenants' rental home). In other words, Guardian stepped into Waters' shoes; their interests are identical. The court allowed Guardian to intervene in this action with the consent of all parties. With Guardian in the case, Waters' interests (to the extent the she has any left) were adequately protected by Guardian. Although Guardian claims to be Waters' legal successor, the court will, for the sake of clarity, refer to Waters, the tenants and Herrmann as the parties.
Herrmann challenges legality of the assignment to Guardian—that matter is not before the court. The court expresses no opinion as to the assignment's validity. The court must decide if the tenants owe Herrmann rent. The court need go no further and will go no further than that, since the validity of the assignment by Waters to Guardian bears not on the dispositive question in this case.
Initially, the court must decide whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. City Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. That is, the subject of the case must be the type which the legislature specifically permitted the court to hear ( Uniform City Court Act § 201 ). Without subject matter jurisdiction, the court cannot exercise its judicial power.
Defendants say that this is a declaratory judgment case disguised as a small claims case. That is, despite Herrmann's claim sounding in contract, this case is about the court declaring who has the legal right to collect the rent generated from 8 Avalon Court. Guardian argues since any declaratory judgment action must be brought in Supreme Court, this courts lacks jurisdiction over the case. ( Suarez v. El Daro Realty, Inc., 156 A.D.2d 356, 358, 548 N.Y.S.2d 313 [2d Dept.1989] ).
Herrmann disagrees. He wants to try his case in City Court because litigating a declaratory judgment action in Supreme Court is more expensive, more complex and riskier. So he cast his case as a small claim breach of contract which City Court has jurisdiction over. Moreover, he impeccably timed his claim to stay within the monetary limits of the City Court's civil jurisdiction ( Uniform City Court Act § 202 ).
Herrmann has a case for damages and the court will decide it. It may well be that the decision in this case has the effect of determining whether Herrmann or Waters gets the rent. Deciding cases causes collateral effects—it is the nature of adjudication. The collateral effect of a decision in this case does not transform it from damages into a declaratory judgment action (see Celestin v. Am. Transit Ins. Co., 193 Misc.2d 72, 74, 747 N.Y.S.2d 920 [Civ.Ct., Queens County 2002] ).
Having resolved the jurisdictional issue, the court makes its factual findings. This case involves a labyrinth of corporate transactions. However, the facts, when distilled to their most simple essence, are as follows. Herrmann loaned Waters $356,000. The loan was secured by a piece of commercial property and by Waters' personal guarantee. Further, to support her personal guarantee, she pledged her property (8 Avalon Court), via a collateral balloon mortgage, as security to make good her debt in case she did not or could not honor her personal guarantee—which happened. Not only did she fail to honor her guarantee, but she also defaulted on the Avalon Court mortgage. Waters filed for bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Court granted her a discharge under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code ( 11 U.S.C. § 727 ) (case no. 12–21309 [D. Me.] ). This discharge erased her person liability for the $356,000 debt. Thus, the personal guarantee made by Waters was extinguished; she no longer owes Herrmann any debt of any kind.
The facts were somewhat more complex. The complete details of the corporate maneuvers are as follows: In 2006, 1056 TSR Realty LLC executed a promissory note and mortgage for $356,000 to Herrmann in exchange for property—1056 Troy Schenectady Road ("1056 mortgage" or "1056 property"). Waters was the principal of TSR. Waters also personally guaranteed the debt. Waters defaulted (and from what the court can glean from the papers, she defaulted rather quickly). In 2008, Herrmann assigned the 1056 mortgage to Keehfus Capital which the court understands is a corporation wholly owned by Herrmann.
Here is where the tenants' property comes into play. Waters owned a house (8 Avalon Court). Waters used the Avalon Court as security for her personal guarantee for the loan on the 1056 property. In 2008, Waters signed a collateral balloon mortgage on their property at 8 Avalon Court with Herrmann as the lender. The Avalon Court mortgage was entered into after Herrmann had already assigned his 1056 mortgage interest to Keehfus Capital.
The transactional part of the story is not quite concluded—in 2009, Herrmann obtained a deed to the 1056 property. He transferred that deed to Elm Lansing Realty Corp for $0.00. Herrmann is the president of Elm Lansing Realty Corp. In 2010, Elm Lansing sold the 1056 property for $220,000 to a third party that is not part of the case and as part of that transaction Keehfus Capital released its mortgage on the 1056 property. Unsatisfied with the $220,000 proceeds that he received from the sale, in 2012, Herrmann sued Waters to collect the deficit. Later that year, Herrmann obtained a $430,000 default judgment against Waters on the original loan on the 1056 property in Saratoga County Supreme Court. The judgment was recorded with the Saratoga County Clerk. Waters filed for bankruptcy in 2012. In 2013 the United States Bankruptcy Court granted her a discharge under Title 7 of the Bankruptcy code (case no. 12–21309 [D. Me.] ). The discharged canceled the $430,000 default judgment that Herrmann obtained from Saratoga County.
At some point, Waters assigned the rents and transferred the title of 8 Avalon Court to Guardian. Guardian argues that these corporate shenanigans raise the specter of fraud. The evidence before the court is limited and the court, without more, finds no fraud involved. Rather this case falls under what then Professor (now Vice Provost) John Siliciano of the Cornell Law School denoted as the Starship Doctrine: "Someone's always playing corporation games; who really cares they're always changing corporation names" (We Built This City, recorded by Starship on Knee Deep in the Hoopla [LP] Los Angeles, CA RCA [1985] ).
The property—8 Avalon Court—is a different matter. Ancient legal doctrine distinguishes between suing a person and suing a thing, like a piece of property (which in Latin is called a rem ). The bankruptcy discharge extinguished only claims against Waters personally; it does not prevent a mortgagee to sue her property in a foreclosure proceeding, an in rem action.
The United States Supreme Court has explained:
A mortgage is an interest in real property that
secures a creditor's right to repayment. But unless the debtor and creditor have provided otherwise, the creditor ordinarily is not limited to foreclosure on the mortgaged property should the debtor default on his obligation; rather, the creditor may in addition sue to establish the debtor's in personam liability for any deficiency on the debt and may enforce any judgment against the debtor's assets generally. A defaulting debtor can protect himself from personal liability by obtaining a discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation. However, such a discharge extinguishes only the personal liability of the debtor.... [T]he Code provides that a creditor's right to foreclose on the mortgage [an in rem proceeding] survives or passes through the bankruptcy
( Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 82–83, 111 S.Ct. 2150, 115 L.Ed.2d 66 [1991] [internal citations and quotations omitted] ).
Significantly, although Herrmann had the right to bring a foreclosure proceeding under Johnson, he did not do that. Instead he exercised the assignment of rents provisions under the mortgage agreement and demanded the rent from the tenants.
The assignment provision provides: "I assign to the lender [Herrmann] the rents of the premises as further security for the payment of the obligations secured and to apply any moneys received to the obligation secured by this mortgage" (Assignment at ¶ 21).
At this point, the case circles back to the basic question of the lawsuit: Do the tenants owe rent to Herrmann? The answer to that questions depends on whether an assignment of rents created an in rem right possessed by Herrmann (not covered by the bankruptcy discharge) or whether the debtor Waters' collection of rent prior to a foreclosure action is personal income which would be protected under the discharge. In simple terms, the issue is whether the rental income is part of the property or personal income.
Generally speaking, an assignment clause may be a source of additional security for a mortgage loan, or, alternatively, it may create an absolute and unconditional assignment. When an assignment is for additional security, the lender has a lien on the rents, but title to the rents remains with the borrower. When an assignment is absolute, title to the rents vests as a property right with the mortgagee upon default of the mortgage (see, In re Jason Realty, L.P., 59 F.3d 423, 427 [3d Cir.1995] ).
Of course as with any general rule of law, the rule varies according to jurisdiction. The court first looks to the federal bankruptcy law to supply the answer because the discharge was a product of that court. The federal courts have decided that the question is to be answered by state law. Specifically, the mortgagee's right to rents collected during a mortgagor's bankruptcy is determined by the law of the state where the property was located ( Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 99 S.Ct. 914, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 [1979] ).
Since the property is in New York, New York law applies. The law of this State is split between a title theory for the rent and a lien theory. While some courts have found rent assignments to be absolute under New York law (title theory), "the majority of New York state cases are of the view that an absolute assignment is not permitted, regardless of the language in the agreement. This majority view is based on New York's lien theory of mortgages" ( In re S. Side House, LLC, 474 B.R. 391, 403 [E.D.N.Y.2012] ). Without a case from the Third Department on point, the court accepts the majority position—the lien theory of mortgages ( Lt Propco, LLC v. Carousel Ctr. Co., L.P., 68 A.D.3d 1695, 1696, 893 N.Y.S.2d 395 [4th Dept.2009] ).
Under the lien theory, a mortgage creates a lien but does not transfer title to the mortgagee. Consequently, a rent assignment clause under New York law acts "merely as a pledge of rents, not as a direct conveyance" ( In re S. Side House, LLC, 474 B.R. at 403 ). Moreover, and of particular relevance here, an assignment of rents provision does not create an automatic conveyance of the rents, even "if the assignment is made as further security for the mortgage debt" ( 641 Ave. of Ams. Ltd. P'ship v. 641 Assocs., 189 B.R. 583, 590 [S.D.N.Y.1995] ).
This means that assignment of rents becomes effective only upon foreclosure or upon the appointment of a receiver of the rents of the mortgaged property. That is, a mortgage is merely a lien, which gives the mortgagee security and no more, and cannot, regardless of its form or of the intention of the parties to the mortgage, transfer title to the mortgagee. Since Herrmann neither sought a receiver nor foreclosed on 8 Avalon Court, Waters, not Herrmann, is entitled to the rents collected by her prior to foreclosure.
Consequently, the court holds that Herrmann has not proven his case. Herrmann has no claim for rent because his right to receive rent is not ripe. Therefore, the tenants owe Herrmann nothing.
The only remaining issue is the counterclaim the tenants bring against Herrmann for their attorney fees. The American Rule for awarding the prevailing attorney is as old as it simple: attorney's fees are incidents of litigation and a prevailing party may not collect them from the loser (see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 Dall. 306, 1 L.Ed. 613 [1796] ). New York strictly follows this rule ( Baker v. Health Mgt. Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 80, 88, 745 N.Y.S.2d 741, 772 N.E.2d 1099 [2002] ). Federal courts allowed an exception and may award the prevailing party attorney's fees when a defeated party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons. ( Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 [1975] ).
The case was not brought in bad faith. Herrmann employed good lawyering that ultimately failed. Under our adversarial system, each party must bear the cost of litigation even if they win. The court has no power to help the tenants under these circumstances.
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's claim is dismissed with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants' counter-claim is dismissed with prejudice.