Opinion
5:22-CV-00185-TES-CHW
01-17-2024
JAMES HERRING, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER CHARLIE WARD, et al., Defendants.
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
CHARLES H. WEIGLE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants Walter Berry, Tracey Lumpkin, Eric Martin, Crystal Tatum, Sabrina Booth, and Pretrillion Whipple's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 56). As discussed below, the undisputed facts show that Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's safety. For that reason, it is RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 56) be GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
On May 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to § 1983, alleging multiple violations of his constitutional rights. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff's complaint was preliminarily reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and his claim of deliberate indifference to safety was allowed to proceed against Defendants Tatum, Booth, Ingram, Berry, Martin, Lumpkin, and Whipple. (Docs. 14; 28). Defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment on August 16, 2023, and Plaintiff responded on September 13, 2023. (Docs. 56; 58).
A suggestion of death was filed for Defendant Ingram on March 13, 2023. (Doc. 49).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and of citing “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” that support summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 32224 (1986). In resolving motions for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) provides that if a party “fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Rule 56(e)(2). This Court's Local Rule 56 similarly provides: “All material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate.” MDGA Local Rule 56. Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(3) provides that the Court may “grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to” summary judgment. Rule 56(e)(3). See also Urdaneta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 734 Fed.Appx. 701, 704 (11th Cir. 2018). Because Defendants properly supported their factual assertions with specific citations to the record, and because Plaintiff failed to do the same, the Defendants' facts may be accepted by the Court as undisputed. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the entire record of the case, with particular reference to Plaintiff's deposition testimony. If evidence in the record shows that a fact is disputed, the Court has drawn all justifiable inferences in Plaintiff's favor for purposes of summary judgment. See United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004) (“the entry of summary judgment [cannot be based] on the mere fact that the motion was unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion”).
RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff was transferred to Baldwin State Prison (“BSP”) on June 23, 2020. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 1). Plaintiff was initially placed in Dormitory K-4 for sixteen days, pursuant to the COVID-19 regulations in place at that time, and was later moved to Dormitory M-4 from July 9, 2020, to January 1, 2022. (Doc. 56-1 ¶¶ 1-2).
The Georgia Department of Corrections Operating Procedures includes procedures that govern the placement of inmates in administrative segregation. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 5). According to these procedures, a shift supervisor may place an inmate in administrative segregation when it is necessary for the safety of the inmate or others. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 6). After an inmate has been placed in administrative segregation, his placement is reviewed and monitored by the Classification Committee. (Id.)
On December 31, 2021, Defendant Lieutenant Ingram, acting as shift supervisor, placed Plaintiff in administrative segregation after he assaulted another inmate in Dormitory M-4. (Doc. 56-1 ¶¶ 7-8). Plaintiff refers to himself as a “handicap ADA inmate,” and he requires the use of a walker or wheelchair. (Doc. 58 at 1; Doc. 56-1 ¶ 24). Plaintiff gave Defendant Ingram his medical profile, which includes his accommodation needs for his disability, while Defendant Ingram considered where to place Plaintiff in administrative segregation. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 15). Dormitory K-1 had the only cell available at the time in administrative segregation with a bottom tier profile and a bottom bunk profile, which Plaintiff required according to his medical profile. (Doc. 56-1 ¶¶ 8, 24). Defendant Ingram brought Plaintiff to Dormitory K-1, and another staff member placed Plaintiff in his cell. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 18). Plaintiff believes that the staff member who took him to his cell was Defendant Sergeant Tatum, but he is not certain. (Doc. 56-1 ¶¶ 19). The Classification Committee approved Plaintiff's placement in Dormitory K-1 on December 31, 2021. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 10).
Plaintiff's cell in Dormitory K-1 did not have handrails installed. (Doc. 56-1 ¶¶ 12, 17). There are only four cells at BSP which include handrails by the cell toilets. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 16). Plaintiff has a medical profile that was set by the medical unit at BSP and dictates the appropriate accommodations he requires. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 22). On January 1, 2022, Plaintiff's medical profile included the following designations: no prolonged standing, eggcrate mattress, foam pillow wedge, shower chair, walking cane, walker, bottom bunk assignment, and bottom tier assignment. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 24). Plaintiff's medical profile did not indicate that he requires a handicap cell or a cell with handrails. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 23). Dormitory M, where Plaintiff was housed before he was moved to administrative segregation, a general population facility that also does not contain cells equipped with handrails. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 3).
Plaintiff told the staff member who placed him in his cell in Dormitory K-1 that he needed a “disability cell,” but he did not say that he required handrails specifically. (Doc. 56-1 ¶¶ 20). Plaintiff claims that Defendants Berry, Martin, Lumpkin, and Whipple inspected Dormitory K-1 at least twice a week, and he told Defendants during these inspections that he needed to be moved to a cell equipped with handrails. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 25). Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 334414 on January 2, 2022, claiming that he was an “ADA disabled inmate” who needed to be in a “handicap cell” and that he had fallen off his cell toilet the day before and injured his back because of the lack of handrail. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 27). Plaintiff requested to be moved to Cell 8 in Dormitory K-4 or another cell that met “ADA requirements” and to be seen by a doctor for his back injury. Id.
Plaintiff fell while using the cell toilet in Cell 4 in Dormitory K-1 around 7:00 P.M. on January 5, 2022. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 31). Plaintiff may have “blacked out” or had a seizure around the time of his fall. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 32). Plaintiff's cellmate called for help after the fall and tried to help him up from the floor. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 33). Defendant Booth responded to the calls for help at Plaintiff's cell, but she left to find another staff member before transporting Plaintiff to the medical unit because she was the only staff member in the dormitory at the time. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 34). Plaintiff had no prior interactions with Defendant Booth in this dormitory before she responded to his fall. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 35). After Plaintiff was taken to the medical unit, the on-call nurse cleaned his wounds and dressed them. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 48). Plaintiff was not given any medication, because Plaintiff was already on medications from a previous back injury. (Doc. 561 ¶¶ 47, 48). Plaintiff wanted to go to the hospital, but the on-call nurse did not believe that was necessary and had him returned to his cell. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 49).
Plaintiff explained in his deposition that he woke up on the ground of his cell after falling, not knowing what had happened. (Doc. 56-1 24:19-21). Plaintiff was told by the doctor or nurse who treated him in the medical unit that he had most likely had a seizure, but Plaintiff was not sure of that himself. (Id. at 25:5-17).
Plaintiff submitted Grievance No. 334043 on January 7, 202, alleging that he had suffered a very bad seizure around 7:00 P.M. on January 5, 2022; he hurt his leg, back, and head “very bad[ly]” during his fall; and he was taken to the medical unit by Defendant Booth around 8:47 P.M. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 37). Plaintiff tried to give additional grievances and written statements about his fall and the lack of handrails in his cell to Defendants Berry, Martin, and Lumpkin on January 4 and January 7, 2022. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 39). Each time Plaintiff attempted to give them grievances or statements, Defendants Berry, Martin, and Lumpkin called Defendant Whipple, the ADA coordinator and grievance coordinator, to take the grievances so they could be properly processed. Id. Defendants Berry, Lumpkin, Whipple, and Booth responded to Plaintiff's requests to be transferred to another cell after his fall, with promises that they would try to help him. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 40). Defendant Whipple considered filing an ADA complaint on Plaintiff's behalf after he filed his grievances, but she chose not to do so after learning that Plaintiff would be moved to Dormitory K-4 and that he would have handrails installed in his new cell. (Doc. 561 ¶ 42). On January 28, 2022, a GDC maintenance official entered a witness statement in connection with the processing of Plaintiff's grievances, which stated that he was “making the change for offender to be moved to K-4.” (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 43). Plaintiff was transferred to Dormitory K-4, Cell 12, because of his requests to be moved to an accessible dorm on February 1, 2022. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 44). Both Grievance No. 334414 and Grievance No. 334043 were denied on February 28, 2022, because Plaintiff had been moved to Cell 12 Dormitory K-4 and handrails had been installed in that cell. (Doc. 56-1 ¶¶ 29, 38).
Plaintiff does not refute the Defendants' statement of facts but claims that “it is plain to see [he] ha[s] a wheelchair and/or walker;” the “K-1 Building does not house ADA inmates;” and he “[has] certain housing requirements” because of his disability, which he does not specify. (Doc. 58 at 1).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his safety when he was placed in a room without handrails, resulting in his fall on January 5, 2022. (Doc. 1). Defendants move for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the Eleventh Amendment and the text of § 1983 bar Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities, as well as his claim for money damages; (2) Plaintiff cannot establish a valid claim of deliberate indifference to his safety; and (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claim of deliberate indifference to his safety.
1. The Eleventh Amendment and the text of § 1983 bar Plaintiff's claims against Defendants in their official capacities and Plaintiff's claims for money damages
To the extent that Plaintiff means to bring his deliberate indifference to safety claim against Defendants in their official capacities, Defendants correctly argue that such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment makes clear that such claims cannot be brought against state officials in their official capacities because any relief sought from such a claim would in fact operate against the state and any monetary recovery would be paid from state funds. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-102 (1984); Jackson v. Ga. Dept. of Trans., 16 F.3d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1994). Additionally, claims against Defendants in their official capacities are barred by the text of § 1983, which requires claims to be brought against a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It has long been held that an official acting as a state officer is not a person within the meaning of § 1983, as the officer acts as the State, and the State is not a person. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989). Plaintiff does not address this argument in his response.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot raise claims against Defendants in their official capacities or seek monetary damages from those claims.
2. Plaintiff cannot establish a valid claim of deliberate indifference to his safety
Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are required to ensure that inmates have human conditions of confinement, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1995). Prison officials must “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. To state an Eighth Amendment claim for exposure to unsafe conditions, a prisoner must allege facts to show a substantial risk of serious harm through the existence of a prison condition that is extreme and poses an unreasonable risk the prisoner's health or safety. See Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the prisoner must allege facts to show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to the risk, which requires that the defendant knew that an excessive risk to health or safety existed but nevertheless disregarded that risk. Id. at 1289-90. If the defendant took action that reasonably responded to the risk, the defendant will not be held liable, even if the harm was not averted. Id. at 1290. Finally, the prisoner must assert facts showing causation between the defendant's deliberate indifference and the plaintiff's injury. Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007).
Substantial Risk of Serious Harm
To show there was a substantial risk of serious harm, Plaintiff must show that conditions were sufficiently serious to violate the Eighth Amendment, that is conditions that were “extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury to his future health or safety.” Lane v. Philbin, 835 F.3d 1302, 1307 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289) (11th Cir. 2004). This element is assessed under an objective standard. Id.
Plaintiff's placement in a cell without handrails before his fall fails to meet the objective standard of a substantial risk of harm. Plaintiff had previously been housed in a cell without handrails without issue, and Plaintiff's medical profile at that time did not require him to be housed in a cell with handrails. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 3-4, 23-24). Transferring Plaintiff to a cell without handrails under these conditions did not present an unreasonable risk of serious injury. See Vosburgh v. Humphrey, No. 5:12-cv-299, WL 533493 *5 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 7, 2014) (finding a disabled inmate could not maintain a deliberate indifference claim based on his fall in a shower without handrails because “the risk of slipping and falling in the shower is not a substantial risk of harm”).
Deliberate Indifference
As explained above, Plaintiff has not shown that there was a substantial risk of serious harm based on his cell assignment. Even if there had been such a risk, upon these facts, Defendants did not act with deliberate indifference. To show that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm, Plaintiff must meet a subjective and an objective standard. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014). Satisfying the subjective requirement requires Plaintiff to produce evidence that the defendant “actually (subjectively) kn[ew] that an inmate [faced] a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Sec. for Dept. of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007). To satisfy the objective component, Plaintiff must produce evidence that shows that the “defendant ‘disregarded that known risk by failing to respond to it in an (objectively) reasonable manner.” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 508 F.3d at 617). A prison official demonstrates such disregard of a known risk if “he knew of ways to reduce the harm but recklessly declined to act.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995). Even if a prison official is aware of facts from which an inference of a substantial risk of harm could be drawn, “[the] official must be both be aware [of these facts], and he must also draw the inference.” Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
As to the subjective component, Plaintiff has pleaded facts that show he complained to Defendants Berry, Martin, Lumpkin, and Whipple about the alleged risk he faced. (Docs. 1; 58; 56-1 ¶¶ 20, 25, 27, 39). Whether Plaintiff actually communicated the alleged risk to Defendants Tatum or Booth is disputed. (Doc. 56-21 at 14-15). Even if all Defendants were subjectively aware of the alleged risk, Plaintiff has not met the objective component of deliberate indifference by showing that Defendants disregarded the alleged risk and acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. See Rodriquez, 508 F.3d at 617. Defendants have provided evidence that they responded to Plaintiff's concerns by telling him that they would try to assist him in moving to a better accommodated cell. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 40). Defendants also referred Plaintiff to Defendant Whipple, the ADA and grievance coordinator for the prison. (Doc. 56-1 ¶ 39). Defendant Whipple processed Plaintiff's grievances, considered filing an ADA complaint on Plaintiff's behalf, and only declined to do so because she learned that Plaintiff was going to be moved to a suitable cell. (Doc. 42). Each of these actions was a reasonable response to the risk that Plaintiff alleged. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants were deliberately indifferent.
Causation
Having failed to show that there was a substantial risk of serious harm or that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to such a risk, Plaintiff cannot show that his injuries were caused by the Defendants' actions.
Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot maintain a claim of deliberate indifference to safety against Defendants based upon his fall, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
3. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
Even if Plaintiff's claim did not fail on its merits, Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's claim. “Qualified immunity protects government officials if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Nam Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole Cnty., Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1278 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). “A government actor can be stripped of qualified immunity only when all reasonable government actors in the defendant's place would know that the challenged discretionary conduct violates federal law.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). “To be entitled to qualified immunity, a public official ‘must first prove that [s]he was acting within the scope of h[er] discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Nam Dang 871 F.3d at 1279. “An official acts within h[er] discretionary authority if h[er] actions (1) were undertaken ‘pursuant to the performance of h[er] duties,' and (2) were ‘within the scope of h[er] authority.'” Id. (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff's allegations all pertain to Defendants' actions in the course of their duties as prison officials. Plaintiff did not respond to the Defendants' qualified immunity argument. Therefore, it is undisputed that Defendants have shown they were acting within their discretionary authority at the relevant times and are eligible to assert qualified immunity.
After a defendant establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.” Myrick v. Fulton Co., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023). A plaintiff fulfills this burden by showing that (1) the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant's conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) that the violated right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). These two elements may be addressed in any order, and if the plaintiff fails to show one is fulfilled, the Court need not reach the other. Id.
As discussed above, Plaintiff has not established that Defendants' conduct violated his constitutional rights. Therefore, it is not necessary to establish that the allegedly affected right was clearly established. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
CONCLUSION
Because the undisputed facts do not support Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 56) be GRANTED.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to these recommendations with the presiding District Judge WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES. See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge's order based on factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED