As this court has often stated, the party seeking injunctive relief bears a substantial burden to show that the party is entitled to such an extraordinary remedy. See, e.g., Herrera v. Riley, 886 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D.D.C. 1995). The court weighs four factors in determining whether preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate: (1) plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable injury if injunctive relief is withheld; (3) the effect of the relief sought on other interested parties; and (4) the public interest.
Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, and plaintiff bears a substantial burden to obtain it. See Herrera v. Riley, 886 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1995). To prevail on a request for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff must "demonstrate (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that [he] would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted, (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction."
See Watkins, Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). Plaintiffs argue that the failure to readjust all October 2005 scores presents immediate and irreparable harm because students with accurate scores are placed at a disadvantage versus the overscored students in competing for admissions, scholarships, and financial aid. Plaintiffs allege that this disadvantage cannot be quantified in terms of actual damages and is therefore harm suitable for injunctive relief. Because Plaintiffs have brought this action on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, it is appropriate for the Court to consider the threat of irreparable harm to the putative class members. SeeHerrera v. Riley, 886 F. Supp. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 1995) (addressing the threat of irreparable injury to the entire proposed class, not just the named plaintiffs); Joyce v. City of San Francisco, 846 F. Supp. 843, 854 (N.D. Cal. 1994) ("Since a determination has not yet been made whether plaintiffs can proceed as a class, it is appropriate at this stage that the Court considers the injuries alleged to the individuals within the entire proposed class."); Sharif v. N.Y. State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (concluding for purposes of an irreparable harm ana lysis that although the named plaintiffs might not receive an award on the basis of their SAT scores, some members of the putative class would). Although a student's ability is rarely measured solely on a numerical scale, the Court recognizes the SAT's primary importance to certain aspects of the college admissions and scholarship processes.
Thus, if irreparable harm is clearly shown, the movant may prevail by demonstrating that he or she has a substantial case on the merits.Akassy v. William Penn Apartments, Ltd. P'ship, 891 A.2d 291, 309-10 (D.C. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Antioch Univ., 418 A.2d 105, 109 (D.C. 1980)); Cuomo v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 249 U.S.App. D.C. 54, 56, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (1985); accord, Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 503 (8th Cir.1987); Competitive Enters. Inst. v. United States Dep't of Agric, 954 F.Supp. 265, 269-70 (D.D.C.1996); Herrera v. Riley, 886 F.Supp. 45, 48 (D.D.C.1995). Nevertheless, if the appellees' claims are barred by law, we must reach the merits of the decision at this point.