Opinion
14-22-00195-CV
08-22-2023
KENNETH HERNANDEZ, Appellant v. TIMOTHY LEE WILLIAMS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 215th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2020-71470
Panel consists of Zimmerer, Spain, and Hassan Justices.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles A. Spain, Justice.
Appellee Timothy Lee Williams filed suit against appellant Kenneth Hernandez, in his official capacity as an administrative employee of the Houston Community College ("HCC"), alleging an ultra vires cause of action. Hernandez filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the trial court denied. In a single issue on appeal, Hernandez argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss Williams's cause of action. We reverse and render judgment dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.
I. Background
In 2018, Williams worked as an adjunct instructor for HCC. In November 2020, Williams filed a lawsuit against Hernandez, a professor at HCC, in his official capacity, alleging that Hernandez terminated him based on his race and color in December 2018, and further alleging that the termination was an ultra vires act by Hernandez. Williams limited his requested relief to two demands: (1) that HCC train its administrative employees on the legal consequences of discrimination and (2) that HCC institute an internal anti-discrimination department.
In January 2022, Hernandez filed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging that Williams lacked standing and failed to plead sufficient jurisdictional facts to establish a waiver of governmental immunity. In his response to the plea, Williams reasserted his claim that Hernandez committed an ultra vires act by discriminating against Williams based on his "race or color." Williams also emphasized that he did not seek monetary damages; he only sought prospective relief.
HCC, as a public community college, is a political subdivision of the state and, thus, protected by governmental immunity. See Texas Tort Claims Act, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.001(3)(A)-(B).
On appeal, Williams alleges that "Appellant presented himself to the Appellee as the Dean of Paralegal Studies as well as the dean of other academic departments" and that "Appellant had the authority to create rules for his department, formal and informal, independent of the policies promulgated by the College." However, he provides no record citations, and we find no support in the record for these claims.
On February 24, 2022, the trial court signed an order denying Hernandez's plea to the jurisdiction. Hernandez filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (permitting interlocutory appeal of orders granting or denying plea to jurisdiction filed by governmental units).
II. Analysis
Hernandez argues on appeal that the trial court erred by denying his plea to the jurisdiction because: (1) Williams lacks standing; (2) Williams's claims are not ripe; (3) Williams's claims are moot; and (4) Williams has failed to sufficiently plead an ultra vires claim.
A. Standard of review and applicable law
We review a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. See Texas Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to the pleader's intent. Id. If the pleadings do not contain sufficient facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. Id. at 226-27. If the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges jurisdictional facts, we consider the facts alleged by the plaintiff and, "to the extent it is relevant to the jurisdictional issue, the evidence submitted by the parties" to determine whether the plaintiff has affirmatively demonstrated the court's jurisdiction to hear the case. Texas Nat. Res. Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex. 2001). The process of deciding whether jurisdictional facts have been affirmatively pleaded is similar to a summary judgment: if the evidence does not raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the jurisdictional issue, then the plea to the jurisdiction should be granted. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228.
A plaintiff suing a governmental unit must both establish standing and overcome governmental immunity from suit. See Perez v. Turner, 653 S.W.3d 191, 197-98 (Tex. 2022). Although standing and governmental immunity from suit both "implicate the courts' jurisdiction, they are distinct requirements that demand distinct showings." Id. at 197.
"Generally, to establish standing, a plaintiff must plead a particularized, concrete injury, distinct from that of the public, which courts have the power to redress." Id. at 198 (citing Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 154-55 (Tex. 2012)). There are three elements of standing:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."Meyers v. JDC/Firethorne, Ltd., 548 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)) (citations omitted); see Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155 ("If, for example, a plaintiff suing in a Texas court requests injunctive relief . . . but the injunction could not possibly remedy his situation, then he lacks standing to bring that claim."). Given the parallels between the federal and Texas tests for standing, we may also look to federal standing requirements for guidance. Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 485.
Whether a plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that the requested remedy will redress its harm can turn on whether the plaintiff has shown that the defendant has authority to respond to any requested injunctive relief. See Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 487.
B. Application
We first address Hernandez's contention that Williams lacks standing.
1. Standing
Hernandez primarily attacks the third prong of standing: whether it is likely-as opposed to merely speculative-that Williams's injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 485. Specifically, Hernandez argues that: (1) Williams's alleged injury would not be redressed by his requested relief; (2) Hernandez does not possess the authority to implement Williams's requested relief; and (3) Williams does not face a realistic threat of being injured by Hernandez.
In his live pleadings, Williams requested an injunction requiring HCC to train its administrative employees and create an anti-discrimination department; as we noted earlier, Williams did not request to be reinstated to his old position. Thus, even if HCC trained its administrative employees and created an anti-discrimination department, per Williams's request, this does not redress the alleged discrimination and wrongful termination that Williams experienced. See Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 485; see also Suarez v. Silvas, No. 04-21-00113-CV, 2022 WL 379965, at *6-7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Feb. 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (observing, in suit in which plaintiff alleged that defendant acted without authority to remove her from office, that "[t]hese alleged facts address allegedly improper past actions, but by their plain language, none allege an injury that could be remedied by the requested prospective relief").
Additionally, Williams has not sufficiently pleaded that the requested remedy will redress his harm because he has not shown that Hernandez has the authority to respond to Williams's requested relief. See Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 487-88; Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155-56. On appeal, Williams claims that there is a genuine issue of fact regarding Hernandez's scope of authority. Without citing the record, Williams simply asserts that Hernandez can institute policies and reinstate Williams to his former position. However, we again note that Williams did not request to be reinstated in his petition. More importantly, unsupported assertions are not evidence. See Grant Prideco, Inc. v. Empeiria Conner, 463 S.W.3d 157, 162 n.10 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
Hernandez, on the other hand, attached multiple exhibits to his plea to the jurisdiction, including: an organizational chart for HCC, a job description detailing the responsibilities for Hernandez's position at HCC, and a declaration by Connie Porter, Dean of HCC's Center of Excellence. Hernandez and his position were not present on the organizational chart, indicating that he was not in a position of authority within HCC. Similarly, the job description listed Hernandez's duties as a professor, but it gave no indication that he had the ability to hire, implement polices, require employee training on discrimination, or that he otherwise had authority over HCC. And lastly, the Dean's statement explicitly declared that Hernandez had no authority to require HCC to train its employees or to institute an internal anti-discrimination department. Because Hernandez challenged the existence of jurisdiction with supporting evidence, to avoid dismissal, the burden shifted to Williams to submit evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact. See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 771 (Tex. 2018).
In determining whether a material fact issue exists, we must take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff's favor. In doing so, however, we cannot disregard evidence necessary to show context, and we cannot disregard evidence and inferences unfavorable to the plaintiff if reasonable jurors could not. Id. (internal citations omitted).
In his response to Hernandez's plea to the jurisdiction, Williams did not produce any evidence to rebut Hernandez's evidence that he lacked authority. See id.; Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 487-88; Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 155-56. Therefore, Williams has not met his burden to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding Hernandez's scope of authority. See Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 771.
Furthermore, because Williams is no longer an employee of HCC, he cannot be harmed by Hernandez in the future. See Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 485; see also Garcia v. City of Willis, 593 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Tex. 2019) (concluding that plaintiff lacked standing because he "no longer face[d] the [purportedly] unconstitutional conduct about which [he] complain[ed]"); see also Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2014) (denying injunctive relief and concluding plaintiff lacked standing because as former employee, plaintiff did not realistically face threat that her former employer would continue to violate her FMLA rights).
In summary, Williams lacks standing because he has not shown that: (1) the relief he seeks against Hernandez would remedy his alleged injury; (2) Hernandez has the authority to implement the requested relief; and (3) he faces a realistic threat of Hernandez harming him in the future. See Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 485.
Because the jurisdictional evidence establishes that Williams lacks standing the trial court should have granted Hernandez's plea to the jurisdiction. Meyers, 548 S.W.3d at 488. We sustain Hernandez's sole issue.
Because of our conclusion regarding standing, we do not need to address Hernandez's arguments regarding mootness, ripeness, and whether Williams adequately pleaded an ultra vires claim. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Having reached this conclusion, we must next decide whether Williams is entitled to an opportunity to amend his petition. See Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. 2022). Williams has not requested an opportunity to replead or made any suggestion that there is a jurisdictional defect he can cure. See Texas A&M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2007) (dismissing claim and concluding plaintiff was not entitled to amend petition, noting that plaintiff's "pleading defects cannot be cured, and he has made no suggestion as to how to cure the jurisdictional defect"). Remanding this case to allow Williams to amend his petition would serve no legitimate purpose because Williams cannot overcome the standing defect of his pleadings.
As outlined above, the jurisdictional evidence affirmatively establishes incurable standing defects because Williams's requested relief does not redress his alleged injury, Hernandez does not possess the authority to implement Williams's requested relief, and Williams no longer works at HCC, making it unlikely that Williams would face future discrimination by Hernandez. Accordingly, Williams is not entitled to an opportunity to amend in this case.
III. Conclusion
We reverse the trial court's order denying Hernandez's plea to the jurisdiction and render the judgment the trial court should have rendered, a judgment dismissing Williams's suit against Hernandez for want of jurisdiction. Tex.R.App.P. 42.3(a), 43.2(c).