No. 05-09-00009-CR
Opinion Filed September 16, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F03-71308-JI.
Before Justices O'NEILL, FRANCIS, and LANG.
Opinion By Justice LANG.
Eleazar Hernandez, Jr. appeals following the adjudication of his guilt for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in adjudicating his guilt and revoking his community supervision. We affirm.
Background
Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a motor vehicle. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on five years' community supervision, and assessed a $2500 fine. A condition of community supervision barred appellant from having contact with his wife, the complainant. The State later moved to adjudicate guilt. In its motion to adjudicate, the State alleged appellant violated a condition of his community supervision by having contact with his wife "on the following dates 12/14/08 and 12/18/08, as indicated in offense reports 0379563-V and 00382943-V." Appellant pleaded true to the allegation in a hearing on the motion. The trial court granted the motion, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at two years' imprisonment. The trial court also made affirmative family violence and deadly weapon findings. Abuse of Discretion
In his sole issue on appeal, appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating his guilt and revoking his community supervision because two reports described in the motion were not admitted into evidence and, without the reports, there was no evidence of improper contact with the complainant. Appellant concedes he had contact with the complainant but contends that because he and his wife testified that the contact occurred "for the sake of the children," adjudication on this basis is a manifest abuse of discretion. The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating appellant's guilt and revoking his community supervision. Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In determining questions concerning sufficiency of the evidence in probation revocation cases, the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. An order revoking probation must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation. Id. at 763-64. A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd.). Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order. See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193-94 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978); Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, no pet.). Appellant pleaded true to the allegation in the motion to adjudicate. Appellant's signed plea of true and stipulation of evidence that he had contact with his wife as alleged in the motion to adjudicate was admitted into evidence. A plea of true, standing alone, supports revocation of community supervision. See Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating appellant's guilt and revoking his community supervision. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64. We resolve appellant's sole issue against him. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.