Opinion
A147118
03-28-2017
SIGLET A. HERNANDEZ, Petitioner and Respondent, CONTRA COSTA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, Real Party in Interest and Respondent, v. RICARDO A. SISNEROS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. F0602013)
Ricardo Sisneros, appearing in propia persona, appeals a trial court order denying his request that Siglet Hernandez reimburse him for health-related costs he paid for their minor child, Gina Sisneros, pursuant to a 1994 stipulated paternity judgment. Sisneros is seeking reimbursement of one-half of all Gina's health insurance premiums he paid for 15 years between 1994 and 2009 as well as certain uninsured medical expenses from 1998. The trial court did not err in denying Sisneros's request, so we shall affirm.
BACKGROUND
On March 9, 1994, Sisneros and Hernandez entered into a stipulated paternity judgment regarding Gina, who was born in September 1990. The parties stipulated that Sisneros was Gina's father. They were awarded joint legal custody of her, and Hernandez was awarded physical custody. Under the paternity judgment, each party was responsible for paying half of Gina's day care expenses. Sisneros was also required to pay $350 in monthly child support until Gina turned 18, or until her death, marriage, or emancipation, whichever first occurred. In addition, Sisneros was obligated to "maintain [Gina] on all health insurance available to him through his place of employment." Each parent was "responsible to pay one-half of all medical, dental, psychiatric, orthodontic, vision, or other health related expenses which are not reimbursed by insurance."
On September 17, 2015, Sisneros filed a Notice of Renewal of Judgment through which he sought approximately $23,000 from Hernandez for Gina's medical-related expenses. Specifically, he claimed Hernandez was responsible for $11,136.50 as her half of Gina's insurance premiums he paid between March 1994 and December 2009 plus $11,829 in pre-judgment interest. He also claimed Hernandez owed him half of approximately $218 in uninsured medical costs he incurred in 1998 on Gina's behalf. He sought to renew the 1994 paternity judgment to reflect Hernandez was in arrears for this past medical support.
On October 21, 2015, following a hearing, the trial court denied Sisneros's motion with prejudice. The court found Hernandez was never ordered to pay half of Gina's health insurance medical premiums and his request for medical costs from 1998 was untimely.
Sisneros now appeals the order. The Contra Costa County Department of Child Support Services (Department), which is providing child support enforcement services in this matter under Family Code section 17400, submitted a respondent's brief. Hernandez, also appearing in propia persona, submitted no brief.
DISCUSSION
A. General Principles
" 'A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct.' " (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564, italics omitted.) "The burden of affirmatively demonstrating error is on the appellant. This is a general principle of appellate practice as well as an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error." (Fundamental Investment etc. Realty Fund v. Gradow (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 966, 971.)
A party appearing in propria persona "is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys." (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1210.) " '[T]he in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedure as an attorney.' '' (Bianco v. California Highway Patrol (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1125-1126.)
B. Medical Insurance Premiums 1994-2009
Sisneros seeks to reverse the trial court's denial of his request for an order requiring Hernandez to reimburse him for half of Gina's health insurance premiums he paid between 1994 and 2009. Sisneros includes no discussion about the standard we should use to review the trial court's order. "Failure to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of lack of merit." (Sonic Mfg. Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems, Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465 (Sonic Mfg.).) We shall review the trial court's order de novo because it was based solely on its interpretation of the stipulated paternity judgment. (See Brandwein v. Butler (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1485, 1497-1498.) There was no error.
The 1994 paternity judgment is straightforward. It placed responsibility for Gina's health insurance on Sisneros. The judgment provides: "Defendant [Sisneros] shall maintain the minor child on all health insurance available to him through his place of employment." Under the judgment, only Sisneros was responsible for maintaining health insurance coverage for Gina. The judgment did not impose any comparable duty on Hernandez, nor did the judgment require Hernandez to reimburse Sisneros for insurance premiums. Given the plain language of the judgment, there was no error.
Sisneros's interpretation of the paternity judgment and the responsibility for Gina's health insurance premiums is simply not supported by its language. Sisneros cites to the portion of the paternity judgment which states "[e]ach party shall be responsible to pay one-half of all medical, dental, psychiatric, orthodontic, visual, or other health related expense[s] which are not reimbursed by insurance" to support his position that Gina's health insurance premiums were a shared cost. However, writings are to be interpreted to give effect to every provision and in a way that does not render language redundant or unnecessary. (See Super 7 Motel Associates v. Wang (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 541, 546.) Because Sisneros's interpretation requires us to disregard completely the part of the paternity judgment expressly dealing with health insurance, we decline this interpretation.
Sisneros's reliance on Family Code, section 291 and In re Marriage of Cutler (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 460 (Cutler), is also misplaced. Under section 291, a judgment for child support "is enforceable until paid in full or otherwise satisfied." (Fam. Code, § 291, subd. (a).) Cutler reiterates this point on the enforceability of child support orders until paid in full. (Cutler, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 474.) We do not dispute the point of law, but it provides Sisneros no relief. Under the 1994 paternity judgment, Hernandez is not obligated to pay for half of Gina's health insurance premiums. There is no indication in the record that the paternity judgment was ever modified or changed to make these health insurance premiums shared responsibilities. Neither section 291 nor Cutler changes the terms of the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated. --------
Sisneros's arguments addressing laches or his lack of diligence do not support a different result either. The trial court's decision refusing to order Hernandez to pay past medical insurance premiums was based solely on its interpretation of the paternity judgment, as is our decision. Laches or lack of diligence are immaterial to our consideration.
B. Uninsured Medical Expenses from 1998
Sisneros also seeks to reverse the trial court order denying his request for half of approximately $218 he incurred in uninsured medical costs for Gina in 1998. Again, Sisneros fails to offer a standard of review here, suggesting the meritlessness of his claim. (See Sonic Mfg., supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.) We shall review the trial court's order denying Sisneros's request for medical expense reimbursement for abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283.) There was no abuse of discretion here.
Family Code section 4063, subdivision (b) provides that "when either parent accrues or pays costs pursuant to a [paternity judgment], that parent shall provide the other parent with an itemized statement of the costs within a reasonable time, but not more than 30 days after accruing the costs." (Fam. Code, § 4063, subd. (b).) The provision, however, "does not prohibit a party from seeking reimbursement in case of a failure to timely present an itemization of costs. Rather, section 4063, subdivision (c) allows the court to award filing costs and reasonable attorney fees 'if it finds that either party acted without reasonable cause.' " (In re Marriage of Rothrock (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 223, 236-237.) The uninsured medical costs Sisneros seeks were accrued in 1998, and Sisneros filed his motion for reimbursement of these costs in 2015, some 17 years later. There is nothing in the record that indicates Sisneros ever presented a statement of costs to Hernandez, nor is there any explanation in the record for the extraordinary delay in seeking payment from Hernandez. In light of this unexcused 17-year delay in seeking reimbursement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deeming these claims untimely.
To the extent Sisneros's contentions against the laches or lack of diligence defenses are directed to this portion of the trial court's order, they do not save him. Defendant never asserted such equitable defenses below. Application of Family Code section 4063, subdivision (b) fully supports the outcome the trial court reached here.
C. Due Process Claims
Finally, for the first time on appeal, Sisneros claims the Department failed to perform its statutory duty by not collecting medical support payments from Hernandez, thus violating his due process rights under the United States and California Constitutions. "[A] party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court. [Citation.] Any other rule would permit a party to ' " 'play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.' " ' " (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 411-412.) Because Sisneros never raised this claim below, the claim is forfeited. (In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
Siggins, J. We concur: /s/_________
Pollak, Acting P.J. /s/_________
Jenkins, J.