Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co.

23 Citing cases

  1. Platson v. NSM, America, Inc.

    322 Ill. App. 3d 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that allegations that supervisor witnessed a man inappropriately touching a 16-year-old intern stated a negligent supervision claim

    As recognized by Eversole v. Wasson, 80 Ill. App.3d 94, 96-97 (1980), cited by plaintiff, an exception to this general rule exists where the plaintiff bore a "special relationship" to the defendant when the attack by the third party occurred. See also Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App.3d 519, 524 (1994). A special relationship exists where,inter alia, one voluntarily takes custody of another so as to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for protection. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1965); see also Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill.2d 552, 560 (1975).

  2. Charleston v. Larson

    696 N.E.2d 793 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)   Cited 17 times
    Holding the plaintiff was not entitled to opportunity to amend her pleading after section 2-615 dismissal of claim when the proposed amendment did not cure the defective pleading

    However, the legal determination of whether a duty exists is dependent upon the factual circumstances giving rise to the litigation. Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App.3d 519, 522, 641 N.E.2d 886 (1994). In determining whether a legal duty exists, Illinois courts consider whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against harm and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant.

  3. Tedrick v. Community Resource Center, Inc.

    235 Ill. 2d 155 (Ill. 2009)   Cited 94 times
    Refusing to extend the rationale of Pippin to allow a medical malpractice action by a nonpatient third party

    Plaintiffs contend that under Illinois law, the duty to protect arises from a defendant's undertaking and that "Illinois appellate courts have repeatedly upheld the duty to protect against criminal acts pursuant to section 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts." In support of this contention they cite Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Ill. 2d 204 (1979), Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard, 125 Ill. 2d 203 (1988), and Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 519 (1994). They also argue that Illinois courts have repeatedly held that the duty to protect against third-party criminal acts arises from a defendant's undertaking, despite the fact that no special relationship may exist.

  4. Green v. Carlinville

    381 Ill. App. 3d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that a school district owed the highest degree of care to a student on a school bus, such that the district could be liable for the sexual abuse of the student by the school bus driver

    Common carriers have duties that others do not have. Generally speaking, Illinois law does not impose a duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third person unless the attack is reasonably foreseeable and the parties stand in one of four "special relationships," namely: (1) common carrier and passenger, (2) innkeeper and guest, (3) business invitor and invitee, and (4) voluntary custodian and protectee. Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524, 641 N.E.2d 886, 890 (1994), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965). In Hernandez, a student was raped by a special-education student as she walked unescorted from a bus to the school.

  5. Adames v. Sheahan

    880 N.E.2d 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)

    Special relationships that have been found to create a duty are: common carrier and passenger; innkeeper and guest; business inviter and invitee; and voluntary custodian and protectee. Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524 (1994). Sheahan concludes that no special relationship existed with Josh and that he did not perform any voluntary undertaking to create a duty to protect Josh. Sheahan argues that the recent trend in cases has identified a fear of the expansion of liability and the special relationship rule.

  6. Iseberg v. Gross

    366 Ill. App. 3d 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 13 times

    Plaintiffs assertion that defendants owed him a duty is based on the theory of their superior knowledge that Slavin planned to attack plaintiff. Generally speaking, Illinois law does not impose a duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third person ( Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 228 (2000)), unless the attack is reasonably foreseeable and the parties stand in one of four special relationship, namely, (1) common carrier and passenger, (2) innkeeper and guest, (3) business invitor and invitee, and (4) voluntary custodian and protectee. Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 552, 559-60 (1975); Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524 (1994). There are four exceptions to the rule that a party does not owe a duty of care to protect another from the criminal acts of third persons: (1) when the parties are in a special relationship and the harm is foreseeable; (2) when an employee is in imminent danger and this is known to the employer; (3) when a principal fails to warn his agent of an unreasonable risk of harm involved in the agency; and (4) when any party voluntarily or contractually assumes a duty to protect another from the harmful acts of a third party.

  7. Doe v. Goff

    306 Ill. App. 3d 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that a voluntary custodian has a duty to protect from reasonably foreseeable harm

    Generally, Illinois law does not impose a duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third person. Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App.3d 519, 524, 641 N.E.2d 886, 890 (1994). However, a duty to protect another can exist if the attack was reasonably foreseeable and the parties stand in one of the following "special relationships": (1) common carrier and passenger; (2) innkeeper and guest; (3) business invitor and invitee; and (4) voluntary custodian and protectee.

  8. Geimer v. Chicago Park District

    272 Ill. App. 3d 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 38 times
    Recognizing common-law rule that municipalities are not liable in tort and owe no duty to individual members of the general public for failure to enforce local laws and ordinances

    ) One exception to this rule occurs when the defendant and wrongdoer have a "special relationship" as described in sections 316 through 319 of the Restatement: parent-minor child, master-servant, possessor of land-licensee, and a person who takes charge of another with dangerous propensities. ( Ventura, 227 Ill. App.3d at 867; Johnson, 119 Ill.2d at 503.) An exception to the rule also occurs when the defendant and the injured party have a "special relationship": common carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, business invitor and invitee, and voluntary custodian and protectee. ( Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co. (1994), 267 Ill. App.3d 519, 524, 641 N.E.2d 886; B.C. v. J.C. Penney Co. (1990), 205 Ill. App.3d 5, 9, 562 N.E.2d 533; Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314A, 315, Comment (1965).) The foreseeability of intentional misconduct by a third party does not itself create any duty without a special relationship.

  9. Padilla v. Hunter Douglas Window Coverings, Inc.

    Case No. 09 CV 1222 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 8, 2012)   Cited 2 times

    LM v. United States, 344 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir. 2003) (Illinois law) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 641 N.E.2d 886, 887-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1994), an Illinois appellate court found that a bus company that transported special education students and a school board attendant who supervised and escorted the students from the bus to the school building voluntarily undertook a duty under Section 324A(b) to supervise and escort the students only when the school board attendant who normally performed this function was absent. When the attendant was present, the bus company had not undertaken a duty under Section 324A(b).

  10. Ryan v. U.S.

    156 F. Supp. 2d 900 (N.D. Ill. 2001)   Cited 7 times

    28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Because Illinois was where the alleged negligence in hiring, supervision, and retention occurred, Illinois law determines the extent of the government's duty. Normally, Illinois law does not impose a duty to protect another from a criminal attack by a third person unless the attack was reasonably foreseeable and the parties stand in one of the following special relationships: common carrier and passenger, innkeeper and guest, business invitor and invitee, or voluntary custodian and protectee. Charleston v. Larson, 297 Ill. App.3d 540, 231 Ill.Dec. 497, 696 N.E.2d 793, 797 (1998) (citing Hernandez v. Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App.3d 519, 204 Ill.Dec. 456, 641 N.E.2d 886 (1994)). The plaintiffs do not state that the relationship between the plaintiffs and the United States falls into any one of the Illinois "special relationship" categories listed above.