endant Moore or Defendant Cruz performed any independent inquiry to confirm Ms. Fitzgerald's alleged role in inmate Roberts' purported drug enterprise after reading memos that were respectively written 14 months, 10 1/2 months, 4 1/2 months and over 3 months before the search of Ms. Fitzgerald. Daugherty v. Campbell, 33 F.3d 554, 556 (6th Cir. 1994) (prison guards' general suspicion of smuggling activity does not justify a strip search, “reasonable suspicion exists only if the information contained in the tip is linked to other objective facts known by correctional authorities.”); Hunter, 672 F.2d at 675 (8th Cir. 1982) (prison officials “must have reasonable grounds, based on objective facts, to believe that a particular visitor will attempt to smuggle contraband . . . generalized suspicion of smuggling activity is insufficient to justify the extensive intrusion of a strip search.”); Hernandez v. Montanez, 36 F.Supp.3d 202, 214 (D. Mass. 2014) (finding an inmate's reputation for being involved in drug activity was insufficient to corroborate an anonymous tip, absent independent suspicion that prison visitor had been the one supplying the inmate with the drugs. The anonymous tip was the only information linking the prison visitor to drug activity; therefore, it could not supply the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a lawful strip-search of the prison visitor.
"When determining whether an invasion of bodily privacy has violated the statute, the Massachusetts courts balance the individual's right of privacy with the interests involved when violating that privacy." Hernandez v. Montanez, 36 F. Supp.3d 202, 217 (D. Mass. 2014) (citation omitted); see Spencer v. Roche, 659 F.3d 142, 150 (1st Cir. 2011) (holding that a body cavity search "performed in accordance with constitutional requirements and that is otherwise reasonable does not constitute an actionable invasion of privacy under Massachusetts law"); Webster v. Motorola, 637 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Mass. 1994) (balancing interests of employer in screening employees against the bodily intrusion of a urinalysis test).
This falls well short of the type of intensely personal intrusion that courts have required for an invasion of privacy to constitute a cause of action. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Montanez, 36 F. Supp. 3d 202, 213 (D. Mass. 2014) (holding that strip-search of a prison visitor without reasonable suspicion could violate Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B). Therefore, as to Count 7, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 1B. "When determining whether an invasion of bodily privacy has violated the statute, the Massachusetts courts balance the individual's right of privacy with the interests involved when violating that privacy." Hernandez v. Montanez, 36 F. Supp. 3d 202, 217 (D. Mass. 2014) (citing Webster v. Motorola, 637 N.E.2d 203, 206-08 (Mass. 1994) (balancing interests of employer in screening employees against the bodily intrusion of a urinalysis test)); see also Spencer v. Roche, 659 F.3d 142, 150 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that a body cavity search "performed in accordance with constitutional requirements and that is otherwise reasonable does not constitute an actionable invasion of privacy under Massachusetts law").