Opinion
EP-02-CA-509-DB
August 15, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day, the Court considered a "Motion for Summary Judgment," filed by Defendant Mid-West Textile Co. in the above-captioned cause on May 13, 2003. Plaintiff Maria Luisa Hernandez filed a Response on May 27, 2003, to which Defendant filed a Reply on June 6, 2003. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's Motion should be granted.
BACKGROUND
Defendant hired Plaintiff as a sorter in the company's shirt department in November 1998. Sorters take garments placed on their tables by other workers or a conveyor belt and toss them into eighteen different bins — located in front, beside, and behind the sorters, according to the garment type. Defendant estimates that Plaintiff handled approximately 4,000 pounds of garments each day, each garment weighing about one pound.
On March 28, 2000, Plaintiff reported swelling and pain in her right wrist. She went to see Dr. Robert R. Bell around July 10, 2000. Dr. Bell diagnosed Plaintiff with radial styloid tenosynovitis and determined that the injury was the result of her sorting work. He put her arm in a cast and cleared her to return to work. Plaintiff experienced further pain upon doing so, however, and visited Dr. Bell again on August 17 and September 7, 2000. After each visit, Dr. Bell recommended that she return to work only on a light or modified duty basis. Specifically, he recommended that Plaintiff avoid sorting work.
When Plaintiff returned to work, her supervisors allowed her to work with only one hand and apparently complied in-full with Dr. Bell's restrictions. Plaintiff concedes this, but alleges that after each doctor's visit, one of her supervisors, Jorge Castaños, told her to resign. Her supervisors transferred her to various other light duty positions, inspecting the sorting bins, inspecting garments in quality control, and working in an office. Nevertheless, Plaintiff remained classified as a sorter. She alleges that, at the time of her termination, she was doing sorting work again, though without the use of her right hand. Defendant discharged her on September 20, 2000, with the following written explanation:
Based on the doctor's report, the type of work, we have available, is not suitable for you. Therefore we are releasing you from your job duties. The company made reasonable accomodations [sic] for her, but no position was available. Records reflect 6 prior eppisodes [sic] of poor quality and low performance.
Plaintiff underwent surgery for the injury on March 16, 2001, and wore a cast for one month.
On April 30, 2001, Plaintiff filed a charge of disability with t he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The charge alleged that Plaintiff was discharged from her employment for "no suitable reason" on the basis that she was perceived as disabled. Following an investigation, the EEOC determined that it was unable to conclude that Plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of her disability. After receiving her right to sue letter, Plaintiff filed the instant suit on August 23, 2002, asserting that Defendant discriminated against her because she was disabled, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The instant Motion followed.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted only where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party that moves for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery on file, together with any affidavit s, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "If the moving party fails to meet this burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response." Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). If the movant does meet t his burden, however, the nonmovant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See, e.g., Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. "If the non-movant fails to meet this burden, then summary judgment is appropriate." Tubacex, 45 F.3d at 954.
When making a determination under Rule 56, factual questions and inferences are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1272 (5th Cir. 1994). The party opposing a motion supported by evidence cannot discharge his burden by alleging mere legal conclusions. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Instead, the party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. See id.
DISCUSSION
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Mid-West argues that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination because Plaintiff cannot establish that she is a "qualified individual with a disability" within the meaning of the ADA. The Court agrees.The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against persons with a disability, providing that
[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 1995).
In employment discrimination cases, it is imperative that a nonmovant plaintiff "present evidence — not just conjecture and speculation" that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of a protected trait. See Grimes v. Tex. Dep't of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th Cir. 1996). The focus is on whether a genuine issue exists as to whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. Id. at 139. Absent direct proof, the plaintiff bears an initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence to raise an inference of intentional discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824; Bauer v. Albemarle Corp., 169 F.3d 962, 966 (5th Cir. 1999).
The McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis used in Title VII cases applies to ADA claims. See Daigle v. Liberty Life Insurance Company, 70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995), citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Once an ADA claimant has established a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. See Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)). Thus, a defendant must merely set forth, through admissible evidence, "reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action." St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, L. Ed.2d 40 (1993) (emphasis in original). The employer need only articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, regardless of that reason's ultimate persuasiveness. Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993). If the defendant articulates such a reason, the inference of discrimination drops out. See Bauer, 169 F.3d at 966. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff, who then must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons asserted by the defendant are pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093. This may be accomplished either directly, by showing that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by showing that the asserted reason is unworthy of credence. Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.
The exact elements of a prima facie case are necessarily defined by the facts of a particular case. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824 n. 13. In this context, as to a disability claim, Plaintiff must show the following: (1) he has a disability; (2) that he was qualified for the position; and (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action on account of his disability. Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys. Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 853 (5th Cir. 1999). Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot establish that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA, nor that she is a "qualified individual" for the position.
The term "disability" as used in the ADA means: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 1995). To qualify as disabled under the ADA, a claimant must initially prove that he or she has a physical or mental impairment. Toyota Motor Mfr. Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 194, 122 S.Ct. 681, 690, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002). Merely having an impairment does not qualify as a disability for purposes of the ADA. Id. at 195. One must also demonstrate that the impairment limits a major life activity, and that the limitation is `substantial.' Id. "Major life activities" include `walking, seeing, hearing, . . . and `performing manual tasks.'" Id. These activities are those `of central importance to daily life.' Id. at 197.
Furthermore, the impairment must "substantially limit" one or more of a person's major life activities. Dutcher v. Ingallas Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 (5th Cir. 1995). "Substantially limits" means 1) unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or 2) significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform the same major life activity. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2002); Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 n. 5 (5th Cir. 1996). Whether an impairment "substantially limits" a major life activity depends on the nature and severity of the impairment, t he duration or expected duration of the impairment, and the impairment's permanent or expected permanent or long-term impact. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2002); Oswalt v. Sara Lee Corporation, 74 F.3d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1996); Dutcher, 53 F.3d at 726.
Plaintiff alleges she is disabled because she has a physical impairment in her right hand which substantially limits the major life activity of performing manual tasks. Plaintiff's deposition testimony reveals that at the time she reported her injury to Defendant in March 2000, she "had a lot of pain" when dressing herself. Plaintiff also testified that, at the time of her discharge in September 2000, she had difficulties with bathing, brushing her hair, and brushing her teeth. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified that, although she experienced pain when performing these tasks, she could accomplish them as necessary. Plaintiff also stated that her ability to dress herself and brush her teeth has improved over time. Certainly, brushing, bathing, and dressing are among the types of manual tasks of central importance to people's daily lives. However, based on the evidence submitted by Plaintiff and considering the long-term impact of the impairment, and particularly in light of the evidence that her condition has improved over time, the Court cannot say that she has established that her discomfort in performing these tasks is so severe such that the effect on her life has been substantial. See, e.g. Toyota Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., 534 U.S. at 202, 122 S.Ct. at 694 (holding that plaintiff's carpal tunnel syndrome and tendinitis that caused her to avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with her children, gardens, or drives long distances did no t establish a manual task disability as a matter of law). Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a material fact issue with respect to having a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Nonetheless, even if Plaintiff could establish a fact issue on her alleged disability, she cannot establish the second prong of her prima facie case because she cannot show that she is a "qualified individual." When determining if someone is a qualified individual under the ADA, courts must give consideration to the employer's definition of essential job requirements. Zenor, 176 F.3d at 858. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that she can perform, with or without reasonable accommodations, all of the essential elements of her job. Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Centers, Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 763 (5th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, an individual is not qualified for a job if his medical condition presents a genuine substantial risk that he or she could be injured or could injure others, and the employer cannot modify the job to eliminate that risk. See Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56 F.3d 695, 698 (5th Cir. 1995). "Where an accommodation is not available, Texas law permits an employer to terminate a disabled employee where it appears that, ultimately, due to the nature of the injury, the employee can no longer perform the essential functions of the job." Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 620 (5th Cir. 1999).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant failed to accommodate her. Rather, she argues that she did not need an accommodation. Therefore, the issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff can carry her burden of proving that she could perform all of the essential elements of her job as a sorter without an accommodation. The Court finds as a matter of law that she cannot.
Defendant points to the affidavit of Antonio Cachazo, plant manager for Defendant during Plaintiff's employment, that Plaintiff was unable to meet the minimum acceptable production standards as evidence of an absence of a genuine issue of fact on the issue of whet her Plaintiff could perform the essential elements of her job as a sorter. Furthermore, Cachazo stated that the company received a letter from Dr. Bell indicating that Plaintiff's repetitious activity at work was the cause of her condition. Therefore, Cachazo believed that, in accordance with her physician's opinion, Plaintiff's continued employment with Defendant as a sorter posed a threat to her health and safety. Moreover, Defendant's termination letter to Plaintiff indicated that she was also being terminated for previous instances of low performance on the job.
Dr. Bell's report stated, "The problem appears to be directly related to certain repetitious activities and twisting of the wrist on repetitious basis causing inflammation of the first and second extensor tendon comparts." Furthermore, he stated that Plaintiff's condition "may continue to recur with her occupation."
Plaintiff must now go beyond the pleadings and point to specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Lawrence, 163 F.3d at 312. Plaintiff admits that her right hand was "significantly impaired" and that she could not use it for sorting. She also stated that "I couldn't do my work 100 percent the way I was doing it before." At the same time, Plaintiff asserts that at the time of her termination, she was working full duty as a sorter, meeting quantity and quality performance standards while using only her left hand. However, Plaintiff provides no evidence to support this bare assertion of her productivity so as to establish that she could perform the essential elements of her job. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's unsupported assertions, the Court finds that Dr. Bell's opinion that she could not continue in her position as a sorter without incurring further injury to herself establishes that she could not perform the essential elements of her job. Daugherty, 56 F.3d at 698. Because Plaintiff could not perform the essential element of tossing garments with the use of her right wrist in order to meet production standards, Plaintiff was not qualified to work as a sorter as a matter of law. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish a fact issue as to whether she was a "qualified individual."
Having determined that Plaintiff has not met her burden in establishing a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter o f law. Accordingly, the Court is of the opinion that Defendant's "Motion for Summary Judgment" should be granted and that the following orders should enter:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Mid-West Textile, Inc.'s "Motion for Summary Judgment" is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other pending motions, if any, are DENIED AS MOOT.