Opinion
E073303
02-23-2021
ROSIE HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent, v. DOMINIC M. LUNA, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Garcia Reed & Ramirez, Raul B. Garcia and Jacoby R. Perez for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. Law Office of Robert J. Spitz and Robert J. Spitz for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1717405) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Randall D. White, Judge. (Retired Judge of the Riverside Sup. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.). Affirmed. Garcia Reed & Ramirez, Raul B. Garcia and Jacoby R. Perez for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant. Law Office of Robert J. Spitz and Robert J. Spitz for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent.
Rosie Hernandez brought this action against Dominic Luna to partition real property that they co-owned. The trial court granted Hernandez's unopposed motion for a partition by sale. After a one-day bench trial, the court determined that Hernandez and Luna should split the proceeds of the sale equally. More specifically, the court found an implied agreement to own and divide the property equally, irrespective of the amount contributed by each party to the down payment, mortgage payments, and other expenses of owning the property. On appeal, Luna argues that the court misunderstood the law, which entitled him to reimbursement for overpaying his share of the property's expenses. He also argues that the record does not contain substantial evidence to support the finding of an implied agreement and that the court erred by excluding certain evidence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Hernandez and Luna met in 1991 or 1992 and have an adult son. They were engaged to be married in June 2013. That same year, the two of them decided to purchase the subject property in Norco, California. They agreed to sell their separate residences and be "50-50" owners of the new property, and they took title as joint tenants. The parties stipulated that Hernandez contributed $124,000 to the down payment from the sale of her separate residence and that Luna contributed $148,000 to the down payment. Hernandez testified that she contributed another $28,000 towards the down payment and presented evidence of those checks, but Luna insisted that he gave her $12,000 in cash to fund several of those checks. The parties were jointly responsible for a $396,000 mortgage on the property.
Hernandez worked part-time at Home Depot; she was also a real estate agent. Luna was a licensed contractor. Hernandez contributed towards the mortgage payments, but the parties stipulated that Luna contributed more. They also stipulated that Luna contributed more towards the utilities payments. Hernandez moved out of the subject property in 2018.
The court issued an oral statement of decision at the end of the one-day trial. The court found that a "true joint tenancy" existed and that the parties should share the proceeds of the partition sale equally. The court relied on Milian v. DeLeon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1185 (Milian), a case on which both parties relied in their trial briefs and arguments. Specifically, the court concluded: "By definition, joint tenancy ownership means equal ownership pursuant to [Milian] . . . . [¶] By definition, joint tenancy ownership means equal ownership, pursuant to Civil Code sections, including Civil Code section 683. In the absence of any agreement for reimbursement, there is no authority which authorizes reimbursement on account of unequal contributions to the down payment or any other payments. [¶] The evidence in this case supports the Court's finding of an implied agreement to own and divide the property equally, irrespective of amount contributed by each party to the acquisition, improvement, maintenance, or preservation of the property. [¶] There is clear evidence in this case—clear and convincing evidence that the parties intended to own the property equally, and there is substantial evidence that each was to contribute what he or she could, and both intended the property to be owned equally, irrespective of inequality in the amounts contributed by each of them."
The court entered a judgment finding a joint tenancy and dividing the proceeds of the partition sale equally between the parties.
DISCUSSION
I. Claimed Legal Errors in the Court's Statement of Decision
Luna argues that the court erred by concluding that, as a rule, joint tenants are not entitled to reimbursement "on account of unequal contributions to the down payment or any other payments." He asserts that in a partition action involving joint tenants, the court has the authority to order a "contribution" or "other compensation adjustment among the parties according to the principles of equity." (Code Civ. Proc., § 872.140.) He further argues that the court misread Milian as holding that joint tenants may not be reimbursed for unequal contributions to any expenses, because Milian held only that joint tenants may not be reimbursed for unequal contributions to the down payment. Even if the court misinterpreted the law in those respects, Luna has not demonstrated reversible error.
"If the decision of a lower court is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment or order will be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the lower court reached its conclusion. [Citation.] [¶] The rationale for this principle is twofold: (a) an appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and not the reasons given for its action; and (b) there can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct." (Mike Davidov Co. v. Issod (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 597, 610.) Thus, "a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason." (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19.)
Milian was a partition action involving an unmarried couple who purchased a home together and took title as joint tenants. (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1188-1189.) The trial court found an implied agreement "to treat [the parties'] property equally and to divide the same equally." (Id. at p. 1192.) This court held that substantial evidence supported the finding of an implied agreement, and we affirmed the judgment dividing the partition sale proceeds equally. (Id. at pp. 1196, 1200.)
Here, the trial court's decision to divide the sale proceeds equally was supported by its finding of an implied agreement to own and divide the property equally, irrespective of each party's contributions to the down payment, mortgage payments, and any other expenses. Such an implied agreement is a sound basis for dividing the sale proceeds equally, as set forth in Milian, and Luna acknowledges as much. Accordingly, because the court correctly based its decision on the implied agreement between Hernandez and Luna, it does not matter whether the court might have misstated the law in other respects. We will not disturb the judgment on that ground.
II. Substantial Evidence of the Implied Agreement
Luna argues that "[m]inimal [e]vidence" supported the court's finding of an implied agreement to own and divide the property equally. (Boldface omitted.) The argument lacks merit.
We review the court's finding of an implied agreement for substantial evidence. (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1194, 1196, 1198.) We "start with the presumption that the record contains evidence sufficient to support the judgment; it is the appellant's burden to demonstrate otherwise." (Baxter Healthcare Corp. v. Denton (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 333, 368 (Baxter).) The opening brief "must set forth all of the material evidence bearing on the issue, not merely the evidence favorable to the appellant, and it also must show how the evidence does not sustain the challenged finding." (Ibid.) If the appellant fails to set forth all of the material evidence, the claim of insufficient evidence is forfeited. (Id. at pp. 368, 370.)
Luna has forfeited his sufficiency of the evidence challenge because he does not set forth all of the material evidence adduced at trial. Indeed, the opening brief fails to include the summary of facts required by rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) of the California Rules of Court.
In any event, substantial evidence supported the court's finding of an implied agreement to own and divide the property equally. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we "consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, accept as true all the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom that tend to establish the correctness of the trial court's findings and decision, and resolve every conflict in favor of the judgment." (Baxter, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 369.)
In Milian, the parties had been dating for nearly eight years and were engaged when they jointly purchased the house at issue. (Milian, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1189.) They had commingled their property and collectively incurred expenses on the house and otherwise. (Id. at p. 1190.) We concluded: "[T]he record shows the parties anticipated marriage and took title to the property as equal owners in joint tenancy. They both contributed significant financial resources and nonfinancial efforts to the acquisition of the home, furnishings, appliances, improvements, decoration, and landscaping. Quite clearly, they intended to own the property equally and there is substantial evidence that each was to contribute what he or she could and that both intended the property to be owned equally irrespective of inequality in the amounts contributed by each." (Id. at p. 1198.)
This case is similar to Milian. The evidence showed that the parties were in a long-term relationship, shared a child, and purchased the subject property in anticipation of marriage. They both contributed significantly to the acquisition of the property, and although they did not contribute equal shares, they agreed to own the property in equal shares. (Civ. Code, § 683, subd. (a) [defining a joint tenancy as "a joint interest . . . owned by two or more persons in equal shares"].) They both agreed to be liable for the mortgage, even if Luna made more of the payments than Hernandez. All of this evidence gives rise to the reasonable inference that in anticipation of marriage, the parties intended to own and divide the subject property equally, with each contributing whatever he or she could to the expenses. Accordingly, substantial evidence supported the court's finding of an implied agreement to that effect.
III. Claimed Evidentiary Errors
Luna contends that the court prejudicially erred by excluding certain evidence. We reject the argument.
First, Luna argues that the court erred by excluding his testimony that he and Hernandez were "going to pay the mortgage equally." He asserts that the evidence was relevant to whether Hernandez owed him reimbursement for overpaying his share of the mortgage payments. But even if the evidence were relevant, Luna fails to demonstrate prejudice. He merely asserts in a conclusory manner that he was prejudiced because the evidence was relevant. That is not sufficient to carry his burden of showing prejudice. (In re Marriage of McLaughlin (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [appellant bears the burden of showing prejudice, and "[i]njury is not presumed from error"].)
Second, Luna argues that the court "directed [him] away" from introducing evidence that would have refuted any implied agreement to own and divide the property equally, such as improvements to the property, maintenance on the property, and the extent to which he kept his personal property and finances separate. But he does not cite any instance in the record when he tried to introduce such evidence and was barred from doing so. That is, he has not shown that he intended to use the evidence or that it even existed. He has thus failed to show prejudicial error on this ground.
Third, Luna argues that the court barred him from introducing evidence that the parties owned the subject property as tenants in common with unequal shares, rather than as joint tenants. But at trial, he did not dispute that the parties were joint tenants, and he provides no record citation demonstrating that he argued for a tenancy in common instead. He cannot change his position now '"and adopt a new and different theory on appeal."' (Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1334, 1350, fn. 12.)
In sum, all of Luna's claims of evidentiary error lack merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Hernandez shall recover her costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).) The remittitur shall issue immediately pursuant to the parties' stipulation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(c)(1).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MENETREZ
J. We concur: MILLER
Acting P. J. CODRINGTON
J.