Hernandez v. Lukas

7 Citing cases

  1. Glassman v. St. Joseph Hospital

    259 Ill. App. 3d 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 28 times
    Finding reversal appropriate only where defendant has been prejudiced by the testimony

    This court "will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury * * * unless there is a lack of a reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record." ( Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 694, 432 N.E.2d 1028.) However, if "the evidence is susceptible to no reasonable inferences sustaining a jury's verdict," this court may order a new trial.

  2. Green v. Querrey

    2025 Ill. App. 3d 240147 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025)

    Courts have recognized that the negligence of a minor pedestrian can break the chain of causation, even as matter of law. See Hernandez v. Lucas, 104 Ill.App.3d 692, 694 (1982) (affirming verdict in favor of defendant where evidence demonstrated that defendant "did all he could do to avoid hitting the child" who ran in front of his vehicle); Hardy v. Smith, 61 Ill.App.3d 441 (1978) (defendant motorist's summary judgment motion was properly granted where only reasonable inference demonstrated that thirteen-year-old child failed to look before stepping into alley and suffering injury); see also Lee v. Weiland, 2022 IL App (4th) 210714-U (concluding that summary judgment was appropriate and the accident was "unavoidable" where 12-year-old pedestrian ran into the street and collided with defendant's vehicle).

  3. Gaylor v. Campion, Curran, Rausch, Gummerson & Dunlop, P.C.

    2012 Ill. App. 2d 110718 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 28 times

    " Merrill, 335 Ill.App.3d at 1006, 270 Ill.Dec. 577, 783 N.E.2d 152. A reviewing court " ‘will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury * * * unless there is a lack of a reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record.’ " Glassman v. St. Joseph Hospital, 259 Ill.App.3d 730, 766, 197 Ill.Dec. 727, 631 N.E.2d 1186 (1994) (quoting Hernandez v. Lukas, 104 Ill.App.3d 692, 694, 60 Ill.Dec. 129, 432 N.E.2d 1028 (1982) ). ¶ 60 If a court determines that a damages award was inadequate, it may order a new trial on all issues or, if certain criteria are met, a new trial on damages only. Hollis, 108 Ill.2d at 408, 92 Ill.Dec. 449, 485 N.E.2d 4. A new trial on the issue of damages alone is warranted if (1) "the jury's verdict on the question of liability is amply supported by the evidence," (2) "the questions of damages and liability are so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages is not unfair to the defendant," and (3) "the record suggests neither that the jury reached a compromise verdict, nor that, in some other identifiable manner, the error which resulted in the jury's awarding inadequate damages also affected its verdict on the question of liability."

  4. Hartman v. Pittsburg Corning Corp.

    634 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 10 times

    ( Chance v. City of Collinsville (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 6, 11, 445 N.E.2d 39, 42.) A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of a jury and set aside a verdict unless there is a lack of reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record. Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 694, 432 N.E.2d 1028, 1029. With that in mind, we turn to defendant's argument that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that he was exposed to Unibestos.

  5. Golf Management v. Evening Tides Waterbeds

    572 N.E.2d 1000 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 7 times

    • 2, 3 It is well settled that in reviewing a jury's verdict, a court of appeal should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury and set aside a verdict unless there is no reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record. ( Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 432 N.E.2d 1028.) A jury's findings should not be disturbed unless the reviewing court is able to say that there is no evidence that tends to support the verdict.

  6. Miklos v. Caliendo

    161 Ill. App. 3d 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 9 times

    • 11 We agree with defendant that the mere fact that a vehicle has struck a pedestrian does not give rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver. ( Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 694.) If all that were known here was that defendant's truck had come in contact with Jeffrey, we could only guess whether defendant's conduct was negligent or whether his conduct was the proximate cause of Jeffrey's injuries. Summary judgment for defendant would thus be proper. As was stated by the court in Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. (1981), 92 Ill. App.3d 813, in affirming summary judgment for the defendant:

  7. Agnello v. Puzzo

    443 N.E.2d 648 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 12 times
    In Agnello, the defendant admitted that he was aware of children in the vicinity of an ice cream truck, but rather than stop his car, he chose to enter the wrong lane of traffic, where pedestrians would not expect his car to be. It was defendant's presence in the left-hand side of the intersection that was clearly the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. The fact that the defendant's speed was unreasonable was evidenced by the fact that he saw the child six feet away but could not stop his car in time to avoid hitting the child.

    Pedrick v. Peoria Eastern R.R. Co. Defendant cites and relies upon Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 432 N.E.2d 1028, to sustain his position. That case is inapposite in its facts. There the driver was on the proper side of the roadway, in midblock, behind other moving traffic, circumstances significantly different from those at bar.