This court "will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury * * * unless there is a lack of a reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record." ( Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 694, 432 N.E.2d 1028.) However, if "the evidence is susceptible to no reasonable inferences sustaining a jury's verdict," this court may order a new trial.
Courts have recognized that the negligence of a minor pedestrian can break the chain of causation, even as matter of law. See Hernandez v. Lucas, 104 Ill.App.3d 692, 694 (1982) (affirming verdict in favor of defendant where evidence demonstrated that defendant "did all he could do to avoid hitting the child" who ran in front of his vehicle); Hardy v. Smith, 61 Ill.App.3d 441 (1978) (defendant motorist's summary judgment motion was properly granted where only reasonable inference demonstrated that thirteen-year-old child failed to look before stepping into alley and suffering injury); see also Lee v. Weiland, 2022 IL App (4th) 210714-U (concluding that summary judgment was appropriate and the accident was "unavoidable" where 12-year-old pedestrian ran into the street and collided with defendant's vehicle).
" Merrill, 335 Ill.App.3d at 1006, 270 Ill.Dec. 577, 783 N.E.2d 152. A reviewing court " ‘will not substitute its judgment for that of the jury * * * unless there is a lack of a reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record.’ " Glassman v. St. Joseph Hospital, 259 Ill.App.3d 730, 766, 197 Ill.Dec. 727, 631 N.E.2d 1186 (1994) (quoting Hernandez v. Lukas, 104 Ill.App.3d 692, 694, 60 Ill.Dec. 129, 432 N.E.2d 1028 (1982) ). ¶ 60 If a court determines that a damages award was inadequate, it may order a new trial on all issues or, if certain criteria are met, a new trial on damages only. Hollis, 108 Ill.2d at 408, 92 Ill.Dec. 449, 485 N.E.2d 4. A new trial on the issue of damages alone is warranted if (1) "the jury's verdict on the question of liability is amply supported by the evidence," (2) "the questions of damages and liability are so separate and distinct that a trial limited to the question of damages is not unfair to the defendant," and (3) "the record suggests neither that the jury reached a compromise verdict, nor that, in some other identifiable manner, the error which resulted in the jury's awarding inadequate damages also affected its verdict on the question of liability."
( Chance v. City of Collinsville (1983), 112 Ill. App.3d 6, 11, 445 N.E.2d 39, 42.) A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of a jury and set aside a verdict unless there is a lack of reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record. Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 694, 432 N.E.2d 1028, 1029. With that in mind, we turn to defendant's argument that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence that he was exposed to Unibestos.
• 2, 3 It is well settled that in reviewing a jury's verdict, a court of appeal should not substitute its judgment for that of the jury and set aside a verdict unless there is no reasonable basis for the verdict shown in the record. ( Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 432 N.E.2d 1028.) A jury's findings should not be disturbed unless the reviewing court is able to say that there is no evidence that tends to support the verdict.
• 11 We agree with defendant that the mere fact that a vehicle has struck a pedestrian does not give rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of the driver. ( Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 694.) If all that were known here was that defendant's truck had come in contact with Jeffrey, we could only guess whether defendant's conduct was negligent or whether his conduct was the proximate cause of Jeffrey's injuries. Summary judgment for defendant would thus be proper. As was stated by the court in Kimbrough v. Jewel Cos. (1981), 92 Ill. App.3d 813, in affirming summary judgment for the defendant:
Pedrick v. Peoria Eastern R.R. Co. Defendant cites and relies upon Hernandez v. Lukas (1982), 104 Ill. App.3d 692, 432 N.E.2d 1028, to sustain his position. That case is inapposite in its facts. There the driver was on the proper side of the roadway, in midblock, behind other moving traffic, circumstances significantly different from those at bar.