Opinion
CV186076930S
09-24-2018
Miguel HERNANDEZ v. CONNECTION, INC.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Wahla, J.
The issue before the court is whether an application for pro hac vice should be denied on one or all of the following grounds: (1) that the case does not constitute a unique, specialized issue that would necessitate help from out-of-state attorneys; (2) that the attorneys’ applications for pro hac vice are neither special nor infrequent; and/or (3) that the applicant attorneys lack specialized skills and/or knowledge concerning the defendant relating to his action.
I. Practice Book § 2-16
Practice Book § 2-16 provides in relevant part: "An attorney who is in good standing at the bar of another state, the District of Columbia, or the commonwealth of Puerto Rico, may, upon special and infrequent occasion and for good cause shown upon written application presented by a member of the bar of this state, be permitted in the discretion of the court to participate to such extent as the court may prescribe ..." "The decision to grant or deny an application to appear pro hac vice rests within the sound discretion of the court." Enquire Printing & Publishing Co. v. O’Reilly, 193 Conn. 370, 373, 477 A.2d 648 (1984). Although courts have the discretion to grant or deny such applications, "[t]he right to have counsel of one’s own choice, although not absolute, is important enough to require a legitimate state interest before a person can be deprived of that right." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Herrmann v. Summer Plaza Corp., 201 Conn. 263, 268, 513 A.2d 1211 (1986). "A litigant’s request to be represented by counsel of his choice, when freely made, should be respected by the court, unless some legitimate state interest is thwarted by admission of the out-of-state attorney." Enquire Printing & Publishing Co. v. O’Reilly, supra, 375.
"Connecticut case law reveals two categories of state interests which have been judicially determined ‘sufficient’ so as to compel denial of motions for pro hac vice admission. The first relevant interest is the court’s efficiency and docket control ... The second circumstance in which [the] courts have found a legitimate state interest concerns the potential for ethical violations." (Citations omitted.) Zogaj v. Kaczmerek, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV- 07-5004755-S (November 27, 2007, Agati, J.) (44 Conn.L.Rptr. 565, 566); see Herrmann v. Summer Plaza Corp., supra, 201 Conn. 269-70 (affirming denial of motion to appear pro hac vice where motion was filed day of trial, on ground that lower court had acted within its discretion to "maintain a legitimate state interest, that of docket control and expeditious caseflow management"); Victor v. Powell, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-15-012655-S (April 27, 2016, Moore, J.) (revoking the granting of pro hac vice appearance for attorney who had violated rule 3.3(a)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides: "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... [m]ake a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). In the present case, neither party has identified a state interest that would compel denying pro hac vice admissions in this case, nor does it appear that any such interest exists.
II. Good Cause Requirement
Practice Book § 2-16 provides in relevant part: "Good cause for according such privilege [of pro hae vice] shall be limited to facts or circumstances affecting the personal or financial welfare of the client and not the attorney. Such facts may include a showing that by reason of a longstanding attorney-client relationship predating the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation at bar, or proceeding, the attorney has acquired a specialized skill or knowledge with respect to the client’s affairs important to the trial of the cause or presentation of the proceeding, or that the litigant is unable to secure the services of Connecticut counsel." "These factors are not exclusive and allows the court to determine good cause based on additional evidence." Zogaj v. Kaczmerek, supra, 44 Conn.L.Rptr. 566.
Compare Kumah v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-08-5015502-S (December 10, 2013, Bellis, J.) (order granting attorney’s motion to appear pro hac vice, for good cause, whereby attorney swore in affidavit to following: working extensively and closely with another attorney to develop client’s testimony; gaining, through significant involvement, "extensive and intimate foundational knowledge of factual and legal issues critical to finalizing preparation for trial"; intending to participate in complex trial, expecting "to last for several weeks"; and claiming prejudice to client would otherwise result), with Kumah v. Brown, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-08-5015502-S (December 9, 2013, Bellis, J.) (order denying attorney’s motion to appear pro hac vice whereby attorney swore in affidavit to have, through work on matter, "gained extensive knowledge of factual, legal and procedural issues critical to the trial" because court held good cause did not exist, although reason was not specified); see also UHY, LLP v. Master-Halco, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6013402-S (February 26, 2014, Nazzaro, J.) (57 Conn. L. Rptr . 668, 669) (order holding good cause shown where plaintiffs’ counsel "approached a number of Connecticut law firms" that declined to get involved in "vexatious litigation"; attorney, who lacked "long-standing relationship" with plaintiffs, was "well acquainted with the voluminous file" of case and ready and willing to assist with case; and there was no indication that legitimate state interest existed to override plaintiffs’ right to counsel of their own choosing).
The noncomplex nature of a particular case may lead a court to deny an application for pro hac vice. See Williams v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-99-0494550-S (May 17, 1999, Gaffney, J.) (24 Conn.L.Rptr. 537). In Williams, the court determined that good cause did not exist for the following reasons: "The several causes of action alleged in the complaint do not raise issues so complex as to require the defendant’s representation by out-of-state counsel with whom there was a prior attorney-client relationship, or counsel having a specialized skill or knowledge with respect to the defendant’s affairs. No suggestion is raised of defendant’s inability to secure the services of skilled Connecticut counsel, nor is any claim advanced that, under the facts or circumstances, denial of permission will affect the defendant’s personal or financial welfare." Id.
In the present case, the two applicant attorneys have been admitted, pro hac vice, in two other cases involving the same defendant. See Supp’l. Br. Sup. of Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice (Docket Entry # 124). The applicant attorneys each swear they have a relationship with the defendant "predating the lawsuit"; thus, they have each acquired "specialized skill and knowledge with respect to the issues of the case." Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice, Ex. 1, Taylor Aff. (Docket Entry # 117); Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice, Ex. 1, Boehmer Aff. (Docket Entry # 118). The applicant attorneys attached affidavits containing this exact same language to their motions to appear pro hac vice in the two other cases, for which the courts have granted said motions. See Pierpont v. Connection, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-17-6075271-S (July 25, 2018, Blue, J.) (Application Motions Nos. 127 & 128); Vazquez v. Connection, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-17-6078787-S (July 25, 2018, Pittman, J.) (Application Motions Nos. 115 & 116). Unlike Williams, the applicant attorneys in the present case appear to address the "good cause" requirements.
III. Special and Infrequent Requirement
The only remaining question is whether the admission of the applicant attorneys, pro hac vice, in two other cases could impact their representation of the defendant in this case, on the ground that their representation of the defendant is not "special and infrequent" as required under Practice Book § 2-16. The trial courts have found that this requirement has been satisfied when attorneys’ affidavits indicate that the attorneys have not previously appeared pro hac vice in the Superior Court on any matters. See Stamford Wrecking Co. v. New Haven, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV-07-5013102-S (September 23, 2008, Bellis, J.) (46 Conn.L.Rptr. 350, 351) ("the affidavits ... satisfy the requirement that out-of-state counsel’s participation be limited to ‘special and infrequent occasion’ by indicating that the affiants had not previously appeared pro hac vice in the Connecticut Superior Court on any matters").
The research shows that there seems to be no appellate cases that have quantified the "special and infrequent occasions," requirement.
Moreover, a legal organization’s or law firm’s regular and routine filing of pro hac vice applications itself does not mean that an attorney from the organization or the firm, who files one such application, has automatically violated the "special and infrequent occasions" requirement. See Corcoran v. German Social Society Frohsinn, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. 562775 (May 20, 2003, Hurley, J.T.R.). In Corcoran, Judge Hurley rejected an argument to deny two motions for pro hac vice appearances by attorneys affiliated with an organization that had filed multiple pro hac vice applications. Id. The court overruled the objections raised in opposition to filing the applications, including an assertion that no complicated legal questions, requiring the assistance of out-of-state attorneys, presented themselves, and an argument that good cause was not demonstrated. Id. The court granted the motions in favor of the out-of-state attorneys on the grounds that (1) the defendant did not present "any evidence that a state interest [would] be thwarted by the appearance" of the attorneys; (2) both attorneys had "a great deal of experience in trying cases rooted in [the] claims [brought]," and (3) the attorneys, who had advised the organization before the action’s initiation had "a prior relationship with the plaintiff." Id.
Recently, as indicated in the defendant’s September 5, 2018 supplemental brief in support of its motions to appear pro hac vice, the two applicant attorneys have been admitted, pro hac vice, to assist the defendant in two other cases. See Supp’l. Br. in Sup. Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice (Docket Entry # 124). The fact that these two specific attorneys will appear, pro hac vice, in two other cases does not alone demonstrate that their appearances are not special and infrequent, especially when all three appearances involve the same defendant and all motions were filed on the same day. See Stamford Wrecking Co. v. New Haven, supra, 46 Conn.L.Rptr. 351; Corcoran v. German Social Society Frohsinn, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 562775. Furthermore, the applicant attorneys have asserted that they have not previously appeared pro hac vice before the Superior Court, an assertion that meets the "special and infrequent" occasion requirement of § 2-16, as indicated in Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice, Ex. 1, Taylor Aff. (Docket Entry # 117); Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice, Ex. 1, Boehmer Aff. (Docket Entry # 118). It seems likely, therefore, that the "special and infrequent" requirement has been met in the present case because, like Corcoran v. German Social Society Frohsinn, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 562775, the applicant attorneys in this case state they have a prior relationship with the party they intend to represent, and that they have knowledge and skills pertaining to the claims in this case in light of their relationship. Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice, Ex. 1, Taylor Aff. (Docket Entry # 117); Mot. Permission Appear Pro Hac Vice, Ex. 1, Boehmer Aff. (Docket Entry # 118). Moreover, as in Corcoran, nothing on the record indicates that granting of these motions would thwart a state interest.
CONCLUSION
As noted above the court has the discretion to grant or deny these motions. The court could deny these motions if the applicants attorneys’ applications are (1) not "special and infrequent"; (2) there is no good cause found because the applicant attorneys’ lack specialized and unique skills; or (3) the present action does not concern complex causes of action that would require out-of-state counsel. In the present case, the court concludes that the applicant attorneys have met and/or almost meeting all of the requirements for granting the pro hac vice motions. In light of the foregoing, both motions are hereby granted.
It is So Ordered.