Opinion
CV156057551S
12-20-2016
Cathy Hernandez v. Bloomfield Foot Specialists, LLC et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE SUBSTITUTED MOTION TO STRIKE
A. Susan Peck, Judge Trial Referee.
In this action arising from an employee-employer dispute, the plaintiff, Cathy Hernandez, alleges in count one that the defendant Bloomfield Foot Specialists, LLC (Bloomfield) discriminated against her by constructively discharging her based on her disability or perceived disability in violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1), and alleges in counts two and three that the defendant Lynn LeBlanc and Bloomfield, respectively, defamed the plaintiff by falsely stating to Bloomfield's employees that the plaintiff was a drug addict. The defendants, on June 15, 2016, filed a substituted motion to strike count one on the ground that it fails to sufficiently allege any adverse employment action and counts two and three on the ground that they fail to provide sufficient factual allegations upon which relief may be granted.
In support of their motion, the defendants argue that count one does not sufficiently allege a constructive discharge because the plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that her working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would have felt forced to resign, nor has she alleged any intent by Bloomfield to establish such intolerable conditions. A successful discrimination claim requires evidence that " [the plaintiff] suffered an adverse employment action . . ." Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492, 505, 832 A.2d 660 (2003). " A discharge, in satisfaction of [an adverse employment action] . . . may be . . . a constructive discharge." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stetson v. NYNEX Service Co., 995 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying Federal antidiscrimination laws). " Constructive discharge occurs when an employer renders an employee's working conditions so difficult and intolerable that a reasonable person would feel forced to resign . . . Through the use of constructive discharge, the law recognizes that an employee's 'voluntary' resignation may be, in reality, a dismissal by the employer." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sophia v. Danbury, 116 Conn.App. 68, 75 n.10, 974 A.2d 804 (2009).
The Connecticut Supreme Court " has determined that Connecticut antidiscrimination statutes should be interpreted in accordance with federal antidiscrimination laws." Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc., 286 Conn. 390, 407, 944 A.2d 925 (2008).
Thus, the District Court for the District of Connecticut found an allegation of constructive discharge to be supported where an employee was repeatedly threatened with elimination of her position, there was a rumored letter announcing her termination, her authority was publicly usurped in the presence of her subordinates, she was repeatedly reprimanded for petty reasons, her superiors suggested the buyback of her contract, commented that she should consider herself " finished, " and warned her that her job would be eliminated at the end of the year. Grey v. Board of Education, 304 F.Supp.2d 314, 324 (D.Conn. 2004). This court, however, determined that evidence was insufficient to support a finding of constructive discharge where an African-American plaintiff offered evidence indicating that his employer had discriminated against other minority employees, had lied about the submission of certain paperwork, and had told the plaintiff not to associate himself with the company's diversity management, and where the plaintiff reapplied for a position with same supervisor within weeks after resigning. Yancey v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. CV-97-0573357-S, (November 2, 1999, Peck, J.).
Moreover, to be liable for constructive discharge, an employer must " intentionally [create] an intolerable work atmosphere." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brittell v. Dept. of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 178, 717 A.2d 1254 (1998). Such " [d]eliberateness exists only if the actions complained of were intended by the employer as an effort to force the employee to quit . . ." D'Amato v. State Board of Pardon & Paroles, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-13-6037167-S, (June 14, 2016, Wilson, J.), quoting Leson v. ARI of Connecticut, Inc., 51 F.Supp.2d 135, 143 (D.Conn. 1999).
Here, the plaintiff alleges the following facts in count one. The plaintiff had a positive employment relationship with the defendants prior to 2013, when she got married. LeBlanc, who is the owner and managing employee of Bloomfield, did not approve of the plaintiff's marriage because she believed the plaintiff's husband to be an alcoholic and drug addict. On January 30, 2014, LeBlanc informed the plaintiff that a patient had informed her that the plaintiff was taking prescription drugs and that the plaintiff was unfit to work with patients. LeBlanc also stated that the plaintiff had been acting strangely, had been too quiet at work, had been on a downward path since her marriage, and needed to leave her husband. LeBlanc stated that the plaintiff needed to get help or else LeBlanc would not let her return to work. When the plaintiff asked LeBlanc whether she was accusing the plaintiff of having a drug problem, LeBlanc answered in the affirmative and repeated that the plaintiff needed to get help. At that point, the plaintiff suffered a panic attack, which sent her to the emergency room. Because of the panic attack and the plaintiff's preexisting psychiatric conditions, she was admitted for inpatient treatment. The plaintiff's psychologist recommended that, in light of the plaintiff's panic attack and LeBlanc's accusation that the plaintiff had a drug problem, the plaintiff should not return to work.
These facts are insufficient to meet the threshold requirement of working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person would be compelled to resign. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts alleged indicate that LeBlanc expressed her belief that the plaintiff should leave her husband, that LeBlanc told the plaintiff that she would not let her return to work unless she sought professional help, that plaintiff did in fact end up going to the emergency room and subsequently being hospitalized for psychiatric conditions, and that the plaintiff decided upon advice of a psychologist not to return to work. These facts do not describe a working atmosphere so intolerable that a reasonable person would believe she could not return to work or would feel compelled to resign. Moreover, they do not support a conclusion that the defendants intended to create an atmosphere that would compel the plaintiff's resignation. On the contrary, they suggest that the defendants, correctly or incorrectly, regarded the plaintiff as needing to " get help" and sought to encourage her to get that help. The clear implication of LeBlanc's statements, as alleged by the plaintiff, was that LeBlanc still had a job with the defendants if she sought the help they believed she needed. Therefore, the motion to strike count one is granted.
With regard to counts two and three, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege to whom LeBlanc allegedly made defamatory statements that the plaintiff was a drug addict. " To establish . . . defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that . . . the defamatory statement was published to a third person . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gambardella v. Apple Health Care, Inc., 291 Conn. 620, 627-28, 969 A.2d 736 (2009). " [A] complaint for defamation must, on its face, specifically identify what allegedly defamatory statements were made, by whom, and to whom . . ." (Emphasis added.) Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV-98-0486346-S, (July 12, 2002, Berger, J.), aff'd, 76 Conn.App. 907, 822 A.2d 372 (2003).
The decisions of the Superior Court, taken as a whole, stand for the proposition that allegations of defamation are sufficient if they provide notice of the substance of the alleged defamatory statements and the identities of the persons to whom the statements were made such that the defendant has a basis to reasonably investigate the claims and interpose any appropriate defenses. Accordingly, where allegations as to the identity of the persons to whom the statements were made are overly broad categories, they have generally been found insufficient. See, e.g., Crosby v. HSBC North American Holdings, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV-06-5000378-S, (June 30, 2008, Ronan, J.) (granting motion to strike where third parties were alleged as " one or more employees" of multiple corporate defendants); Winters v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-07-5012082-S, (March 4, 2008, Thompson, J.) (allegation that defamatory statements were made within " earshot of patients" found insufficient).
In contrast, where the allegation is such as to give a defendant reasonable guidance to ascertain the identities of the individuals to whom the statements were made, they have generally been found sufficient. See, e.g., Dean v. Liberation Programs, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV-13-6018607-S, (November 13, 2013, Tobin, J.T.R.) (identification of third parties as " co-workers and [drug treatment center's] other employees" sufficiently specific for defamation because identifies particular group); Tax Data Solutions, LLC v. O'Brien, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-10-6016263-S, (February 6, 2013, Zemetis, J.) (allegation of publication to " tax assessor's office and other employees of the City of New Haven" sufficient); Mendez v. Utopia Home Care, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-09-6006222-S, (November 5, 2010, Peck, J) (publication to " department of public health" sufficient); Milne v. Filene's, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-05-4018766, (February 21, 2007, Wiese, J.) (allegation of publication to department of labor sufficient).
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges in counts two and three that LeBlanc falsely stated at a staff meeting on January 31, 2014, that the plaintiff was a drug addict and was being treated for drug addiction. The statements are alleged to have been made to " all of the . . . staff present" at the meeting, and the individuals present are described in various points in the complaint as " staff" and " the plaintiff's co-workers." Unlike Crosby v. HSBC North American Holdings, Inc., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-06-5000378-S, where the persons to whom the defamatory statements were made could have been any employees of multiple corporate defendants, the allegation in the present case is limited to those employees of a medical practice who were present at a staff meeting on a particular date. This allegation gives the defendants sufficient notice of the identity of the third parties to whom the alleged defamatory statements were made. Therefore, the motion to strike counts two and three is denied.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, the motion to strike count one is hereby granted and the motion to strike counts two and three is hereby denied.