Opinion
24A-CR-822
12-20-2024
Paul Hernandez-Ruiz, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Noble Superior Court The Honorable Steven T. Clouse, Judge Trial Court Cause Nos. 57D01-2207-F6-298 57D01-2211-F6-447
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Victoria Bailey Casanova Casanova Legal Services, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Ian McLean Supervising Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
KENWORTHY, JUDGE.
Case Summary
[¶ 1] Paul Hernandez-Ruiz, Jr., appeals the sanction imposed by the trial court after he admitted to violating the terms of his probation. Hernandez-Ruiz raises one issue for our review: did the trial judge fundamentally err by not sua sponte recusing himself from Hernandez-Ruiz's probation violation proceedings? We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶ 2] In October 2022, Hernandez-Ruiz pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a minor ("Cause 298"). Under his plea agreement, Hernandez-Ruiz was to receive an eighteen-month sentence with ninety days executed and the remainder suspended to probation. After a hearing, the trial court took the plea agreement under advisement and set a sentencing date.
[¶ 3] On November 28, 2022-two days before Hernandez-Ruiz's sentencing hearing in Cause 298-the State charged Ruiz with four criminal offenses ("Cause 447"). Hernandez-Ruiz's sentencing hearing in Cause 298 proceeded as scheduled. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court gave Hernandez-Ruiz an opportunity to make a statement. Hernandez-Ruiz shared:
The State charged Hernandez-Ruiz in Cause 447 with Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a minor, Level 6 felony strangulation, Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, and Class A misdemeanor interference with reporting a crime.
[T]hings have been up and down with [Victim] and I. Sort of, kind of struggling financially with raising our three kids. Uh, and that's kind[] of caused me, now and then, to drink a little bit and when I drink she gets mad at me and she knows, you know, all's she has to do is say one thing and I asked her, this last time, why did you say I hit you with a curtain rod and she told me because I didn't think they would arrest, I thought they would give you rehab. And so, that kind of made me flustered a little bit but we were working and everything was going good, while I was out and I was helping her pay the bills. Um, I was coming up on paying rent this Monday, when I got arrested Sunday, I ended up buying some alcohol and she got mad and that's when she called the cops and I got this new case and said that I put my hands on her.Tr. Vol. 2 at 15.
[¶ 4] After Hernandez-Ruiz's statement, the trial court explained it was "having a very difficult time" thinking the plea agreement was appropriate because "circumstances changed" since Hernandez-Ruiz entered his guilty plea. Id. at 16. The trial court laid out its thoughts:
I'm just bothered, as much as anything, by your comment, why did you tell the police I hit you with a curtain rod. Because she doesn't want to be hit with a curtain rod, that's why she told them. That is your statement today in terms of how this went down, just shows an absolute lack of understanding. Well, I drink and then she gets mad at me, you know, if she says the wrong thing. People don't deserve to be hit with a curtain rod.
Whether you['re] drunk, sober, whether it's your wife, anybody. And she gets to report that to the Police.Id. at 17. Hernandez-Ruiz then claimed he "[p]hrased it wrong . . . I didn't say that like that to her." Id. at 17-18. The trial court continued:
Well I bet you phrased it exactly the way you said it to her, is what I bet. I think the first time you said it today, is the way you said it. Your actions in this case, and the way you have not accepted responsibility disgusts me today, sir. It disgusts me.Id. at 18.
[¶ 5] The trial court then accepted Hernandez-Ruiz's guilty plea while also reminding him it had "not forgotten who you are." Id. at 18. Soon after, the trial court repeated its view that Hernandez-Ruiz's statements were "beyond [the] pale" and his attitude and behavior during his case were "disgusting." Id. at 18, 20. The trial court sentenced Hernandez-Ruiz in line with his plea agreement.
[¶ 6] In March 2023, Hernandez-Ruiz and the State entered into a plea agreement in Cause 447. In exchange for Hernandez-Ruiz pleading guilty to Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a minor and Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, the State agreed to dismiss Hernandez-Ruiz's two remaining charges. The trial court accepted Hernandez-Ruiz's guilty plea and sentenced him according to its terms: an aggregate two-year term with one year executed in the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") and one year suspended to probation. Hernandez-Ruiz was to serve this sentence consecutive to his sentence in Cause 298.
[¶ 7] In August 2023, the State alleged Hernandez-Ruiz violated the terms of his probation in Causes 298 and 447 by committing a new criminal offense and possessing illegal drugs. A senior judge of the Noble Superior Court presided over a status hearing concerning Hernandez-Ruiz's alleged probation violations. During the hearing, Hernandez-Ruiz admitted to violating the terms of his probation and requested his dispositional hearing be set on a date that would allow the same trial judge who had been presiding over his previous proceedings in Noble County to determine the appropriate sanction for his violations.
[¶ 8] During a March 2024 disposition hearing presided over by the same trial judge as Hernandez-Ruiz's change of plea and sentencing hearings, Hernandez-Ruiz confirmed he violated his probation conditions. The trial court responded, "Right downhill" and revoked Hernandez-Ruiz's probation. Id. at 58. The trial court then ordered Hernandez-Ruiz to execute the remaining balance of his previously suspended sentence in Cause 298. And the trial court ordered Hernandez-Ruiz to serve one year of his previously suspended sentence in Cause 447 consecutive to his sanction in Cause 298.
The trial judge did not fundamentally err.
[¶ 9] Hernandez-Ruiz argues the trial court's classification of his attitude and behavior as "disgusting," its reminder it would not forget who Hernandez-Ruiz was, and its remark Hernandez-Ruiz had gone "[r]ight downhill" in the months after he pleaded guilty in Causes 298 and 447 displayed actual prejudice against him, such that the trial judge should have sua sponte recused himself. Id. From Hernandez-Ruiz's perspective, the trial judge's failure to do so resulted in fundamental error.
[¶ 10] Judges are presumed unbiased and unprejudiced in the matters that come before them. See Seabolt v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2024). If a judge "harbors actual prejudice in a case, justice requires that a sua sponte judicial disqualification from the case be made." Flowers v. State, 738 N.E.2d 1051, 1060 (Ind. 2000). The record must show actual bias and prejudice against the defendant before reversal is warranted on the ground the trial judge should have sua sponte disqualified himself. Id. at 1061. In other words, the trial judge's action and demeanor must have "crossed the barrier of impartiality and prejudiced the defendant's case." Id.
[¶ 11] Acknowledging he did not object to the trial judge's statements or move for the trial judge to recuse himself, Hernandez-Ruiz raises a claim of fundamental error. The "fundamental error" exception to waiver is "extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process." Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006). This "formidable standard . . . applies only where the error is so flagrant that the trial judge should have corrected the error on [their] own, without prompting by defense counsel." Tate v. State, 161 N.E.3d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2021). The appellant "faces the heavy burden of showing that the alleged errors are so prejudicial to [their] rights as to 'make a fair [hearing] impossible.'" Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 756 (Ind. 2002)). Only on "rare occasions" have Indiana appellate courts determined a trial judge's comments amounted to fundamental error. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Ind. 2000).
[¶ 12] This case is not one of those "rare occasions." Although the trial judge's comments were perhaps unnecessary and better left unsaid, we cannot say they displayed a personal prejudice or bias that denied Hernandez-Ruiz fundamental due process. Several months after the trial judge made most of the statements at issue, Hernandez-Ruiz requested that same trial judge preside over his probation revocation disposition hearing. Moreover, we cannot agree with Hernandez-Ruiz that he was prejudiced by the trial judge's alleged enmity toward him. After Hernandez-Ruiz admitted to violating the terms of his probation, the trial court imposed a sanction permitted by law. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) (2015) (setting forth the sanctions a trial court may impose following a probation violation finding). Put simply, Hernandez-Ruiz has not carried his "heavy burden" to prevail on a fundamental error claim. See Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 864 (Ind. 1985) (explaining without objective evidence 2 of actual prejudice by the trial judge, it was not necessary for the trial judge to sua sponte disqualify himself).
To the extent Hernandez-Ruiz bases his argument on a perceived violation of Rule 2.11 of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge's obligations under that Code "do not create freestanding rights of enforcement in private parties." Mathews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1255 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016), trans. denied. Rather, a judge's obligations are first enforced by the individual judge against himself and later by disciplinary actions of our Supreme Court, if necessary. Id.
Conclusion
[¶ 13] The trial judge did not fundamentally err in not sua sponte recusing himself from Hernandez-Ruiz's probation violation proceedings.
[¶ 14] Affirmed.
Felix, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.