Opinion
NO. 03-15-00290-CR
05-26-2016
Rafael Hernandez-Prado, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BURNET COUNTY, 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 9767A, HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
Rafael Hernandez-Prado was charged with burglary of a habitation with intent to commit the offense of sexual assault.See Tex. Penal Code § 30.02(a)(1) (setting out elements of offense). The victim in this case was Maria Irene Gonzalez. Hernandez-Prado entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for the State recommending that his adjudication of guilt be deferred and that he be placed on community supervision for ten years. In accordance with that agreement, Hernandez-Prado pleaded guilty to the charged offense, and the district court deferred his adjudication of guilt and placed him on community supervision for ten years. Almost ten years later, the State filed a motion to adjudicate alleging that Hernandez-Prado had violated several conditions of his community supervision. In response, Hernandez-Prado filed an application for writ of habeas corpus asserting that he did not knowingly, intentionally, or voluntarily enter his guilty plea. After convening a hearing addressing the motion to adjudicate and the writ application, the district court denied the writ application and rendered judgment adjudicating Hernandez-Prado's guilt and sentencing him to fifteen years' imprisonment. See id. § 30.02(d) (specifying that offense is first-degree felony if "the premises are a habitation" and if "any party to the offense entered the habitation with intent to commit a felony other than felony theft"); see also id. § 12.32 (listing permissible punishment range for first-degree felony). In two issues on appeal, Hernandez-Prado contends that his plea was involuntary and that the district court erred by denying his writ application because "he was not informed of his right to an interpreter and, therefore, could not knowingly waive that right" and because "he was not informed of the terms and conditions of community supervision before he was placed on community supervision nor could he lodge an objection to any terms." We will affirm the district court's order denying his writ application.
Although the district court's order denying Hernandez-Prado's application for writ of habeas corpus as well as Hernandez-Prado's brief on appeal reflect that Hernandez-Prado's first name is spelled "Rafeal," the indictment, the notice of appeal, and the documents in the record in which Hernandez-Prado signed his name all show that his first name is spelled "Rafael." We will use the spelling that Hernandez-Prado himself uses and that is reflected in the notice of appeal.
BACKGROUND
As set out above, Hernandez-Prado was charged with the offense of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit sexual assault, and he pleaded guilty to the offense under the terms of a plea-bargain agreement with the State. As part of the agreement, the State agreed to recommend that the district court defer adjudication and that Hernandez-Prado be placed on community supervision, and he later signed and agreed to abide by the terms and conditions of his community supervision, including several supplemental terms and conditions for sex offenders.
At the start of the plea hearing, the district court stated that Hernandez-Prado's attorney had previously informed the court that Hernandez-Prado could not speak or read English, and the court asked Hernandez-Prado if he would like to have his attorney serve as an interpreter in the proceeding. Hernandez-Prado's attorney translated the questions by the court, and Hernandez-Prado communicated that he would like to have his attorney act as an interpreter, that he had communicated with his attorney extensively, and that he believed that his attorney's translations were accurate. When approving Hernandez-Prado's attorney as an interpreter, the district court explained that it "knows counsel to be proficient in Spanish." Later in the hearing, the district court went over the terms of the plea-bargain agreement with Hernandez-Prado, inquired whether he understood all of the rights that he was waiving by entering a guilty plea, asked whether he was freely and voluntarily entering his plea, informed him that a plea of guilty could result in his deportation and impact his ability to become a citizen of the United States, accepted his plea, and discussed some of the terms of his community supervision.
In addition, his attorney related during the hearing that an immigration hold had been placed on Hernandez-Prado, and the district court emphasized that if he was deported and returned to the United States, he had to "report to the probation department within 24 hours" and that a failure to report would be a violation of his community supervision. See Martinez v. State, 449 S.W.3d 193, 203 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd) (explaining that "'ICE hold' or 'ICE detainer' is a notice that the Department of Homeland Security issues to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to inform the agency that Immigration and Customs Enforcement ('ICE')" intends to take custody of person "in the law enforcement agency's custody").
A few weeks before the expiration of Hernandez-Prado's community supervision, the State moved to adjudicate his guilt, and a capias was issued for his arrest. Hernandez-Prado was not arrested until approximately one year after his community supervision would have ended. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 5(h) (explaining that if period of community supervision has expired, trial court has jurisdiction over motion to adjudicate if motion was filed and capias issued before end of period of community supervision). In its motion to adjudicate Hernandez-Prado's guilt, the State alleged that he had violated various conditions of his community supervision.
Following his arrest, Hernandez-Prado filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus. In his writ application, Hernandez-Prado asserted that the terms and conditions of his community supervision "were not explained to him in a manner and in a language where he could understand" those conditions because he "only speaks Spanish." Further, he urged that "all terms and conditions of his plea were not explained to him upon entering his plea." Accordingly, he insisted that his "plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally" and asked the district court to withdraw his guilty plea.
After Hernandez-Prado filed his writ application, the district court convened a hearing to address both the State's motion to adjudicate and his writ application, and the parties agreed to allow the court to consider the evidence presented during the hearing for both purposes. At the beginning of the hearing, the State called Jeanette Murray to the stand. Murray was the community-supervision officer assigned to Hernandez-Prado at the time that he entered his plea. In her testimony, Murray explained that she went over the terms and conditions of community supervision with Hernandez-Prado by having his lawyer translate them to Spanish and recalled that all of the conditions were explained to him. Although the record is not entirely clear on this matter, Murray's testimony seems to indicate that the conversation happened after Hernandez-Prado entered his guilty plea. Regarding this exchange, Murray related that she went through all of the conditions, including those specific to sex offenders, and waited for him to answer that he understood and that she took "specific care" to ensure that he understood each condition "because of the gravity of" the sex-offender requirements. In addition, Murray testified regarding the various ways in which Hernandez-Prado had not complied with the terms and conditions of his community supervision.
After Murray concluded her testimony, Hernandez-Prado called Tomas Leon to the stand. Leon was the certified interpreter who had been assigned to the adjudication hearing. In his testimony, Leon discussed the qualifications that someone must have to become a certified court interpreter; explained that the consequences of not having legal documents translated "can be dramatic"; emphasized the importance of having certified interpreters as translators; stated that "it is a fallacy that somebody that speaks both languages can actually accomplish a[n] interpretation of a document or interpret[] a court proce[eding] because speaking the two languages allows them to communicate, but does not allow them to convey with exact precision something that requires exact precision, such as a court document"; and said "that the job of a court interpreter requires exact precision in as far as the conditions that are stated in a document in order for the understanding of the person to whom that is being translated or interpreted for because that is what is expected of that person—that that person will do, and perform, and act by down the road." Finally, Leon related that he became a certified interpreter when the law in Texas allowed for that type of certification, but he admitted that he did not know what year that was and that he did not know whether there was "a requirement that a court have a licensed court interpreter at the time this case was plead" in 2003.
After considering the arguments by the parties, the district court issued an order denying Hernandez-Prado's writ application. Later, the district court determined that he had violated some of the conditions of his community supervision and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. Following that determination, the district court issued the following relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law pertaining to his writ application:
Findings of Fact
3. Concurrent with his plea of Guilty on October 10, 2003, the Defendant submitted to the previous judge of this Court written acknowledgments that (a) the Court warned Defendant of the consequences of his plea of Guilty including the minimum and maximum punishment provided by law, (b) the potential consequences of Deferred Adjudication, (c) the fact that Defendant had the right to remain silent and anything Defendant might say can be used against Defendant, (d) the right to be confronted by the witnesses against Defendant, (e) the plea agreement, if any, is not binding on the Court, (f) that his plea must be made freely and voluntarily and not the result of any fear or persuasion, threats, force, coercion, delusive hope or promise of pardon or parole, or promise of anything whatsoever, (f) if Defendant is not a citizen of the United States of America a plea of Guilty for the offense charged may result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or denial of naturalization under federal law, and (g) Admonishments under V.A.C.C.P. Art. 62.02 et seq acknowledging his understanding of the sex offender registration requirements and their application to him. The Defendant also acknowledged these admonishments orally to the previous judge of this Court.
. . .
5. The Defendant did not file notice of appeal or a written motion requesting final adjudication or any other pleading complaining of the validity of the court's judgment within 30 days of October 10, 2003.
. . .
7. Eddie Arredondo is a licensed attorney who is fluent in both English and Spanish and is fully capable of translating and explaining legal documents in criminal cases to defendants who speak only Spanish and are unable to read or understand the English language.
8. No credible evidence was presented to this Court that the Defendant did not understand the warnings and admonitions given to the Defendant both in writing and orally by the Court on October 10, 2003.
9. No credible evidence was presented to this Court that the plea of guilty entered by the Defendant on October 10, 2003, was not made freely, voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.
10. On October 10, 2003 at the plea agreement hearing, the Defendant did not make a request of the Court for the assistance of an interpreter other than his own attorney, Eddie Arredondo.
Conclusions of Law
3. A Defendant's delay in seeking habeas corpus relief may prejudice the credibility of his claim.
. . .
5. In this case, the Court concludes that the Defendant entered his plea of Guilty on October 10, 2003, freely, voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review a trial court's denial of habeas-corpus relief under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Kniatt v. State, 206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable." Gaytan v. State, 331 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, pet. ref'd). But a trial court does not abuse its discretion if its ruling lies within "the zone of reasonable disagreement." Bigon v. State, 252 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see Lopez v. State, 86 S.W.3d 228, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Under that standard, we "review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. Further, "[a]n applicant's delay in seeking habeas corpus relief may prejudice the credibility of the claim." Id.
An individual who has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor may seek habeas "relief from an order or a judgment of conviction ordering community supervision." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 1. "At the time the application is filed, the applicant must be, or have been, on community supervision, and the application must challenge the legal validity of . . . the conviction for which or order in which community supervision was imposed; or . . . the conditions of community supervision." Id. § 2(b); see Ex parte Motta, No. 13-13-00667-CR, 2014 WL 6602280, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (addressing appeal of habeas application filed by individual who pleaded guilty to offense "and was placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision"). In general, a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus may not be used to decide matters that could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072, § 3. To succeed under a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, "the applicant bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts that would entitle him to relief." Ex parte Ali, 368 S.W.3d 827, 830 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, pet. ref'd). This is true for claims seeking habeas relief on the ground that the defendant's guilty plea was involuntary. See Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
In habeas proceedings, "[v]irtually every fact finding involves a credibility determination," and "the fact finder is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses." Ex parte Mowbray, 943 S.W.2d 461, 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). For habeas proceedings under article 11.072, "the trial court is the sole finder of fact," and appellate courts afford "almost total deference to a trial court's factual findings when supported by the record, especially when those findings are based upon credibility and demeanor." Ex parte Ali, 368 S.W.3d at 830. "[W]hen the facts are uncontested and the trial court's ruling does not turn on the credibility or demeanor of witnesses, a de novo review by the appellate court is appropriate." Id. at 831.
DISCUSSION
Right to an Interpreter
In his first issue on appeal, Hernandez-Prado contends that his plea was involuntary. When presenting this argument, Hernandez-Prado refers to the following three types of rights discussed in Marin v. State: "(1) absolute requirements and prohibitions; (2) rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of litigants which are to be implemented upon request." 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Moreover, he notes that if a trial court is aware that a defendant does not understand English, the right to an interpreter is a right falling under the second category, see Garcia v. State, 149 S.W.3d 135, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004), and accordingly, that an accused may only waive the right if the waiver is made "'plainly, freely, intelligently, sometimes in writing and always on the record,'" Garcia v. State, 429 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Marin, 851 S.W.2d at 280) (emphasis added in Garcia); see also id. (providing that if trial court knows that defendant cannot understand English, court must appoint interpreter unless defendant waives appointment). In light of the preceding, Hernandez-Prado argues that his plea was involuntary because the district court never specifically stated that he had the right to an interpreter and that, accordingly, he could not and did not knowingly waive that right during the plea proceeding occurring more than ten years earlier. Cf. Ex parte Perez, 398 S.W.3d 206, 215-18, 216 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (describing how common law principle of laches applies in post-conviction habeas cases and explaining that delay of five years or more in bringing habeas claim "may generally be considered unreasonable in the absence of any justification for the delay").
As an initial matter, we note that Hernandez-Prado did not assert in his application for writ of habeas corpus that the district court failed to advise him of his right to an interpreter and made no allegation regarding any waiver of that right. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (providing that for issue to be preserved for appellate review, record must show that complaint was made to trial court and that trial court ruled on complaint or refused to); see also Ex parte Karedia, Nos. 03-11-00831-CR, -00832-CR, 2013 WL 599555, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 15, 2013, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that issue presented for first time in appeal of denial of habeas application was not preserved for appeal). In any event, we are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion by failing to grant habeas relief on the ground that the district court's purported failure to inform him of his right to an interpreter rendered his plea involuntary. See Ex parte Wilson, 716 S.W.2d 953, 956-58 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (considering and overruling habeas claim that applicant's guilty plea was involuntary); Ex parte Montes de Oca-Orozco, No. 14-14-00910-CR, 2015 WL 5935617, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 13, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (addressing habeas claim alleging that defendant's "guilty plea was rendered involuntary because he was denied the assistance of a sworn, certified interpreter at the time of his plea" and overruling claim because record showed that defendant had interpreter and because record did not show that his "wishes were not communicated to the trial court"). Although Hernandez-Prado correctly notes that the district court did not specifically state that he had the right to an interpreter, the record in this case reveals that it was his intention for his lawyer to serve as his interpreter during the plea proceeding and that his lawyer did serve in that capacity. See Rivera v. State, 981 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (explaining that "[w]here there is evidence an interpreter was present and available to help the defendant, then a trial court does not err by failing to appoint an interpreter" and that this also holds true "when the defendant's counsel is capable of interpreting for the defendant"); see also Medina v. State, No. 14-97-00859-CR, 1999 WL 587657, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 5, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (providing that "[i]t is well settled law that an attorney may serve as an interpreter for his client"). Accordingly, the record reveals that the potential need for an interpreter was addressed by the district court and that the case proceeded with Hernandez-Prado's agreement that his attorney serve as an interpreter. For those reasons, we must conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying habeas relief on the ground the alleged failure to inform him of his right to an interpreter in the manner that he suggested somehow rendered his guilty plea involuntary.
In the argument section of his brief, Hernandez-Prado principally relies on Garcia v. State, 429 S.W.3d 604 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In that case, the court of criminal appeals determined that the record reflected that the defendant effectively waived his right to an interpreter where the record showed that his trial attorney told him that he had the right to an interpreter, that appellant agreed with his attorney that an interpreter would be distracting to the jury, and that the defendant and his attorney "communicated their desire not to have an interpreter to the trial judge." Id. at 605, 609. We find Hernandez-Prado's reliance on this case misplaced. As an initial matter, we note Garcia was a direct appeal and not a habeas case. In any event, as set out above, the record reflects that Hernandez-Prado asked the district court to allow his attorney to serve as his interpreter.
To the extent that Hernandez-Prado is attempting to suggest that his attorney was not an effective interpreter, we note that nothing in the record indicates that he had any reservations concerning his attorney's abilities to serve as an interpreter. Cf. Ramos v. Terry, 622 S.E.2d 339, 343 (Ga. 2005) (stating that "[t]he failure to interpose a timely objection to an interpreter's qualifications constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal"). On the contrary, the record from the plea proceeding reveals that his attorney informed the district court that he does not speak, read, or write in English and served as an interpreter for him from the start of the hearing. See Garcia, 149 S.W.3d at 145 (explaining that "[t]he judge may become aware of the defendant's language problem either by being informed of it by one or both parties or by noticing the problem sua sponte"); see also Linton v. State, 275 S.W.3d 493, 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (explaining that if defendant cannot understand English well enough to understand plea proceedings or communicate without counsel, interpreter must be provided). Moreover, the district court specifically asked Hernandez-Prado if he wanted his attorney to serve as his interpreter and whether he was satisfied with his attorney's interpretive abilities, and he answered, "Yes," to each question. Similarly, nothing from the record of the plea hearing indicates that Hernandez-Prado's attorney was not able to accurately translate the proceedings. Further, the plea papers, including the judicial confession, all contain a statement demonstrating that the documents were translated into Spanish by his attorney, and he signed next to the statements indicating that the documents had been translated. In addition, he did not provide any evidence during the habeas proceeding establishing that his attorney was not able to accurately translate the proceeding and court documents. Cf. Leon v. State, 25 S.W.3d 841, 843 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd) (stating that "[a]bsent any showing to the contrary, we assume regularity in the proceedings").
Although Hernandez-Prado's witness in the habeas hearing stressed the importance of having a certified interpreter, the provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the use of interpreters in criminal proceedings does not require that an interpreter be licensed or certified in order to serve as a translator. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.30(a); Nois v. State, No. 05-15-00203-CR, 2016 WL 891086, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas March 9, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Moreover, as with evidentiary determinations, an attack on the competency of an interpreter is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Castrejon v. State, 428 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.); see also Linton, 275 S.W.3d at 500 (noting that trial judge "has wide discretion in determining the adequacy of interpretive services"). When the district court approved Hernandez-Prado's attorney as an interpreter, the court explained that it knew "counsel to be proficient in Spanish," and there is nothing in the record before this Court that contradicts that conclusion.
On appeal, Hernandez-Prado challenges the following conclusion by the district court: "A defendant who does not request an interpreter waives the right to complain on appeal, unless the record otherwise demonstrates the defendant's lack of understanding of the proceedings. Villarreal v. State, 853 S.W.2d 170, 171 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no pet.) (citing Baltierra v. State, 586 S.W.2d 553, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979))." Specifically, he disagrees with the conclusion to the extent that it suggests that he was required to request an interpreter before he may present the issue on appeal. However, given the general nature of the conclusion, it is not entirely clear that the district court did in fact determine that he had waived this complaint. In any event, given that his attorney served as his interpreter, we need not address the effect of any alleged failure to object.
For all of these reasons, we overrule Hernandez-Prado's first issue on appeal.
Opportunity to be Informed of Terms and Conditions of Community Supervision
In his second issue on appeal, Hernandez-Prado asserts that he was unaware of the terms and conditions of his community supervision when he entered his plea. When presenting this issue, he refers to provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure requiring the preparation of presentence-investigation reports in felony cases "before the imposition of sentence by a judge" that includes "a proposed client supervision plan describing programs and sanctions that the community supervision and corrections department would provide the defendant if the judge suspended the imposition of the sentence or granted deferred adjudication." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12, § 9(a), (g); see also id. art. 42.12, § 9A (addressing presentence-investigation reports for sex offenders). Further, he seems to indicate that the district court erred by not preparing a presentence-investigation report but then concedes that he did not preserve this complaint for review because he made no objection to the district court when he entered his plea. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (setting out requirements for preserving complaint for appellate review); Oldham v. State, 5 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (concluding that complaint that trial court erred in failing to order presentence investigation report was waived on appeal because defendant did not object or request preparation of report in trial court). Next, he refers to the testimony from Murray in which she indicated that she went over the terms and conditions of his community supervision with him after the district court accepted his guilty plea.
We note that although Murray's testimony seems to indicate that she went over the terms and conditions of community supervision after the district court had accepted his plea, Murray did not testify that those terms and conditions were never provided to Hernandez-Prado before he entered his plea. In fact, Murray explained that Hernandez-Prado "had a couple of pretrial hearings" before he entered his plea and that she typically tries to get as much paperwork done as possible before the plea hearing, but she did admit that she did not remember whether she was able to go over any paperwork with him before the plea hearing that occurred more than ten years before she testified.
In light of his assertion that no presentence-investigation report was prepared and in light of Murray's testimony explaining that she went over the terms of his community supervision immediately after the district court accepted his plea, Hernandez-Prado contends that "he did not know the terms of his" community supervision, "including the sex offender conditions, until after he pleaded and was placed on community supervision" and, therefore, could not have objected to the conditions. See Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 534 & n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining that defendant who is given benefit of community supervision must complain at trial regarding conditions that he finds objectionable but clarifying that rule assumes that defendant knew what conditions were in time to object at trial). For these reasons, Hernandez-Prado urges that he did not understand the obligations of his community supervision when he entered into the "quasi-contractual relationship" with the State. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. State, 444 S.W.3d 21, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Accordingly, he contends that this type of "denial of understanding the full expectations of community supervision must render such 'quasi-contractual relationship' invalid" and that his "plea should be rendered involuntary and unknowingly entered."
In his application for writ of habeas corpus, Hernandez-Prado asserted that he could not understand the terms and conditions of his community supervision because he could not read or write English, but he does not urge those claims in his second issue on appeal. To the extent that his second issue could be read as asserting that he did not and could not have understood the terms and conditions of his community supervision when they were explained to him, we believe that the portions of the record establishing that his trial counsel served as his interpreter, that his attorney translated the terms and conditions of his community supervision into Spanish when Murray described the obligations, and that Murray went slowly to ensure that he understood what was expected of him when she discussed each condition would require this Court to overrule that argument in the absence of any indication in the record that he was not able to understand the translation provided by his attorney.
To comply with due process, a guilty plea "must be entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." Kniatt, 206 S.W.3d at 664. A plea is voluntary if it is the expression of the defendant's own free will and was not induced by threats, misrepresentations, or improper promises. Id. Moreover, a defendant's sworn representation that his guilty plea was made voluntarily "'constitute[s] a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.'" Id. (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) with alteration in Kniatt). Furthermore, mere procedural irregularities, such as failing to obtain the defendant's signature on a waiver, do not, on their own, amount to deprivations of constitutional rights. See Ex parte Sadberry, 864 S.W.2d 541, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
Turning to Hernandez-Prado's arguments, we note as an initial matter that he has not referred us to any cases indicating that habeas relief is appropriate under the circumstances as suggested by him in this issue, nor have we been able to find any. Moreover, although article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does list five admonishments that a trial court must give a defendant before accepting his guilty plea and although one of those admonishments requires the trial court to inform the defendant that he "will be required" to register as a sex offender if he is "convicted of or placed on deferred adjudication for an offense for which a person is subject to registration," the provision does not specify that the defendant must be fully informed of all of the terms and conditions of community supervision, including ones pertaining to sex offenders, before the trial court may accept his plea. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a). Moreover, before pronouncing its judgment during the plea hearing, the district court ascertained whether Hernandez-Prado understood that he was obligated to register as a sex offender, whether the sex-offender-registration requirements had been fully explained to him by his attorney, and whether he understood that the failure to register could result in his community supervision being revoked and in his imprisonment. In addition, prior to the plea hearing, he signed as part of his plea papers a document setting out his duty to register as a sex offender, and the document contained a statement indicating that the contents had been translated into Spanish by his attorney. Furthermore, as set out previously, in response to questions posed by the district court during the plea hearing, he stated that he understood the nature of the charges and the punishment, that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty, and that no one threatened him or otherwise tried to force him to enter a guilty plea.
It is worth noting that the district court did give all of the admonishments listed in subarticle 26.13(a). See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a). --------
Previously, this Court was confronted with a similar timing argument in which the defendant sought habeas relief on the grounds that his plea was not voluntary because the trial court did not "fully admonish him of the consequences of his plea in the event of an adjudication of guilt and" because "he was not advised of the effects of the sex offender registration statute until after the plea was accepted and judgment pronounced and he was being advised by the community supervision officer as to the terms of" his community supervision. Ex parte Salinas, No. 03-08-00043-CR, 2009 WL 2410521, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 6, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). When overruling that claim and determining that the defendant's "allegations regarding the completeness and the timing of the admonitions regarding sex-offender registration do not show actions entitling him to habeas relief," this Court explained that trial courts are only required to substantially comply with the requirement obligating trial courts to admonish defendants about the need to comply with the sex-offender-registration requirements and that the failure to comply is not a permissible ground upon which the plea may be set aside. Id.; see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(h) (explaining that "[t]he failure to comply with Subsection (a)(5) is not a ground for the defendant to set aside the conviction, sentence, or plea").
In light of the authority above and the record before us and given that we have been pointed to no authority authorizing habeas relief under the facts of this case, we similarly conclude that any alleged error potentially resulting from a failure to provide Hernandez-Prado with the full terms and conditions of his community supervision before he entered his plea does not provide a basis upon which his plea may be set aside, particularly when he made no objection asserting that he had not been advised of the relevant terms and conditions during the hearing even though the district court instructed him that a violation of the terms of his community supervision would result in his guilt being adjudicated and his punishment being assessed.
For all of these reasons, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying his requested habeas relief on the grounds alleged by Hernandez-Prado, and we, therefore, overrule his second issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Hernandez-Prado's issues on appeal, we affirm the district court's order denying his application for writ of habeas corpus.
/s/_________
David Puryear, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field Affirmed Filed: May 26, 2016 Do Not Publish