CPLR 7503 (c) requires that an application to stay arbitration be made within 20 days after service of a notice of intention to arbitrate ( see Matter of Fiveco, Inc. v Haber, 11 NY3d 140, 144; Matter of Land of the Free v Unique Sanitation, 93 NY2d 942, 943; Matter of Steck [State Farm Inc. Co.], 89 NY2d 1082, 1084; Matter of Spychalski [Continental Ins. Cos]., 45 NY2d 847, 849). "Unless a party makes an application for a stay of arbitration within the statutory 20-day period, CPLR 7503 (c) generally precludes the party from objecting to the arbitration thereafter" ( Matter of Hermitage Ins. Co. v Escobar, 61 AD3d 869, 869; see Matter of Fiveco, Inc. v Haber, 11 NY3d at 144; Matter of Land of Free v Unique Sanitation, 93 NY2d at 943; Matter of Steck [State Farm Ins. Co.], 89 NY2d at 1084; Matter of State Farm Ins. Co. v Williams, 50 AD3d 807, 809).

An insurer that fails to seek a stay of arbitration within 20 days after being served with a demand to arbitrate a claim generally is precluded from thereafter objecting to the arbitration ( see Matter of Fiveco, Inc. v Haber, 11 NY3d 140, 144; Matter of Land of the Free v Unique Sanitation, 93 NY2d 942, 943; Matter of Steck [State Farm Ins. Co.], 89 NY2d 1082, 1084; Matter of Spychalski [Continental Ins. Cos.], 45 NY2d 847, 849; Matter of Hermitage Ins. Co. v Escobar, 61 AD3d 869). It is undisputed that the instant petition was filed more than 20 days after MetLife was served with Zampino's demand for arbitration.

The failure to move for a stay of arbitration within the statutory period will generally preclude objections to the arbitration after the expiration of that 20-day period ( see Matter of Fiveco, Inc. v Haber, 11 NY3d at 144; Matter of Land of the Free v Unique Sanitation, 93 NY2d at 943; Matter of Steck [State Farm Ins. Co.], 89 NY2d at 1084; Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Zacharoudis, 65 AD3d at 1354; Matter of Hermitage Ins. Co. v Escobar, 61 AD3d 869; Matter of State Farm Ins. Co. v Williams, 50 AD3d 807, 809). Here, once Urban served his notice of intention to arbitrate upon State Farm on December 26, 2008, the 20-day period for State Farm to move for a stay of the arbitration started to run and the subsequent service of the "Request for Arbitration" filed with the AAA did not reset the 20-day period ( see Matter of Government Empls. Ins. Co. v Castillo-Gomez, 34 AD3d 477).

Before: Mastro, J.P., Skelos, Eng and Roman, JJ., concur. Ordered that on the Court's own motion, the notice of appeal from so much of the order as granted the petition to the extent of directing a hearing is deemed an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order, and leave to appeal is granted ( see CPLR 5701; Matter of Hermitage Ins. Co. v Escobar, 61 AD3d 869; Matter of Standard Fire Ins. Co. v Mouchette, 47 AD3d 636); and it is further,

To be considered a valid notice of the intention to arbitrate, the notice must identify the agreement under which arbitration is sought and the name and address of the person serving the notice in addition to containing the statutory 20-day warning that failure to commence a proceeding to stay arbitration will preclude an objection to arbitration (see CPLR 7503[c]; Matter of Blamowski [Munson Transp.], 91 NY2d 190, 195 [1997]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Szwec, 36 AD2d 863, 321 NYS2d 800 [1971]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Urban, 78 AD3d 1064, 1065, 912 NYS2d 586, 587 [2d Dept 2010]). Unless a party makes an application for a stay of arbitration within the statutory 20-day period, CPLR 7503(c) generally precludes the party from objecting to the arbitration thereafter (see Hermitage Ins. Co. v Escobar, 61 AD3d 869, 869, 877 NYS2d 413, 414 [2d Dept 2009][internal citations omitted]).

To be considered a valid notice of the intention to arbitrate, the notice must identify the agreement under which arbitration is sought and the name and address of the person serving the notice in addition to containing the statutory 20-day warning that failure to commence a proceeding to stay arbitration will preclude an objection to arbitration (see CPLR 7503[c]; Matter of Blamowski [Munson Transp.], 91 NY2d 190, 195 [1997]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Szwec, 36 AD2d 863, 321 NYS2d 800 [1971]; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Urban, 78 AD3d 1064, 1065, 912 NYS2d 586. 587 [2d Dept 2010]). Unless a party makes an application for a stay of arbitration within the statutory 20-day period, CPLR 7503(c) generally precludes the party from objecting to the arbitration thereafter (see Hermitage Ins. Co. v Escobar, 61 AD3d 869, 869, 877 NYS2d 413, 414 [2d Dept 2009][internal citations omitted]). Here, it is undisputed that Progressive noticed its Petition within 20 days of Saez's demand for arbitration, on November 15, 2017, two days before the expiration of the statute of limitations on November 17, 2017, measured from the October 28, 2016 demand for arbitration.

In opposition, Andrea and Avraham point to the undisputed fact that pursuant to CPLR 7503(c), Geico's applications to stay arbitration were untimely served. CPLR 7503(c) mandates that an application to stay arbitration be made within 20 days after service of the demand for arbitration ( see Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Urban, 78 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2d Dept., 2010]; Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Zacharoudis, 65 AD3d 1353, 1353–1354 [2d Dept., 2009]; Matter of Hermitage Ins. Co. v. Escobar, 61 AD3d 869, 869–870 [2d Dept., 2009] ). As discussed above, Geico's petitions were not served within this 20–day period since they were belatedly served 56 and 74 days after service of the demands for arbitration against Andrea and Avraham, respectively.

In opposition, Andrea and Avraham point to the undisputed fact that pursuant to CPLR 7503 (c), Geico's applications to stay arbitration were untimely served. CPLR 7503 (c) mandates that an application to stay arbitration be made within 20 days after service of the demand for arbitration (see Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Urban, 78 AD3d 1064, 1065 [2d Dept., 2010]; Matter of Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v Zacharoudis, 65 AD3d 1353, 1353-1354 [2d Dept., 2009]; Matter of Hermitage Ins. Co. v Escobar, 61 AD3d 869, 869-870 [2d Dept., 2009]). As discussed above, Geico's petitions were not served within this 20-day period since they were belatedly served 56 and 74 days after service of the demands for arbitration against Andrea and Avraham, respectively.