Hergert Appeal

4 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Wetton

    538 Pa. 319 (Pa. 1994)   Cited 3 times
    Recognizing that Pennsylvania Constitution article V, section 16(c), which provides that " former or retired justice or judge may, with his consent, be assigned by the Supreme Court on temporary judicial service as may be prescribed by rule of the Supreme Court," allowed assignment of a senior justice to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court by the chief justice pursuant to court rules generally authorizing assignment to "any court"

    Article V, Section 2(a). Thus prudence dictates that the Court's general power to use senior judges when necessary "in the interest of justice" must be exercised with the highest regard for the Constitution's specific provisions as to the number and qualifications of the Court's members. Only in the most unusual of circumstances, such as the indefinite unavailability of a member of the Court, is it appropriate for the Court to assign a Senior Justice on temporary service to this Court. Having addressed the challenge to Mr. Justice Montemuro's assignment as a Senior Justice, we turn to the Appellants' argument that he could not participate as a Senior Justice in a case that had been argued during his term as an appointed Justice. The Appellants cite Hergert Appeal, 384 Pa. 544, 120 A.2d 888 (1956), and Yulis v. Borough of Ebensburg, 182 Pa. Super. 423, 128 A.2d 118 (1956), for the proposition that a judge's powers are extinguished at the expiration of his term, and while his findings may be adopted by the remaining judges of a court, a vote of a judge whose term has expired has no independent effect. In Yulis, a challenge was made to an opinion and decree dismissing motions for judgment n.o.v. and new trial prepared by the trial judge and filed after the expiration of his term.

  2. Breskman Motor Veh. Op. License Case

    233 A.2d 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967)   Cited 1 times

    The court below was without authority to reverse the Secretary's action on the ground that the period of suspension was excessive. The schedule of penalties by suspension for speeding violations adopted by the Secretary of Revenue was expressly approved by this court in Stout Motor Vehicle Operator License Case, 199 Pa. Super. 182, 184 A.2d 108. Nor was the action below justified on the ground that economic hardship would result: Hergert Appeal, 384 Pa. 544, 120 A.2d 888. While we agree with Mrs. Breskman's counsel that her excuse for speeding is "unique and unusual", we are not in accord with his contention that the Secretary of Revenue was guilty of an abuse of discretion. The order of the court below is reversed, and the order of the Secretary of Revenue is reinstated.

  3. Yulis v. Ebensburg Borough

    128 A.2d 118 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956)   Cited 12 times
    Summarizing the law with respect to municipal liability for sewer-related damages

    This same practice has since been followed by our Supreme Court. See Hergert Appeal, 384 Pa. 544, 547, 120 A.2d 888. Decree affirmed.

  4. Commonwealth v. Toole

    304 A.2d 177 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1973)   Cited 4 times

    In a case such as this, where testimony is taken de novo by a hearing judge and extenuating facts and circumstances such as an emergency are adequately supported by the testimony, our Supreme Court has held that the exercise of the hearing judge's discretion will not be disturbed. Commonwealth v. Emerick, 373 Pa. 388, 96 A.2d 370 (1953). See Hergert Appeal, 384 Pa. 544, 120 A.2d 888 (1956). Here the lower court found that the emergency arising from the bomb threat and Toole's belief that her presence was immediately necessary at the hospital constituted such mitigating circumstances as to justify reversing the suspension of Toole's license. There is certainly competent evidence in the record to support this decision, and we can find no basis, therefore, for questioning the lower court's discretion on this issue.