Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 08DV01566
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J.
Julie A. Herendeen obtained a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Walter C. Watson. Watson timely filed this appeal. We affirm.
Watson, a prison inmate appearing without counsel, has not provided this court with a reporter’s transcript of the hearing, and the clerk’s transcript does not contain a document he relies on to support his appeal. It is Watson’s burden, as the appellant, to provide this court with a record adequate to support his claims of error. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, § 628, pp. 704-706.) The fact he appears without counsel does not relieve him of the duty to follow legal procedures. (Dowden v. Superior Court (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 126, 129-130.) We briefly address his claims seriatim.
On June 10, 2008, Herendeen filed a petition for a DVRO, alleging that Watson had been her stepfather, and in 1989 he was convicted of molesting her when she was aged 7 to 15. She alleged he was now contacting her children by mail, with the aid of the children’s grandmother. She alleged this conduct was designed “to find some way to keep me in his control. He is still trying to take from me after all these years.”
On July 1, 2008, the trial court issued a five year DVRO after a hearing, in part forbidding Watson from contacting Herendeen’s children directly or through third parties. It also provides “Walter Watson is ordered not to have possession of any photographs of any of the protected parties.” The minute order notes some details of Watson’s convictions, including his 66-year prison sentence.
For completeness, we note that we previously affirmed Watson’s conviction and 66-year prison sentence. (People v. Watson (Mar. 29, 1991, C007023) [nonpub. opn.].)
Watson filed a timely appeal.
1. Watson claims that as a state prisoner, he showed good cause in his written request for a continuance, and the trial court violated due process by denying that motion. However, there is no continuance request in the clerk’s transcript, nor any official indication such a request was filed. There is a letter from Watson to the superior court clerk, claiming that he had filed a written request for a continuance, in which he purportedly had described being in “lock-down” and unable to respond to the petition. We conclude no continuance request was ever filed, and the claim the trial court improperly denied the continuance lacks support.
2. Watson contends the forms used to notify him of the hearing date violate due process because they do not explain what steps an incarcerated defendant must take in order to appear at the hearing, and that the statement on the notice that advises that a defendant can oppose a petition in writing was insufficient or misleading. A civil complaint does not advise a defendant how to defend a civil suit, the pleadings serve to advise a defendant of the allegations being raised. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a)(1).) The forms in this case did so. Watson provides no coherent argument or authority why this was insufficient to satisfy due process, and therefore we reject the claim. (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 (Paterno).)
Further, the record does not show what steps, if any, Watson actually took upon receipt of notice, apart from his unsupported claim that he filed a request for a continuance. The fact Watson failed to take appropriate steps to defend himself in this case does not establish a due process violation.
3. Watson contends his due process rights were violated because he was denied the ability to present “oral testimony, affidavit, cross complaint.” (Unnecessary capitalization omitted.) This appears to be hinged to his claim that the trial court should have continued the case. Again, there is nothing in the record to support Watson’s claim that he filed a continuance request.
Watson mentions authorities regarding cross-complaints in restraining order cases, but fails to provide any coherent explanation why that is relevant to his case. He did not file a cross-complaint, nor would the judgment in this case prevent him from doing so. For lack of coherent argument and authority, we do not address this portion of his brief further. (Paterno, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.)
4. Watson contends the temporary restraining order(TRO) issued without sufficient evidence of harassment. Issuance of the DVRO moots this claim. (Wilson v. Civil Service Com. (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 340, 343 [“entry of final judgment rendered the question of the right to interim relief moot”]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 174, pp. 249-250.) To the extent Watson makes claims not embraced by this heading, they are forfeited. (Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831, fn. 4.)
5. Watson contends there was no evidence of ongoing threatened injury sufficient to justify the DVRO. This is an appeal on the judgment roll. Absent a reporter’s transcript, we do not know what evidence was introduced and we must presume the evidence supports the order. (Estate of Kievernagel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1031 (Kievernagel).)
6. Watson contends Herendeen falsified documents and presented perjured testimony. This claim fails for the reason just stated: The record does not establish the use of perjured testimony or falsified evidence and we will not presume the trial court based its order on insufficient evidence. (Kievernagel, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 1031.) Watson relies on evidence attached as exhibits to his brief in support of his claim, but that evidence was not before the trial court and therefore may not be considered on appeal. (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, § 334, pp. 385-386.)
7. Watson contends his property was improperly seized by correctional officials executing the DVRO. As stated, the DVRO prohibits Watson from possessing photographs of Herendeen’s children. To the extent Watson contends prison officials exceeded the terms of the DVRO, the facts supporting such claim are not in the record. To the extent Watson argues the property restriction is invalid because the TRO did not mention a property restriction, he provides no authority for the proposition that the DVRO must contain the same terms as the TRO. For lack of coherent legal argument and authority, we reject the contention. (Paterno, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment issuing the DVRO is affirmed. Herendeen is awarded her costs of this appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
We concur: ROBIE, J. BUTZ, J.