For example, we may overturn a prior holding if we find it to be "clearly wrong"; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., 660; or when "the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic" require us to do so. Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955). "Lower courts, for example, are expected to respect the decisions of higher courts.

In evaluating the force of stare decisis, our case law dictates that we should be especially wary of overturning a decision that involves the construction of a statute. See Jolly, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, supra, 237 Conn. 196; General Electric Employees Federal Credit Union v. Zakrzewski, 235 Conn. 741, 744, 670 A.2d 274 (1996); Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 406, 636 A.2d 816 (1994); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 333-34, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990); Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 61-62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955). "When we construe a statute, we act not as plenary lawgivers but as surrogates for another policy maker, the legislature.

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) White v. Burns, supra, 213 Conn. 335; see Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 406, 636 A.2d 816 (1994) ("a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955) ("[a] court, when once convinced that it is in error, is not compelled to follow precedent"). Because "stare decisis is not a rule of law but a matter of judicial policy . . . it does not have the same kind of force in each kind of case so that adherence to or deviation from that general policy may depend upon the kind of case involved, especially the nature of the decision to be rendered that may follow from the overruling of a precedent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ozyck v. D'Atri, 206 Conn. 473, 483, 538 A.2d 697 (1988) ( Healey, J., concurring).

A court, when once convinced that it is in error, is not compelled to follow precedent. . . . If, however, stare decisis is to continue to serve the cause of stability and certainty in the law — a condition indispensable to any well-ordered system of jurisprudence — a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it. . . . This is especially true when the precedent involved concerns the interpretation or construction of a statute.' (Citations omitted.) Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 406, 636 A.2d 816 (1994); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335-36, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990)." (Emphasis added.)

" (citations omitted.) Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see Kluttz v. Howard, 228 Conn. 401, 406, 636 A.2d 816 (1994); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335-36, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990). In the circumstances of this case, we are not persuaded that the defendant has presented "the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic"; Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, supra, 142 Conn. 62; for overruling Staples.

Accordingly, "a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic require it. Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc., p. 226." Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see also State v. Somerville, 214 Conn. 378, 384-85, 572 A.2d 944 (1990); White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 335-36, 567 A.2d 1195 (1990). This is not such a case.

We have consistently held that "a court should not overrule its earlier decisions unless the most cogent reasons and inescapable logic requires it." Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955); see also State v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 435, 481 A.2d 56 (1984); Society for Savings v. Chestnut Estates, Inc., 176 Conn. 563, 570, 409 A.2d 1020 (1979). We have also recognized, however, that "[p]rinciples of law which serve one generation well may, by reason of changing conditions, disserve a later one," and that "[e]xperience can and often does demonstrate that a rule, once believed sound, needs modification to serve justice better."

There can be no doubt that "`[e]xperience can and often does demonstrate that a rule, once believed sound, needs modification to serve justice better. Ziman v. Whitley, 110 Conn. 108, 114, 147 A. 370; Napier v. Peoples Stores Co., 98 Conn. 414, 426, 120 A. 295;' Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, [ 142 Conn. 53, 62, 111 A.2d 4 (1955)]; see also Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212, 78 L.Ed. 369 (1933); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (Cardozo, J.)." Connecticut Junior Republic v. Sharon Hospital, 188 Conn. 1, 17-18, 448 A.2d 190 (1982).

Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed, 1941), p 1021. See, also, Pacific Meat Company v. Otagaki (1964), 47 Haw. 652, 653 ( 394 P.2d 618, 621); Herald Publishing Company v. Bill (1955), 142 Conn. 53, 56 ( 111 A.2d 4, 6); Bryarly v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 47, 51 ( 111 N.E.2d 277, 279). The attorney general asserts that the threat of criminal prosecution was not here sufficiently imminent to justify plaintiff's commencement of this action.

The plaintiffs respond to the ripeness argument by citing Herald Publishing Co. v. Bill, 142 Conn. 53, 111 A.2d 4 (1955), which, they argue, "makes it clear that the plaintiffs do not have to prove that they are presently treating a terminally-ill, mentally competent patient who has requested aid in dying for their claims to be ripe." (Plfs' Brief p. 13)