Hepler v. Ford Motor Co.

6 Citing cases

  1. Buehler v. Whalen

    41 Ill. App. 3d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 20 times

    We find that the amended complaint properly alleged the essential elements of a theory of strict liability in tort for a defective design. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182; Hepler v. Ford Motor Co., 27 Ill. App.3d 508, 327 N.E.2d 101. Ford further contends that under the "extraordinary collision facts" of the case at bar it had no duty to design its 1966 Ford Fairlane so as to prevent the burn injuries suffered by the plaintiffs.

  2. Broussard v. Houdaille Industries

    183 Ill. App. 3d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 15 times
    Stating that in warning cases, there must be sufficient evidence supporting a reasonable inference, rather than a guess, that the presence of adequate warnings would have prevented the plaintiff's injuries

    • 7 We find no causal relationship between the conduct of Surty in not providing a written instruction manual and the injuries sustained by Broussard. It is our view that the plaintiffs did not introduce any credible evidence from which it might be reasonably inferred that the condition of the product proximately caused Broussard's injuries. See Pedrick, 37 Ill.2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504; Hepler v. Ford Motor Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 508, 327 N.E.2d 101; Belleville National Savings Bank, 20 Ill. App.3d 707, 313 N.E.2d 631. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment entered below and remand this case to the circuit court of Cook County to enter judgment for the appellant Surty Manufacturing Co.

  3. Curry v. Louis Allis Co.

    427 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 25 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Affirming summary judgment for component part manufacturer, suggesting it would be "absurd" to hold the maker of a component part liable because the assembler of the overall device chose not to install safety devices offered and sold by the component part manufacturer

    32 Ill. App.3d 122, 336 N.E.2d 338, appeal denied (1976), 61 Ill.2d 602), and it is under no duty to make products incapable of causing any injury under any circumstance. ( Palmer v. Avco Distributing Co. (1980), 82 Ill.2d 211, 412 N.E.2d 959; Hunt v. Blasius (1978), 74 Ill.2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368.) Before plaintiff can recover he must prove that the product, in this case the motor and motor frame, was unreasonably dangerous; that the condition or defect was in the product when sold by the manufacturer, that the assembler made no substantial change in the motor or motor frame and that the injury was directly attributable to a condition or defect in the motor or motor frame itself ( Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals (1980), 81 Ill.2d 206, 407 N.E.2d 32; Bobka v. Cook County Hospital (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 351, 422 N.E.2d 999; Peterson v. B/W Controls, Inc. (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 1026, 366 N.E.2d 144; Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc. (1977), 49 Ill. App.3d 480, 364 N.E.2d 502; Hepler v. Ford Motor Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 508, 327 N.E.2d 101, appeal denied (1975), 60 Ill.2d 597), and an inference of defectiveness may not be drawn from the mere fact of injury. ( Huff v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co. (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 1091, 419 N.E.2d 561.) When defendants filed their motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was required to present some factual basis that would arguably entitle him to a judgment under the applicable law.

  4. Peterson v. B/W Controls, Inc.

    366 N.E.2d 144 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 20 times
    In Peterson v. B/W Controls, Inc. (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 1026, 366 N.E.2d 144, the court was faced with a claim by an electrician against the manufacturer of a relay switch where the plaintiff, an electrician, was injured when he touched an insufficiently insulated wire which was near the switch.

    • 1, 2 Illinois law of strict liability requires that the plaintiff allege and prove that his injuries were proximately caused by a condition or defect in the product; that the product was unreasonably dangerous; and, that the condition or defect existed when the product left the manufacturer's control. ( Neal v. Whirl Air Flow Corp. (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 266, 356 N.E.2d 1173; Hepler v. Ford Motor Co. (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 508, 327 N.E.2d 101; Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182.) Proving that an injury was caused by a dangerous condition of the product is not sufficient for recovery; the injury must be caused by an unreasonably dangerous condition of the product. ( Rios v. Niagara Machine Tool Works (1974), 59 Ill.2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232.)

  5. Hutter v. Badalamenti

    362 N.E.2d 114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 6 times

    In order to state a cause of action under the doctrine of strict liability, the plaintiff must allege that "[the] injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control." 32 Ill.2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188; see also Hepler v. Ford Motor Co., 27 Ill. App.3d 508, 327 N.E.2d 101. The grounds underlying the imposition of strict liability upon a manufacturer, as stated by Suvada are: (1) the public interest in human life and health; (2) the invitations and solicitations of the manufacturer to purchase the product; and (3) the justice of imposing the loss on the manufacturer who created the risk and reaped a profit by placing the product in the stream of commerce.

  6. Gillespie v. R.D. Werner Co.

    43 Ill. App. 3d 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 5 times

    The elements of proof required are the same whether the theory is one of strict liability or one of implied warranty. Bollmeier v. Ford Motor Co., 130 Ill. App.2d 844, 265 N.E.2d 212; Hepler v. Ford Motor Co., 27 Ill. App.3d 508, 327 N.E.2d 101; 1 American Law of Products Liability § 1:6 (2d ed. 1974). In the instant case there was no direct evidence of a prior defect in the ladder in question.