Opinion
No. M2001-02343-COA-R3-CV.
Filed March 4, 2003.
Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County; No. 01-1965-III; Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor.
Affirmed and Remanded.
Randy Hensley, Mountain City, Tennessee, Pro Se.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; and Dawn Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Ben H. Cantrell, P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which William B. Cain, J., joined. William C. Koch, Jr., J. filed a concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion.
OPINION
An inmate in a correctional institution sought a review of the punishment imposed by a disciplinary committee after finding that the inmate tested positive for drugs and attempted to alter a drug screen. The Chancery Court of Davidson County dismissed the petition for certiorari because the punishment alleged was not atypical or did not result in significant hardship to the petitioner. Therefore, the petition did not state a claim on which relief could be granted. We affirm.
I.
Randy Hensley filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on June 20, 2001, alleging that while he was incarcerated at the Northeastern Correctional Complex in Mountain City, he was accused of failing a drug test and attempting to bring pressure on the laboratory to falsify the results. Following a hearing, the disciplinary committee found him guilty of both infractions and gave him five days in punitive segregation, took away his visitation privileges for six months, took away his package privileges for six months, charged him seventeen dollars for the drug test, and fined him four dollars. According to the petition, the petitioner's urine sample got mixed up with someone else's and that several actions taken at his hearing deprived him of a fair hearing.
The Department of Corrections moved to dismiss under Tenn. R.Civ.P. 12.02(6), for failure to state a claim. The trial judge granted the motion.
II.
This court has held that the statutory writ of certiorari is not available to review actions of a prison disciplinary proceeding. Buford v. Tennessee Department of Correction, No. M1998-00157-COA-R3-CV, slip op. at 8 (Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. 10, 1999). The trial judge so held in this case and we affirm that holding on appeal.
Under the common law writ the courts are only interested in whether the lower tribunal acted arbitrarily, illegally, or in excess of its jurisdiction. Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994). In this case there is no allegation that the disciplinary committee acted arbitrarily or exceeded its jurisdiction. In fact, the petitioner attached to the petition copies of the record showing that he was notified of the charges against him on May 18, 2001, that he was given a hearing on May 30, 2001, and that the findings of the committee were based on evidence offered at the hearing.
Therefore, the only allegation that would justify issuing the writ is the petitioner's allegation that the hearing was fundamentally unfair and deprived him of his right to due process. In order to prevail with this claim, the petitioner must demonstrate that the conduct of the prison officials has imposed atypical and significant hardships on him that are not ordinarily incident to prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
Although the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Sandin v. Conner seems to preclude Mr. Hensley's exercise of due process rights in regard to punitive segregation and other conditions of his confinement, two recent decisions by this court have held that inmates are entitled to due process in disciplinary proceedings before they can be deprived of a protected property interest. Hedges v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, No. M2002-00140-COA-R3-CV and Jeffries v. Tennessee Dept. of Correction, No. M2001-02300-COA-R3-CV (both filed December 31, 2002). Thus, Mr. Hensley might have been entitled to prevail on his due process argument in regard to the $17 charge for the drug test and the $4 fine. But he did not raise that issue at trial or on appeal, and thus we need not consider it.
The petitioner does not argue that the punishment handed down is atypical or unduly harsh in a prison setting. Nor does he argue that the punishment was inconsistent with applicable prison regulations. He does assert, however, that his prison discipline may have a catastrophic effect on his chances for parole. But the fact that the disciplinary proceedings may have a negative implication on his chances for parole is insufficient to create a liberty interest protected by due process. See McGowan v. Vance, No. 99-5975, slip op. at 5-6 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2000); Drummer v. Luttrell, 75 F. Supp.2d 796, 802 (W.D.Tenn. 1999).
The judgment of the court below is affirmed and the cause is remanded to the Chancery Court of Davidson County for any further proceedings necessary. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant, Randy Hensley.
I concur in affirming the dismissal of Mr. Hensley's certiorari petition in this case. I disagree, however, with the court's footnoted conclusion that Mr. Hensley has not raised the issue of whether he was deprived of property without due process of law.
I.
The trial court resolved this case by granting the Department of Correction's Tenn. R.Civ.P. 12.02(6) motion. This motion tests the legal sufficiency of the petitioner's complaint. Doe v. Sundquist, 2 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tenn. 1999). It requires the courts to look at a complaint's substance rather than its form, Kaylor v. Bradley, 912 S.W.2d 728, 731 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995), and to determine whether the complaint contains a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. We particularly look past matters of form when reviewing the pleadings of pro se litigants. Winchester v. Little, 996 S.W.2d 818, 824 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1998).
Mr. Hensley alleges that the prison disciplinary board failed to accord him due process of law. Specifically, he alleges that he was convicted of testing positive for marijuana use based on a faulty drug screening procedure. According to Mr. Hensley, the corrections officer who took his urine sample mishandled it and allowed it to become confused with another prisoner's urine sample. He also alleges that the board (1) placed him in punitive segregation, (2) ordered him to pay a $22.00 drug test fee, and (3) fined him $4.00. The drug testing fee and the fine implicated a property interest sufficient to sustain a due process challenge to the disciplinary procedure. Jeffries v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., No. M2001-02300-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31890879, at *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec. 31, 2002) perm. app. filed (Tenn. Jan. 30, 2003).
Prisoners state a due process claim by alleging that a prison disciplinary board imposed monetary sanctions on them as the result of a proceeding that failed "to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law." Hedges v. Tennessee Dep't of Corr., No. M2002-00140-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31890869, at *6 (Tenn.Ct.App. Dec. 31, 2002) (Cottrell, J., concurring). Convicting a prisoner for drug use based on another prisoner's blood or urine sample would clearly amount to a failure to proceed according to the essential requirements of the law. Because this is exactly what Mr. Hensley alleged happened, I find that he has stated a claim for deprivation of property without due process of law.
II.
Concluding that Mr. Henley's petition states a claim for which relief can be granted does not end the matter. When the Department moved to dismiss his petition, Mr. Hensley responded by filing selected portions of the record of the disciplinary hearing, along with copies of the Department's procedural rules and regulations governing inmate testing for drugs and alcohol. The record fails to reflect whether the trial court considered or disregarded these materials. Had the trial court considered these materials, the Department's motion to dismiss should have been converted to a motion for summary judgment. Wilson v. Sentence Info. Servs., No. M1998-00939-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 422966, *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. Apr. 26, 2001) (No Tenn.R.App.P. 11 application filed).
The Department's internal policies contain detailed instructions regarding the collection and handling of urine samples. They state that the failure of the Department or an affiliated private contractor to follow these procedures "shall not constitute a reason for the dismissal of test results." Tenn. Dep't Corr. Policy No. 506.21(VI)(D)(14) (2000). Thus, while prisoners may challenge the evidentiary weight of the test results of a mishandled urine sample, the disciplinary board ultimately has the prerogative to consider the test results for whatever they may be worth.
The materials Mr. Hensley submitted to the trial court show that the disciplinary board allowed Mr. Hensley, through his inmate advisor, to challenge the result of his urinalysis by questioning the corrections officers who conducted the test and handled the sample. The board evidently decided to put confidence in the lab report. Thus, Mr. Hensley's argument, reduced to its essence, is that the board erred by accrediting the officer's testimony regarding the urine sample. This argument is nothing more than a challenge to the intrinsic correctness of the board's decision which is not the sort of relief a common-law writ of certiorari can provide. Arnold v. Tennessee Bd. of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Tenn. 1997); Powell v. Parole Eligibility Review Bd., 879 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1994).
I would affirm the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Hensley's petition on this basis.