Opinion
3:21-cv-184
01-25-2023
JOSEPH HENSLEY, Plaintiff v. JONATHAN MCCAULLEY, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No. 90]
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 90] be granted.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Joseph Hensley, an inmate formerly incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (SCI-Houtzdale), initiated this pro se civil rights action on October 20, 2021. See ECF No. 1. In his Second Amended Complaint - the operative pleading in this action - Hensley alleges violations of the First and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. See ECF No. 76. As Defendants, Hensley has identified former Secretary of Corrections John Wetzel, Superintendent of SCI-Houtzdale Barry Smith, and four other Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) employees: Unit Manager Jonathan McCaulley, counselor Kyle Boozer, psychologist Brenda Lee Dubler, and therapeutic activities worker Jason Bainey. Id. Although he invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Hensley does not request any relief. Id.,
Hensley has since been transferred to SCI-Huntingdon. ECF Nos. 102-103.
B. Factual background
The following allegations of Hensley's complaint are accepted as true for purposes of this motion. According to Hensley, "[t]he whole time [he] has been housed on the Special Needs Unit and Residential Treatment Unit, Defendants have been driving [him] to hurt himself." ECF No. 76 ¶ 8. Hensley contends that McCaulley, Boozer, Bainey, and Dubler keep telling him that "he is everyone's problem and everything is his fault." Id. When he reports this mistreatment to Smith and Wetzel, he "gets screamed at" and experiences unspecified retaliation. Id. Defendants "refuse to review the cameras when Plaintiff tells them that it is a witness" and "constantly say Plaintiff is lying." Hensley does not provide any additional details as to how or when any of these vaguely alleged events occurred but claims that he is "to the point that he's going to succeed at suicide." Id. at p. 4.
In addition, Hensley accuses a non-Defendant, Dr. Bloom, of discontinuing his mental health medications. Id. Hensley avers, without explanation, that Defendants "refuse to speak up to Dr. Bloom." Id. He also claims that "inmate Frede keeps trying to force him to be his boyfriend and trying to grab his genitals" but that unidentified Defendants "say he's got the mind of a child and say I can't PREA him." Id.
Finally, Hensley accuses McCaulley, Boozer, Bainey, and Dubler of retaliating against him by "tak[ing] certain inmates to their offices and show what Plaintiff filed." Id. ¶ 9. Hensley maintains that this makes him feel unsafe. Id.
Presently pending before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss. ECF No. 90. Despite receiving an extension of time to respond, Hensley failed to do so. See ECF No. 113.
C. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, 'because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, 'where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of tolerance").
D. Analysis
1. Personal involvement
Defendants first contend that dismissal is warranted because Hensley has failed to plead any facts to establish that any Defendant had personal involvement in any misconduct. It is axiomatic that a § 1983 plaintiff "must show that each and every defendant was 'personally] involve[d]' in depriving him of his rights." Kirk v. Roan, 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This means that each defendant must have played an "affirmative part" in the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 ("In a § 1983 suit... [a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct."); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed.Appx. 297, 300 (3d Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant played a role in depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g., Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) because the plaintiffs had failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that certain defendants had played an affirmative part in the alleged Eighth Amendment violation).
These principles apply with equal force where the defendants are supervising prison officials. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that liability for supervisory officials must still be based on "personal involvement in the alleged wrongs"); Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) ("[Liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior."). Although a supervisor cannot encourage constitutional violations, "a supervising public official has [no] affirmative constitutional duty to supervise and discipline so as to prevent violations of constitutional rights by his or her subordinates." Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133 (3d Cir. 1986); Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1120 (3d Cir. 1990). Moreover, it is "well established that the filing of a grievance is not sufficient to show the actual knowledge necessary for a defendant to be found personally involved in the alleged unlawful conduct." Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776, 782 (W.D. Pa. 2013). See also Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement."). Rather, a supervisor-defendant may only be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates if the supervisor either: (1) with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm; or (2) participated in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cty. Juvenile Det. Or., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).
In the instant case, Hensley's only factual averment regarding the supervisory Defendants, Wetzel and Smith, is that neither took any action when informed of the misconduct by McCaulley, Boozer, Bainey, and Dubler. Based on this allegation, it is apparent that Hensley is attempting to hold Wetzel and Smith responsible for the unconstitutional actions of other individuals based entirely upon their supervisory role in the prison system and their response to his complaint. As described above, this type of averment is insufficient to establish personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Mincy v. Chmielsewski, 508 Fed.Appx. 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2013) ("[A]n officer's review of, or failure to investigate, an inmate's grievances generally does not satisfy the requisite personal involvement."); Kloss v. SCI-Albion, 2018 WL 4609144, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2018) (allegation that supervisory defendant was "made aware of several issues of the plaintiffs and .. . failed to help him" is insufficient to state a claim for reliefs) participation in an administrative appeal process); Rogers v. United States, 696 F.Supp.2d 472, 488 (W.D. Pa. 2010) ("If a grievance official's only involvement is investigating and/or ruling on an inmate's grievance after the incident giving rise to the grievance has already occurred, there is no personal involvement on the part of that official").
As to the non-supervisory Defendants, Hensley alleges only that they have been "driving him to harm himself by telling him that he's "everyone's problem and the world would be better without him." ECF No. 76 at p. 4. However, Hensley has failed to articulate such basic facts as when and where these events took place or which Defendant made any particular offending comment. "Alleging a mere hypothesis that an individual defendant had personal. . . involvement in depriving the plaintiff of his rights is insufficient to establish personal involvement." Gannaway v Prime Care Medical, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511, 526-27 (E.D. pa. 2015) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208). This is particularly true where the plaintiffs allegations implicate multiple Defendants but fail to delineate individual conduct. See Van Tassel v. Piccione, 608 Fed.Appx. 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that "non-specific allegations" that a group of defendants violated the plaintiffs rights "failed to allege facts upon which liability could be based for each of those defendants").
In short, Hensley has failed to allege the personal involvement of any Defendant in the deprivation of a constitutional right. This alone warrants dismissal.
2. Failure to state a claim
a. Eighth Amendment claims
Even if Hensley's claims were better articulated as to such basic facts as time and place, they fall well short of stating a claim for relief. Initially, Hensley's pleading appears to assert an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against McCaulley, Boozer, Bainey, and Dubler based on their verbally abusive conduct in telling him that he's "everyone's problem," "everything is his fault," and "the world would be better without him." ECF No. 76 at pp. 3-4. It is well settled, however, "that verbal harassment of a prisoner, although deplorable, does not violate the Eighth Amendment." Robinson v. Taylor, 204 Fed.Appx. 155, 156 (3d Cir. 2006). See also Lindsey v. O'Connor, 327 Fed.Appx. 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Verbal harassment of a prisoner, although distasteful, does not violate the Eighth Amendment."); Booth v. King, 228 Fed.Appx. 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2007) ("Absent any allegation of physical harm, the defendants' verbal threats do not amount to a constitutional violation."); DeFranco v. Miller, 2021 WL 6498250, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 6037580 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2021) (collecting cases for the proposition that "verbal threats or taunts, without more, are not sufficiently adverse to violate the Constitution."). Hensley's allegations plainly run afoul of this principle.
To state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety; and (3) the prison officials' deliberate indifference caused him harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Hensley next claims that a non-Defendant, Dr. Bloom, improperly discontinued his psychiatric medications. The only link between this claim and any named Defendant is Hensley's general averment that "Defendants . . . refuse[d] to speak up to Dr. Bloom." ECF No. 76 at p. 4. To the extent that this vague allegation is intended to support of a claim for deliberate indifferent to his serious mental health needs, the Court cannot locate anything in Hensley's pleading to suggest that any of the named Defendants were aware of Dr. Bloom's decision or had the authority to override Dr. Bloom's medical judgment. Dismissal is warranted.
To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that demonstrate: (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Finally, Hensley alleges that another inmate "keeps trying to force him to be his boyfriend and trying to grab his genitals" but that unidentified Defendants "say he's got the mind of a child and [that Hensley] can't PREA him." ECF No. 76 at 4. Again, Hensley has failed to supply any meaningful details - the who, what, when, and where of his claim - to support a plausible entitlement for relief. Absent such pertinent details, his claim must be dismissed.
For example, Hensley has not articulated such basic facts as when the incident with the other inmate occurred, who he reported it to, what action, if any, was taken, or even whether the other inmate's overtures resulted in any physical contact or injury.
b. First Amendment retaliation
In addition to his Eighth Amendment claims, Hensley avers that Defendants engaged in unlawful retaliation by "tak[ing] certain inmates to their offices and show[ing] what Plaintiff filed. This makes plaintiff unsafe." ECF No. 76 ¶ 9. Hensley also alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he experienced unidentified retaliation from Defendants after "reporting issues." Id. at p. 3.
To establish a claim for retaliation, an inmate must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) that an adverse action was taken against him by a prison official; and (3) that there is a causal connection between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action. Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003). Even assuming Hensley engaged in constitutionally protected conduct when he "reported] issues" to prison officials, his generic and conclusory allegations still fall well short of the pleading requirement, particularly with respect to his failure to allege any sort of adverse action. This pleading deficiency is fatal.
The Court can locate no caselaw holding that a prison official violates an inmate's rights simply by allowing other inmates to "[see] what Plaintiff filed." ECF No. 76 ¶ 9. In any event, it is entirely unclear what filings Hensley is referring to or why showing them to other inmates caused him to fear for his safety. To the extent that some threat of harm might be implied - for example, if the filings in question accused those other inmates of misconduct or could be characterized as "snitching" - Hensley has failed to connect those dots in his pleading.
E. Leave to amend
The Court of Appeals has instructed that if a civil rights complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court should permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). This instruction is equally applicable to pro se litigants and those represented by counsel. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
Based on the well-established legal principles discussed above, it is recommended that Hensley be given one additional opportunity to amend his complaint. While Hensley has already filed two amended pleadings, he has not yet had the opportunity to take corrective action in response to an order from the Court identifying the fatal deficiencies in his claims. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court recommends that Hensley be provided that opportunity.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 90] be granted but that Plaintiff be provided one additional opportunity to amend his pleading within a reasonable time following the adoption of this Report and Recommendation.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Bhghtwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).