Opinion
1:22-cv-241 Erie
05-16-2023
JOSEPH HENSLEY, Petitioner v. KLEINFELTER, Respondent
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 19]
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Respondents' Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 19] be granted.
II. Report
A. Background
Petitioner Joseph Hensley, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon (SCI-Huntingdon), initiated this action on July 29, 2022, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). ECF No. 6. Petitioner is challenging the judgment of sentence imposed upon him by the Court of Common Pleas of Warren County in CP-62-CR-528-2015, after he pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated indecent assault of a victim under age 16 in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a)(8). See ECF No. 20-1 at pp. 338, 370-71. Petitioner raises a single ground for relief, arguing that he is mentally incompetent based on his “ADHD, ADD, ODD, Pervasive Development Disorder, Anxiety, Depression, PTSD, Autism, [and] Borderline Personality Disorder.” ECF No. 6 at p. 5. Petitioner does not offer any supporting facts, legal argument, or specific details concerning his claim. Id.
On November 10, 2022, Respondents filed the instant motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. ECF No. 19. Respondents maintain that the petition is untimely, unexhausted, and meritless. Id. Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss on December 1, 2022. ECF No. 25. This matter is ripe for adjudication.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
B. Analysis
Respondents first contend that the amended petition is untimely under AEDPA, which generally requires a state prisoner to file a federal habeas petition within one year after his or her conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Thompson v. Adm'r N.J. State Prison, 701 Fed.Appx. 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2017). A state-court criminal judgment becomes “final” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1) at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking such review. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, the filing of a post-conviction relief petition may statutorily toll (i.e., suspend) the running of the one-year habeas limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.”). Thus, in analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the “trigger date” for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). See Caldwell v. Mahally, et al., 5741706, *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019). Second, the court must determine whether any “properly filed” applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Id. Third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented. Id.
Turning first to the “trigger date,” the record indicates that the trial court denied Petitioner's post-sentence motion on December 8, 2016, and Petitioner did not appeal. ECF No. 20-1 at p. 92. As such, his sentence became “final” (and the one-year AEDPA clock began to run) thirty days later, on January 9, 2017, when the time to appeal expired. See Pa. R. Crim. P. 720(a)(2)(A) (“If the Defendant files a timely post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be filed . . . within 30 days of the entry of the order deciding the motion.”). See also Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
On February 8, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 9545, et seq. (“PCRA petition”). ECF No. 20-1 at pp. 97-106. As of that date, 30 days of the AEDPA clock had expired. The PCRA court denied Petitioner's petition on June 22, 2018, and he did not appeal. Id. at pp. 181, 217-53. As noted above, Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a “properly filed” state post-conviction proceeding. Because Petitioner's PCRA petition was “properly filed,” the statute of limitations was tolled until July 22, 2018, when the time for Petitioner to appeal the denial of his PCRA petition to the Superior Court expired. See Pa. R.A.P. 903; Swartz, 204 F.3d at 423. At that point, Petitioner had 335 days remaining (365 days - 30 days = 365 days) in which to file a timely habeas petition, or until approximately April 23, 2019. His petition, filed on July 26, 2022, missed that mark by over three years.
Before dismissing the petition as untimely, the Court must consider whether AEDPA's statute of limitations should be equitably tolled. See Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 134 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003) (citing Miller v. New Jersey State Dep't of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 617-618 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted)). To receive the benefit of equitable tolling, Petitioner must demonstrate that he: (1) pursued his rights diligently, and (2) extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. Petitioner bears a “strong burden to show specific facts” supporting equitable tolling. Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Although sparsely articulated, Petitioner appears to contend in the instant case that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he has a learning disability and his counsel “abandoned him.” ECF No. 25 at p. 1. However, Petitioner has made no attempt to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that his case presents the “rare situation” where equitable tolling “is demanded by sound legal principles [and] the interests of justice.” Martin v. Adm'r N.J. State Prison, 23 F.4th 261, 272 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting source omitted). Initially, he has failed to submit any evidence to support a finding that he acted with reasonable diligence. The record contains no evidence - such as letters to counsel or inquiries to the state courts - that Petitioner actively sought to monitor the status of his PCRA appeal. See Pennington v. Tice, 365 F.Supp.3d 579, 586 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2019) (“Although he knew he would have only a couple of weeks remaining to file a timely federal petition once his appeal was denied, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner contacted anyone for more than four months to inquire about its status.”). Under these circumstances, the Court is unable to conclude that Petitioner diligently pursued his rights. See, e.g., LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that equitable tolling was not warranted where Petitioner “did not attempt to ascertain from his attorney” whether a timely petition had been filed and noting the obligation “to make an occasional status inquiry”).
Nor has he made any attempt to demonstrate that exceptional circumstances barred him from filing a timely petition. Although he contends, without explanation, that his attorney “abandoned him,” it is well-settled that, “in a non-capital case such as [Petitioner's], attorney error is not a sufficient basis for equitable tolling of AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations.” Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 76 (3d Cir. 2004). See also LaCava, 398 F.3d at 278 (noting that “attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes have not been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary' circumstances required for equitable tolling” in non-capital cases). While courts have acknowledged that “an attorney's affirmative misrepresentation to his client” might create “a situation appropriate for tolling,” there is no evidence that this type of malfeasance occurred here. Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999).
In short, Petitioner has failed to present any specific facts supporting the application of equitable tolling. As a result, federal review of Petitioner's § 2254 petition is barred by AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. Moreover, because Respondents' timeliness defense is clearly dispositive, the Court need not consider whether Petitioner's claims are also procedurally defaulted.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Respondents' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 19] be GRANTED.
IV. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA provides that “an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court” unless “a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. at § 2253(c)(2). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because jurists of reason would not find it debatable that Petitioner's claims are untimely, the Court should not issue a certificate of appealability.
V. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).